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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 General introduction 
1.1.1 Climate change and forestry 
Today, the planet experiences severe challenges related to climate change due to greenhouse 
gas emissions and ecosystem deterioration. Climate change is a predominant global issue. 
Since the early 1990s, global climate negotiations take place in which nearly all countries 
meet annually under the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to 
discuss measures and policies for combating climate change issues. But also outside the 
UNFCCC there are multiple global efforts at cooperation in creating strategies for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. The forestry sector in particular plays an important role in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation because forests absorb large quantities of CO2 
every year (Canadell and Raupach, 2008; Bonan, 2008; FAO, 2011). Forestry can also 
contribute positively to the ecosystem; moreover, forestry provides products and services to 
improve rural livelihoods and society (FAO, 2011; FAO, 2012). Hence, in addition to carbon 
sequestration, forests also provide economic, environmental, and sociocultural benefits 
(Canadell and Raupach, 2008; Bonan, 2008).  
Several important international schemes are being implemented in developing 
countries to promote forest protection and afforestation. In order to combat climate change, 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism-Afforestation/Reforestation 
(CDM-AR) initiative, several projects have already paved the way for greenhouse gas 
mitigation through afforestation and reforestation in voluntary carbon markets (Zomer et al., 
2008). Another important global mechanism supporting forestry projects is the so-called 
REDD+ program (the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries), whose rules and principles 
were negotiated and agreed upon by the international community. To date, more than four 
billion dollars have been given to support REDD+ activities in developing countries, which 
have in turn announced ambitious targets for emission reductions in the forestry sector (UNEP, 
2010). Hence, generating appropriate policies and incentives to implement afforestation and 
reforestation projects is significant for combating climate change (Torres et al., 2010).  
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Currently, developing countries are a crucial part of global forest conservation and 
ecosystem services provisioning because the majority of tropical forests are located in 
developing countries. However, developing countries still depend on resource-based 
economic development to meet their peoples’ basic needs, which means that the process of 
forest conservation is not easy. Forestry conservation programs in developing countries have a 
major impact on small farmers’ livelihoods, especially forest-dependent farmers. The 
objective of poverty alleviation is challenging and critical for smallholders in complicated 
forestry systems. In forestry conservation programs, understanding the smallholder’s interests, 
incentives and forestry practices is significant to set pro-poor targets and to ensure that the 
large number of indigenous people in developing countries benefit from these programs. 
Moreover, as many developing countries experience decentralization in forestry sectors 
(Dahal et al. 2011), the roles of local communities and smallholders are rendered increasingly 
important in forestry management and governance. 
The Chinese government is paying great attention to climate change and the 
development of green and sustainable economic development strategies. The forestry sector 
plays an important role in low carbon transitions and climate mitigation in China. In addition 
to being a carbon sink, the Chinese government indicates that the forestry sector also has 
other benefits, such as the promotion of biodiversity, ecological conservation, and the 
improvement of rural livelihoods by increasing farmers’ incomes (SFA, 2009a).  
1.1.2 General background of the forestry sector in China 
Chinese forestry development  
China’s forests cover 195.45 million hectares, 20.36% of its total territory (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2012). Although China’s forests account for 5.12% of the world’s total 
forest area, ranking fifth behind Russia, Brazil, Canada and the United States, its per capita 
forest area is quite low, only 25% of the world’s average per capita forest area (FAO, 2011). 
Society’s demand for timber and non-timber forestry products still imposes enormous 
pressure on China’s forest resources. Triggered by the demand for forestry products and 
several ecological conservation projects from the late 1970s onward, China’s forest still 
extends across almost all provinces (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). China has 
invested a great deal of effort to develop tree plantations to increase its forest resources for 
both ecological purposes and economic interests. In 2011, the plantation area reached about 6 
million hectares, an increase of 1.47% over 2010 (SFA, 2012a). After years of afforestation, 
China has the largest area of forest plantation in the world (FAO, 2011).  
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Figure 1.1 shows the development in the area of natural forests and man-made forests 
from 1973 to 2008. According to Figure 1.1, the area of natural and man-made forests 
decreased from 1977 to 1981 because of the forestland reform at the end of the 1970s; after 
that, the areas of both types of forests increased gradually due to the significant efforts in 
forest conservation and afforestation. In 2008, natural forests (accounting for 65.99% of the 
total forest area) reached 1.2 million hectares, a 0.3 million hectare increase from their lowest 
point in 1981 (SFA, 2009b). Man-made forests (accounting for 34.01% of the total forest area) 
reached 0.62 million hectares, a 0.4 million hectare increase from 1981. In 2008, economic 
forests,
1
 an important subset of man-made forests, covered 0.2 million hectares, 31.59% of 
the total area of man-made forests. In conclusion, these statistics show the major 
achievements in Chinese forest protection and afforestation efforts in the last 30 years.  
 
Figure 1.1: Area of natural and man-made forestsa from 1973 to 2008 (Unit: 10,000 hectares) 
 
Source: State Forestry Administration (2009a)  
a Natural forests refer to forests with natural origins ; man-made forests refer to the area of stable growing forests, 
planted manually or by airplanes (FAO, 2010; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012) 
 
Priority Forestry Programs overview 
Since 1998, the Chinese central government has consolidated old programs and initiated new 
programs in the area of ecological restoration and resource development in the forestry sector 
and renamed them collectively as “Priority Forestry Programs” (PFPs). These include the 
Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP); the Sloping Land Conservation Program (SLCP), 
also known as the ‘Grain for Green’ program; the Desertification Combating Program around 
                                                   
1 Economic forests refer to forests that mainly produce fruits, nuts, oil, beverages, indigents, raw materials and 
medicinal materials. 
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Beijing and Tianjin (DCBT); the Shelterbelt Development Program (SBDP); the Wildlife 
Conservation and Nature Reserve Development Program (WCNR); and the Industrial Timber 
Plantation Program (ITPP) (Liu et al., 2010; SFA, 2003, 2004; Priority Forestry Programs 
socio-economic assessment team, 2003). More specifically, NFPP conserved natural forest by 
completely banning logging in the upper Yangtze and middle Yellow River areas and by 
promoting afforestation and forest management wherever possible. The SLCP contains a 
subsidized conversion of cropland to ecological and/or economic forest and grassland. The 
DCBT uses flexible measures to convert desertificated land into forestland and grassland. The 
SBDP contributes to shelterbelt development and tree planting in the north and in several 
important river basins. The WCNR creates protected reserves with the sponsorship of the 
central and local governments and encourages international participation and the involvement 
of the private sector. The ITPP attempts to increase the domestic timber supply through 
government funding, financial support and credit provisions with the participation of state and 
collectively owned entities including community, private and shareholder-based entities. The 
implementation of PFPs has played an important role in increasing the forest area (see Figure 
1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2: Annual afforestation area of the Priority Forestry Programs (2000-2011) (Unit: 
thousand hectares). 
Source: 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012) 
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The afforestation by PFPs is dramatic, accounting for 62.1% and 51.6% of the total 
amount of plantation in 2010 and 2011, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2012). Among the six programs, the SLCP contributed the highest proportion of afforestation 
area, with the NFPP, SBDP and DCBT falling in the middle. The ITPP’s scale is low 
compared to the others, but it also planted over 20 thousand hectares in 2009. In conclusion, 
the success of the six large scale PFPs proved that they have indeed provided incentives to 
plant more trees and increase the forest coverage area in the last decade. PFPs are a top-down 
initiative, and the lion’s share of their financing, such as the subsidies for the SLCP and NFPP, 
comes from the central government. The programs are mainly under the responsibility of the 
State Forestry Administration (SFA), which works in cooperation with local governments and 
stakeholders. Although one objective of the programs is poverty alleviation, participating 
farmers have seen only moderate income increases (Xu et al., 2006; Liang, 2012). Finally, the 
weak cooperation between the SFA and other government sectors and the limited 
market-based mechanisms are often mentioned as factors that prevented even more successful 
afforestation (Xu et al., 2006). 
Source of forestry investment  
The source of funding for forestry investment is presented in Figure 1.3. In 2011, the total 
funding for forestry investment increased dramatically to 274.4 billion yuan, of which the 
state budget accounted for 47.45% and foreign investment accounted for 0.83% (SFA, 2012a). 
Moreover, according to Figure 1.3, the state budget’s proportion has increased rapidly, 
especially between 2010 and 2011. Foreign investment and other funds increased gradually 
from 2000 to 2011. In 2011, foreign investment funded 272 forestry projects, while the actual 
amount of foreign investment (including loans, direct investment, and free aid) reached 1.7 
million dollars, a 159% increase over the previous year (SFA, 2012a). In summary, budget 
allocation from the central government remains the main source of funding. Simultaneously, 
foreign investors and individuals also gradually increased their investment in Chinese 
reforestation efforts. 
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Figure 1.3: Source of annual funds for forestry investment
a
 (2000-2011) (Unit: Billion Yuan)  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011, 2012) and SFA (2012a) 
a Funds from the state budget consist of budgetary appropriations and loans from the state budget; Domestic 
loans refer to loans of various forms originating from banks and non-bank financial agencies; Foreign investment 
includes overseas funds, including foreign borrowing and foreign direct investment; Self-raised funds refer to 
extra-budgetary funds contributed by investing units from central government ministries, local government, 
enterprises and agencies.  
 
Forestry administration and tenure reform 
Forestry governance in China is a complex mix of governmental political systems and 
forestland property rights systems. In China, the political system generally consists of five 
levels of government: central, provincial, city, county and township. Each level of 
government contains organs, such as councils, commissions, ministries and administrations. 
Agencies are fragmented by function as well as by rank, meaning that each ministry sits atop 
a functionally-defined hierarchy of government units that exist at each territorial level of 
government (Lieberthal, 2000; Lieberthal, 2004, pp.177-178). The SFA is at the top of a 
hierarchy of forestry departments made up of five-level units; but there are no township 
forestry stations in areas where forestry is not the main industry. Thus, each specialized organ 
has two potential masters: the highest level of government at its own territorial level, and the 
office in the same functional sphere one level up in the territorial hierarchy (Lieberthal, 2000). 
In addition to the formal political system, the administrative village and natural village 
(hamlet) also make up important informal parts of the governance structure beneath the 
township level. The administrative village is the lowest level in the government hierarchy, 
11 
 
although it is not a formal level of government (Zhang et al., 2004). In China, an 
“administrative village” (xingzhencun) is an administrative entity for several “natural 
villages” (zirancun). While the administrative village is headed by a village council, the 
natural village does not form part of the formal political structure. Since 2003, the Chinese 
central government has begun a reform of forestland rights that distributes the user rights of 
collective forestland to individual households. Individual households’ user rights for 
collective forestland then are devolved through a lease contract (Liang, 2012). In general, the 
collective forestland is required to be distributed to each household, but if a majority of the 
villagers in the natural village agree, other management regimes such as collective 
management and contracts to other private sector entities are also allowed. As a result of the 
devolution, multiple forestry management practices under various tenure regimes exist, 
involving a diverse range of actors (SFA, 2009b). In conclusion, after the reform, forestry 
resource management has been complicated down to the lowest level of the formal political 
structure and below (village level and natural village level).  
According to Table 1.1, 32.1% of forestland is under individual management (SFA, 
2009b). Furthermore, individuals managed 82.7% of the economic forest, indicating that 
individual households play a vital role in economic forests’ planting and management. These 
results are further supported by evidence that manually planted forests and new afforestation 
areas managed by individuals accounted for 59.2% and 68.5% of the total, respectively (SFA, 
2009b). As individual households have taken the lead in afforestation and economic forestry 
plantation, the implementation of government-initiated forestry programs have become 
dependent on individuals with the coordination of the forestry administration system and local 
government. These results also reflect a new phase of forestry resource management and 
governance.  
Table 1.1: Forest resources by forest property right regimes 
Items State Collective Individual 
Forestland with forest area 
- in thousand hectares 
 
7, 1436  
5, 1770 
 
5, 8175 
- in percentage (%) 39.4 28.5 32.1 
Economic forest area  
- in thousand hectares 
 
1008  
2527 
 
1, 6875 
- in percentage (%) 4.9 12.4 82.7 
Source of data: State Forestry Administration (2009b) 
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1.2 Large-scale bioenergy and oil forest development 
1.2.1 Global energy and oil forest development 
Global warming, high energy prices, an increasing awareness of energy security and greater 
recognition of the environmental consequences of fossil fuel dependence are creating an 
urgent need to find ecologically friendly fuels (Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008; Hill et al., 
2006). In view of environmental considerations, biofuel is considered carbon neutral because 
all the CO2 released during consumption has been sequestered from the atmosphere for the 
growth of plants (although the production of biofuels still consumes energy and thus net CO2 
emissions) (Pandey et al., 2012). Policies to promote renewable bioenergy have mushroomed 
world-wide over the past several years (van Eijck and Romijn, 2008). Bioenergy accounted 
for 10.2% of energy sources in the total global energy supply in 2008 (IPCC, 2012). 
Compared to fossil fuel use biofuels can reduce carbon emissions, increase farm income, 
improve energy security and create new jobs (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007; 
Mol,2007,2010). First-generation liquid biofuel from oil crops (biodiesel) and sugar and 
starch crops (ethanol) (IPCC, 2012), such as maize, sugarcane, soybean, and rapeseed, are 
broadly promoted in the United States, Brazil and Europe (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007; 
Oosterveer and Mol, 2010; Havlik et al., 2011). Figure 1.4 provides an overview of different 
crops that are used for biofuel production. 
 
Figure 1.4: Overview of biofuel crop resources.  
 
Source: Sanchez and Vasudevan, 2006; AI-Zuhair, 2007; Demirbas, 2008; Naik et al., 2010; de Vries et al., 
2010,  
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In addition to annual agricultural crops, perennial wood species such as palm and olive 
trees are also used as a biodiesel resource (USDA, 2008; Sanchez and Vasudevan, 2006). 
Moreover, as Scharlemann and Laurance (2008) argue, biofuels are likely to consume vast 
areas of farmland, driving up food prices. In order to not compete with arable land and food 
production, jatropha has become a promising alternative and has been promoted accordingly 
in different countries. In addition, the production of biodiesel from olive oil waste is also 
being explored (Arvanitoyannis et al., 2007) 
Jatropha is a plant native to Mexico and Central America that now grows across Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. Jatropha is a vigorous, drought- and pest-tolerant plant that can 
grow on wasteland and whose seeds and other plant parts have traditionally been used for oil, 
soap and medicinal compounds (van Eijck and Romijn, 2008; Pandey et al., 2012). Its 
potential as a biofuel crop was discovered in the early 2000s. Since then, governments, 
international organizations, and financial funds have begun to develop large-scale plantations 
for commercial use as well as local rural development. India and a handful of African 
countries have developed large-scale jatropha-based biodiesel development programs (Wu et 
al., 2010). There is great hope that jatropha will provide a promising sustainable alternative to 
fossil fuel. Moreover, it can grow on marginal land that will compete with neither food 
production nor nature conservation. In this context, a vast number of jatropha projects have 
been planned and initiated globally.  
International organizations have supported jatropha projects in Africa, Latin American 
and Asia by using jatropha to provide energy to rural areas and local developments in the 
early 2000s. With more than 900 thousand hectares planted, Asia has by far the largest 
acreage of jatropha cultivation currently under management worldwide, and the largest 
jatropha plantations are found in India, Myanmar, China and Indonesia (Gexsi, 2008). The 
largest projects are government initiatives that typically work with smallholder farmers in 
Asia, including pro-poor support schemes in India and village programs in Laos and 
Myanmar (Gexsi, 2008). Significant international and national private companies are also 
becoming active in this field.  
Although jatropha is receiving formal recognition, growers are still unable to achieve 
optimum economic benefits from the plant, due to various social and economic constraints 
(Mujeyi, 2009). The experience with jatropha systems in poor and remote areas thus far 
indicates that the major obstacles are organizational rather than technical (Nielsen, et al., 
2012). Institutional intervention and facilitation in remote areas is critical. Poor site selection 
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has been the root cause of many failures worldwide (Nielsen, et al., 2012). Moreover, the 
plantations worked by small farmers are not optimal due to the challenges associated with 
introducing new production systems in remote, underdeveloped areas. The global picture 
clearly points to a significant majority of private projects; however, public initiatives and 
public-private partnerships also play a vital role in developing the emerging jatropha industry 
(Gexsi, 2008). 
Access to secure financing for jatropha growers to bridge the gap between planting 
and harvest is very difficult to obtain, which could be a significant issue. It is also difficult to 
raise awareness and educate the different stakeholders involved in the jatropha supply chain 
about the issues surrounding biofuel, carbon footprints and biomass. Communication across 
the different sectors and support schemes involved in jatropha projects can also be 
challenging. Effective cooperation between different stakeholders, including local parties such 
as farmers, district administrators, village level institutions, NGOs, and universities, is vital 
(Gexsi, 2008). 
While small farmers play a vital role in most jatropha projects, approximately 50% of 
all project developers in Latin America and Asia opted for a cooperative approach, by which a 
contract to manage a plantation is initiated between a company (or NGO) and a smallholder; 
two thirds of the projects in Africa integrates smallholders (Gexsi, 2008). The road to 
large-scale biofuel production for developing countries is bumpy, and what works in a 
small-scale aid project rarely translates into commercial success (Gilbert, 2011). Additionally, 
the efficiencies and economies of scale that come from commercializing and centralizing 
biofuel production have limited benefits for locals (Gilbert, 2011). A good institution that can 
bridge the gap between the smallholder and large-scale commercial ventures is crucial for 
jatropha development. These issues are also important for REDD+ projects and CDM-AR 
projects.  
1.2.2 Review of Chinese bioenergy and oil forestry program development 
Perennial wood species, as well as bushes and small trees such as jatropha and olive trees, 
have been promoted globally as oil-bearing crops, and sometimes jatropha is also planted on 
arable land. In China, oil-bearing small trees, which mainly grow on slope land, are 
considered to be bioenergy and oil forests, a subset of economic forests. Various tree species 
in China are defined as part of bioenergy and oil forests, including jatropha, pistacia (Pistacia 
chinensis Bunge), xanthoceras (Xanthoceras sorbifolia Bunge), swida (Swida Wilsoniana), 
and camellia (Camellia Olifera) (Qian et al., 2007). Table 1.2 provides an overview of the 
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bioenergy and oil forest plantations in China. Because China has little additional arable land, 
energy and oil forests that can grow on slope land and do not compete with food crops for 
cultivated land have attracted great attention from policy makers and biodiesel industries in 
China. 
The national government has devised a series of laws and policies resulting in tax 
preferences, subsidies and investment support to promote bioenergy and oil forests. Moreover, 
in China, the Forestry-Oil Integration (FOI) program, which is part of the Eleventh Five-year 
Plan, has been established to promote energy and oil forests. This influential program began 
in 2007 with an agreement between the SFA and the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) to set up a jatropha demonstration base. Two other state-owned companies, the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), later joined the project as main promoters. Under the guidance of these main 
stakeholders, some private companies joined the project. Local communities and farmers 
work on the planting process together with these actors. In addition, other state government 
sectors, such as the National Energy Department and the National Development and Reform 
Committee (NDRC), participate through policy making and supportive regulations; further, 
some research centers contribute by providing training to farmers. In summary, the FOI 
program has been devised by central government agencies and state-owned companies, while 
the implementation is carried out by local governments and farmers. The program does not 
specify details concerning implementation; thus, during implementation, differences will 
occur across counties.  
Table 1.2: Overview of bioenergy and oil forest plantations (Unit: thousand hectares)  
Species Planted area 
until 2010 
Planned 
plantation area 
until 2020 
Provinces with (planned) plantations 
Camellia 164.3 1,680 Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hubei, Guizhou, Anhui, Yunan, 
Chongqin, Henan, Sichuan, Shaanxi 
Jatropha curcas L. 164. 1,410 Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Chongqin 
Pistacia chinensis 
Bunge 
139.66 710 Shaanxi, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Gansu, 
Yunnan, Shandong, Zhejiang, Shanxi  
Swida Wilsoniana 
(Wanger.) Sojak 
55 630 Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi 
Xanthoceras 
sorbifolia Bunge 
135.7 940 Neimeng, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Xinjiang, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Jining, 
Heilongjiang 
Sapindus 14 250 Guangxi, Chongqin, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Fujian, 
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mukorossi Gaertn Zhejiang, Anhui, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangdong 
Source: calculated based on Yang et al., 2013; SFA, 2009c, 2012a, 2012b. 
In this study, we focus on the jatropha and camellia programs. Camellia has the largest 
planting area and jatropha the second largest in China (see Table 1.2). Jatropha was the 
species on which the FOI’s first bioenergy and oil project was centered and it remains the 
main species of interest. Moreover, it is largely promoted globally with international aid funds. 
After jatropha faced problems in China, however, the central government initiated specific 
programs in order to promote camellia planting.  
Jatropha is an alien species, introduced to China long ago and now found mainly in the 
provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Fujian, Hainan and other 
southern provinces. Despite ambitious goals for jatropha planting, many Chinese projects 
have failed.  
Consequently, China’s central government began to focus on camellia programs in 
2008. Camellia is a typical Chinese perennial oil-producing wood species, native to 
sub-tropical areas. Camellia has a long cultivation history in Jiangxi, Hunan, and Guizhou 
provinces, and the oil produced from the seeds is edible (in contrast to jathropha), with 
biodiesel as a by-product. Now, with several years of selection and biotechnological 
modification, some high-yield varieties have been selected and prepared for planting in large 
areas of China. The better varieties demonstrate high yields in experimental stages. In other 
words, the initial input for smallholders is quite high, but the profit from the new variety is 
promising. Thus, in this new era, better camellia varieties are promoted in China. 
Simultaneously, the central government published a list of policies to support camellia 
planting. Preferential subsidies as well as credit access for camellia programs are provided by 
the central and provincial governments. International low-interest loans also support these 
programs through the China Climate Change Framework Loan program (CCCFL).
2
 Due to 
this support, camellia acreage has increased gradually every year since the inception of the 
programs in 2008. In 2011, camellia afforestation stretched across 235,000 hectares (SFA, 
2012b).  
Bioenergy and oil forests have also other benefits. They are beneficial for land 
sustainability, considering global soil deterioration levels. Furthermore, bioenergy and oil 
                                                   
2 CCCFL is a contract between the European Union and China dating from the EU-China Summit in 2005 and 
providing for lower interest loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) to be used for investment in clean, 
renewable energy for climate change mitigation objectives in China.  
17 
 
forests offer environmentally friendly development with economic and ecological advantages 
that include lowering greenhouse gas emissions, increasing rural development, and improving 
food and energy security. Thus, in addition to generating biodiesel, FOI and especially 
camellia programs also focus on the objectives of combating climate change by afforestation, 
improving rural livelihood by involving smallholders and stimulating forest investment 
through the efficient use of forestland. 
 
1.3 Research problems and objectives 
China has experienced numerous difficulties in the implementation of national forestry 
programs. For example, although the PFPs dramatically increased forest area and suppressed 
deforestation in some ecologically fragile areas, these programs also faced serious obstacles 
during implementation (Zhang et al., 2008). Some farmers lack interest in these programs due 
to difficulties in implementation and poor supporting policies (Du, 2004; Xu, et al., 2003). 
Challenges faced in carrying out the world’s largest ecological rehabilitation projects (China’s 
NFPP and SLCP) include a “top-down” administrative approach, a lack of interagency 
cooperation and long-term planning, and poorly functioning market-based approaches; hence, 
major policy efforts must be made to successfully implement these projects (Xu, et al., 2006; 
Zhang et al, 2008). The heavy reliance on the state for project financing, the lack of 
coordination between the SFA and other agencies and the tremendous social costs inflicted by 
the projects have not been adequately assessed or addressed (Xu, et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
the government has neglected to engage local people in program implementation (Xu, et al., 
2006; Liang and Mol, 2013). In addition, some PFPs (SLCP, SBDP and the NFPP, for 
example) are intended to bring benefits and income to poor rural farmers (Liu et al., 2010). 
Despite the fact that one objective of the SLCP and NFPP is poverty alleviation, participating 
farmers have by and large seen only moderate increases in income (Xu et al., 2006; Uchida et 
al., 2007). Because there have been several barriers during the implementation process of the 
PFPs, the present Forestry Oil Integration programs, as large-scale government-initiated 
forestry programs, may face similar institutional problems in their implementation as the 
afforestation programs mentioned above.  
However, given the above presented variety of institutional problems, the question 
arises how to capture them within one analysis. Institutions can in general be defined as “any 
form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction”(North, 1990, 4; see 
also Ostrom and Basurto (2011)). These constraints can both be formal – like laws – and 
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informal – like norms and traditions. In general, formal rules are the written (e.g. legal) rules, 
while informal rules are unwritten. Adger et al. (2008) provided another rough distinction of 
institutions, in the “institutional framework” and “institutional arrangements”. However, these 
divisions may not suffice for a coherent analysis of institutional problems in the 
implementation of bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China.  
In investigating the institutional problems faced in China with the implementation of 
bioenergy and oil forestry programs, this research will employ a framework of institutions as 
developed by Williamson (1998), where he provides a four-level categorization of institutions. 
While these four different categories of institutions are rather different in nature, they are 
understood as influencing each other. As will be further explained below, the institutions 
treated in this thesis can be placed at different levels of Williamson's framework. This 
research will concentrate on the role of three institutions: property rights, the governance 
structure and farmer incentives. They are assumed to significantly influence the 
implementation of bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China. The framework developed 
by Williamson, the place of these three institutions in it, and the operationalization of the 
institutional analysis for each of the three institutions will be discussed in more depth in 
section 1.4. 
Hence, the general objective of this research is to investigate how these three types of 
institutions impact the implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and 
in particular, whether and how these institutions determine farmers’ participation in these 
programs. This objective is addressed through four research questions as listed below, which 
are further elaborated upon in the next section:  
1. How and to what extent do different forest property rights affect the investment of farm 
households to maintain the forestry project sustainability? (RQ 1) 
2. How do smallholders benefit from large-scale forestry projects under different project 
implementation regimes? (RQ 2) 
3. How are various stakeholders involved in forestry project governance, particularly under 
long time horizons? And which factors determine a sustained governance of these projects? 
(RQ3) 
4. Which household-level factors determine farmers’ participation in large-scale forestry 
projects? (RQ 4) 
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1.4 Conceptual and theoretical framework 
This study focuses on three institutions that are assumed to play a major role in the 
implementation of biofuel and oil tree programs in China. Using Williamson’s four-level 
categorization of institutions, this section outlines the conceptual framework for the 
institutional analyses in this thesis, the operationalization of the institutional analyses at each 
of the three studied levels using distinct institutional theories (1.4.2) and the specification of 
the empirical investigation, research sites and data collection (1.4.3).  
1.4.1 Four levels of institutional analysis 
With his four-layer model of institutions, Nobel-prize winner Oliver Williamson has provided 
a systematic framework to classify institutions and illustrate how different institutions are 
related to and embedded in each other (Williamson, 1998). This four-layer model of 
institutions and institutional analysis is the consequence of his evaluation that, while social 
sciences have witnessed significant progress in the study of institutions over the past three 
decades, we are still far from a unified theory and thus should accept pluralism in the study of 
institutions (Williamson, 2000: 595). Williamson’s framework is particularly apt for this 
study as it combines different disciplines (among which economics, political sciences and 
sociology) in studying institutions. 
Figure 1.5 presents the four levels of institutional analysis as distinguished by 
Williamson (1998), which form the basis of the conceptual framework of this thesis. Each 
level represents a distinct type of institutions that can be analyzed with corresponding 
theoretical and analytical approaches. While the very different nature of institutions at 
different levels does not allow for direct comparisons or comparative analyses, institutions at 
different levels can interact with each other. For instance, institutions at higher levels, such as 
traditions and religion, put constraints on and structure lower level institutions, such as 
governance and incentive structures.  
'Embeddedness' is the top level of the institutional framework. This level contains 
what Williamson calls informal institutions, such as traditions, customs and norms, that exist 
within societies. The embeddedness level also extends to and influences the micro-level of 
network relationships where the role of norms of reciprocity and trust add an important 
dimension to the informal rules that shape human interaction (Granovetter, 1985).According 
to Williamson (1998), informal institutions at the embeddedness level often have a 
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spontaneous origin (third column, Figure 1.5) and they change very slowly (second column, 
Figure 1.5). As these institutions have a long duration, and this thesis focuses on institutional 
change through the introduction of large-forestry programs, they were considered out of the 
scope of research.  
The second institutional level of the conceptual framework is referred to as the 
'institutional environment' and consists of the set of formal institutions that shape society. 
Formal institutions or rules of the game include constitutions, or laws and regulations. The 
purpose of analysis at this level is “to get the institutional environment right”. These 
institutions change more frequently than institutions at the first level, but are relatively more 
inert than institutions at the third level.  
The institutions of 'governance' are located at the third level of the conceptual 
framework. The focus of analysis at this level is that of institutional arrangements, for 
instance contractual relations. The purpose of analysis at this level is to “get the governance 
structures right”. Transaction costs economics – and more generally the economics of 
organization – and governance theories are commonly used theoretical approaches that are 
applied at the governance level. According to Williamson, the transaction becomes the unit of 
analysis and the organization of this transaction through the governance structure is analyzed 
in terms of its potential benefits, e.g. to mitigate conflicts or to create mutual gains. 
The fourth and lowest level in Williamson's framework includes the analysis of 
'resource allocation'. The combination of formal and informal rules and governance structures 
create a set of incentives to which resource users react. Theoretical approaches that analyze 
marginal decisions of resource use and allocation include neoclassical analysis and agency 
theory. The former relies strongly on – potentially distorted – price incentives while the latter 
gives more attention to the trade-off between ex ante incentive alignment and risk allocation 
within an exchange relationship. 
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Figure 1.5: Four levels of institutional analysis 
 
Source: Williamson (1998) 
 
As stated above, each level of analysis represents a distinct set of institutions. In this 
thesis we focus on three institutions (see the research questions in section 1.3; see also Table 
1.3) that are each placed at a different institutional level: property rights are part of the second 
level, the institutional environment; governance structures are part of the third level; farmers’ 
incentives are part of the fourth level. These three institutions should be further analyzed with 
different institutional theories, as we still lack an overall theory to adequately analyze such a 
diverse set of institutions with one theory. The theoretical approaches used for the analysis of 
each institution are further elaborated below. However, subsequent institutions at different 
levels are not isolated and interact with and affect each other, also the three selected 
institutions in this thesis. Hence, analysis of institutions at one level often relates to 
institutions at other levels (see also the final chapter, section 6.5). 
The next section will further elaborate and operationalize how the three institutions – 
in relation to the four research questions – will be analyzed individually in this thesis, and 
how interactions between these institutions will be looked at. 
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1.4.2 Operationalization of the conceptual framework 
For each of the four research questions, Table 1.3 relates the research questions to 
Williamson’s levels of institutional analysis, introduces the theoretical approaches used to 
analyze the institution, indicates the variables that are used in the analysis, and presents the 
data collection methods. The contents of the table are further elaborated below for each 
research question separately. The following paragraphs will also outline which relations can 
be expected between the respective institution and the institutions on other levels of 
Williamson’s framework. 
Table 1.3: Framework of Analysis 
Researc
h 
question 
(RQ)  
Correspondin
g 
Williamson’s 
level 
Type of 
institution 
Theoretical 
approach  
Operationalization 
variables 
Means of data 
collection 
 
Chapter 
RQ 1 
 
Level 2 Property 
rights 
Property rights 
theory 
Tenure regimes 
Tenure security 
Residual income 
rights 
Residual control 
rights 
Literature and 
document 
analysis, key 
stakeholder 
interviews and 
farm 
household 
survey  
Chapter 
2 
 
RQ 2 
 
Level 3 Governanc
e structure 
Implementation 
regime 
Local governance 
institutions, tenure 
regimes,  
Project policy, 
project access, 
benefit distribution 
Literature and 
document 
analysis, key 
stakeholder 
interviews and 
farm 
household 
survey  
Chapter 
3 
 
RQ 3 Level 3 Governanc
e structure 
Policy 
arrangement 
approach  
Actors, resources, 
rules of the game, 
discourses, 
Governance/institu
tional 
arrangements 
Literature and 
document 
analysis, key 
stakeholder 
interviews and 
farm 
household 
survey  
Chapter 
4 
RQ 4 Level 4 Farmers’ 
incentives  
Marginal 
analysis 
 
Tenure insecurity 
Information access 
Household 
characteristics  
Farm 
household 
survey  
Chapter 
5 
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Research question 1: How and to what extent do different forest property rights affect the 
investment of farm households to maintain the forestry project sustainability? (RQ 1) 
This question focuses on differences in forest property rights, i.e. the second level in 
Williamson’s framework of institutional analysis. Forest tenure regimes constitute the formal 
rules of how property rights are defined and enforced in the local context. Property rights in 
most developing countries reflect a diversity of tenure regimes, and property rights regimes 
are quite complicated under different local contexts (Elbow et al., 1998; Streck, 2009). Since 
the recent forestland tenure reform in China (a unique change in the formal rules of the game 
that is still ongoing), forestland and forest resources have been affected by different tenure 
regimes. 
Adding to the existing literature on the implications of tenure security – i.e. the 
recognition and protection of property rights against acts of others – my focus will be on the 
effect of different tenure regimes from a new property rights theory perspective. There are 
two main theoretical approaches in the economic property rights literature. The first, generally 
referred to as the old property rights theory, defines ownership based on the concept of a 
bundle of rights, including use, transfer and income rights. The second, the new property 
rights theory or the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) model, assumes the incompleteness of 
contracts and analyzes ownership based on residual control and income rights (Barzel, 1997; 
Besley, 1995; Coase, 1960; Furubotn and Richter, 2005; Hart and Moore, 1990; Williamson, 
2000). In this thesis, I analyze and operationalize ownership following the new property rights 
approach.  
Originally, the GHM model was framed as a theory of the firm. Specifically, the 
decision to vertically integrate (i.e. full ownership of initially separate production units) is 
based on gaining residual control over assets to influence workers’ and managers’ incentives. 
Key in the argumentation is the separation of residual control rights over assets and the 
entitlement to profit streams (residual income) and the effect of this separation on incentives. 
In this thesis I operationalize this theoretical approach in the context of bio-energy and oil 
forestry projects in China. Specifically, the GHM model is operationalized by identifying the 
degree of residual control over forestry assets and the entitlement to profit streams (residual 
income) from investments and resource allocation to forestry projects for different forest 
tenure regimes. Subsequently, the implications are analyzed of a separation of residual control 
and income rights on households’ incentives to invest. The relationship between property 
rights and incentive alignment is an integral part of this theoretical approach. In terms of the 
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Williamson framework, linking property rights (level 2) to incentives (level 4) explicitly 
crosses the boundaries of the institutional levels of analysis. Hence, while the focus of chapter 
2 is on property rights for different tenure regimes, I also provide interesting insights on the 
impact of the institutional environment on resource allocation and incentives.  
Chapter 2 will use the case of camellia planting in China to analyze the impacts of 
differences in property rights in large-scale forestry projects on farm households’ investments 
in forest management. An overview of the forestland tenure reform is given first. Then, the 
expected incentive effects of present tenure regimes are analyzed on the one hand from the 
conventional perspective of tenure security and on the other hand from the perspective of the 
new property rights theory. Finally, whether and how property rights influence household 
investment is examined using a regression model. Specific explanations will be presented in 
chapter 2.  
 
Research question 2: How do smallholders benefit from large-scale forestry projects under 
different project implementation regimes? (RQ 2) 
The second research question will be addressed in chapter 3 by examining the camellia case 
study, focusing on level 3 of Williamson’s hierarchy. Level 3 examines the institutions of the 
governance structure and starts from the question which governance structure is more 
efficient in mitigating conflicts and creating mutual benefits for the different parties to an 
agreement. The chapter accordingly inquires the effects of local governance on the 
distribution of benefits. “Benefits” relates this level to level 4, i.e. resource allocation among 
households participating in the camellia plantation project.  
There is a wide diversity of theoretical frameworks available for analyzing governance 
(see e.g. Adger et al., 2003; Armitage, 2008; Rhodes, 2007). As outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter, given the difficulties in the implementation of forestry projects, chapter 3 
accordingly analyses the governance structures by the means of which projects are 
implemented. Governance institutions are understood as “institutional arrangements”, i.e. 
“(particular sets of rules) through which decisions are implemented” (Adger et al., 2003: 
1100). Chapter 3 specifies these arrangements as “implementation regimes”, i.e. the rules and 
actors that govern the implementation of an institutional arrangement. They stretch across 
multiple scales and actors, from the county government to smallholders.  
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Reaching from the county government to smallholders, implementation regimes are 
also influenced by the institutional environment at the county level. Chapter 3 gives particular 
attention to how forest tenure regimes influence the implementation regime. Further 
influences are local governance institutions and project characteristics, resulting in a diversity 
of implementation regimes. These implementation regimes have various distribution impacts 
on benefit sharing among smallholders.  
While the focus of this chapter is on the governance level of Williamson’s framework, 
linkages are made both to lower and higher level institutions. Tenure regimes (level 2, formal 
rules) affect and structure implementation regimes of the projects. Local governance 
institutions (level 3, play of the game) mediate the effects of the tenure regimes. And the 
forestry implementation regimes affect benefit sharing and incentive structures for local 
farmers, which are included in the analysis of this chapter (level 4, incentive structures) 
 
Research question 3: How are various stakeholders involved in forestry project governance, 
particularly under long time horizons? And which factors determine a sustained governance 
of these projects? (RQ 3) 
The third research question, developed in chapter 4, seeks to analyze and understand the 
failure of two jatropha projects in Sichuan and Guangxi provinces, China, focusing on level 3 
of the governance structure. Governance here refers to modes of steering that are no longer 
the privilege of governmental agencies only, but de facto or de jure the common responsibility 
of a variety of agencies representing governmental bodies, market agencies and civil society 
organizations (Leroy and Arts, 2006).  
The theoretical framework that forms the basis of this chapter is the policy 
arrangement approach as developed since the mid 1990s in the Netherlands, and subsequently 
applied especially, but not only, to environmental and natural resources conflicts and 
governance in different countries (e.g. van Tatenhove et al, 2000; Arts and van Tatenhove, 
2004; Arts et al., 2006; Liefferink, 2006). The policy arrangement framework has also been 
applied fruitfully to analyzing forest policy and governance (e.g. Arts and Buizer, 2009; 
Veenman et al., 2009; Wiersum et al., 2013). The policy arrangement approach focuses on the 
– interdependent – actors in their coalitions; the division of power between these actors, 
where power refers to “the mobilisation, division and deployment of resources” (Arts et al., 
2006: 99); the rules of the game; and the ongoing discourses to analyze the functioning and 
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change of governance structures and institutions (see Arts et al., 2006).While useful for 
higher-level policy levels, the concept was deemed less applicable to arrangements that, while 
implemented within the frame of a policy-arrangement, do not involve policy actors. For 
arrangements that implement policies and targets on the ground, the concept “institutional 
arrangement” will be used. Institutional arrangements can be related to a variety of actors, and 
do not necessarily have to include policy actors. 
In chapter 4, the institutional arrangements of two very distinct jatropha projects are 
analyzed: one characterized by a conventional strong government-driven arrangement, and 
another characterized by a more novel market-driven institutional arrangement. Government- 
and market-driven arrangements are analyzed with respect to the actors (relations) involved, 
decision-making and power (hence, resources), types of contracts and coordination 
mechanisms (rules of the game in terms of the policy arrangement approach).The chapter also 
compares government-driven arrangements with market-driven arrangements in regard to 
whether and how they reduce uncertainty about future outcomes among involved actors over a 
long period of time. Hence, a long time horizon perspective (Hoogstra and Schanz, 2009) is 
integrated to understand the failures of institutional arrangements.  
The analysis links to institutions at other levels. In chapter 4, focus will be on the 
influence of the administrative system and its influence on the time horizons of 
administrations (level 2, institutional environment), as well as the legal institutional 
environment. They crucially impact the “play of the game” in unexpected and contra 
productive ways.  
 
Research question 4: Which household-level factors determine farmers’ participation in large 
scale forestry projects? (RQ 4) 
The final research question is analyzed in the fifth chapter and focuses on level 4 of 
Williamson’s classification of institutions. Level 4 moves from discrete structural to marginal 
analysis, dealing with efficient incentive alignment (Williamson, 1998). How well institutions 
solve the problems of coordination and production is determined by the intentions, reasons 
and motives of acting agents (North, 1990; Giddens, 1984, 1990). Hence, farm household 
incentives are analyzed quantitatively starting from a neoclassical theoretical perspective 
(Rogers, 1983; Besley, 1995; Otsuka et al., 2001; Brasselle et al., 2002).  
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The focus of this chapter is on the 4
th
 level of institutional analysis using the 
corresponding theoretical basis of neoclassical, marginal analysis. This theoretical basis is 
operationalized by focusing on the role of risk attitude and uncertainty about future returns on 
investment in the household decision-making process. In the empirical analysis, this leads to 
the inclusion of variables related to household characteristics and access to information. 
However, explicit linkages are also made that cross the different levels of Williamson’s 
framework. Specifically, the effect of differences in property rights (level 2) is analyzed by 
looking at the role of tenure insecurity for household decision-making. 
Chapter 5 determines farmers’ participation in large-scale camellia projects, as well as 
which parameters affect farmers’ participation in international and national projects. A probit 
model and bivariate probit model are applied econometrically to test the derived hypotheses.  
 
1.4.3 Program characteristics, site selection and data collection methods 
Following the general overview of China's bioenergy and oil forestry program development in 
section 1.2.2., I now provide a discussion of the program characteristics of the jatropha and 
camellia projects, the study site selection and the data collection methods. 
 
General characteristics of the jatropha and camellia programs 
Forest-based biodiesel has attracted significant attention by policy makers and biodiesel 
industrial companies in China. As a result, the Chinese government devised a series of laws 
and policies to promote energy crops including jatropha. Moreover, in the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan for oil-breeding energy forests, published by the SFA in 2006, an FOI program was 
formulated in which jatropha plantations were to be increased in 3 provinces: Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan (SFA, 2006). Through these programs the state gives subsidies to 
demonstration and pilot jatropha projects. Provinces also published regulations, policies and 
subsidy schemes to support the jatropha program. Within the jatropha program, 
government-driven projects and market-driven projects are implemented (see chapter 4). 
Government-driven projects are set up between state-owned oil companies and SFA to 
promote jatropha plantations and jatropha based biodiesel production. CNPC, China's largest 
state-owned oil company, first entered in a collaborative relation with SFA; two other major 
state-owned oil companies, Sinopec Group and CNOOC, later joined this cooperation. These 
projects are implemented with a high involvement of local and higher level government 
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authorities and organizations. Market-driven projects are set up between private companies 
and other market stakeholders such as farmers, as part of the jatropha program. Accordingly, 
the case of a government-driven jathropha plantation project was selected in Sichuan and the 
case of a market-driven project was selected in Guangxi.  
The Chinese government started the large-scale camellia program in 2008 with the 
objective to plant 1,68 million hectares of camellia by 2020 in China (SFA, 2009). The 
camellia program is focused on a large number of provinces (see Table 1.2) and supported by 
a number of policies from the central government and often by subsidies from the central 
financial budget for planting camellia. In Jiangxi province (our case study area), two types of 
projects can be distinguished in the camellia program: projects financially supported by the 
government, and projects (also) financially supported by international projects and donors. 
Government projects are subsidised from the central financial budget, called ‘Modern 
Camellia Demonstration County’ (Xiandai Youcha Shifan Xian Xiangmu), through the MOF 
and SFA. Apart from central financial support, also provinces and counties provide financial 
support from their provincial and county financial budgets. Farmers who participate in 
camellia projects receive subsidies. Some projects are also internationally financed, for 
instance the European Investment Bank financed the project ‘Jiangxi Biologic Energy Forest 
Demonstration Base Construction’.  
 
Data collection 
Three methods of data collection were used: secondary data collection, in-depth interviews 
with stakeholders, and farm household surveys (see Table 1.4). Through these methods, 
information and data about bioenergy and oil forestry policies, implementation and 
performance of bioenergy and oil forestry programs and the forest tenure reform process have 
been collected at different administrative levels. Household activity data has also been 
collected through questionnaires. 
 
Table 1.4: Data collection methods 
Data collection methods Tools Data sources 
Secondary data collection Government databases and 
websites 
Policy documents, statistical data, 
laws and regulations at national 
level, provincial level and county 
level 
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In-depth interviews Semi-structured 
Face-to-face 
Provincial level: officials in 
provincial forestry department 
County level: officials in county 
forestry bureaus 
Village level: village leaders and 
natural village leaders 
Survey Questionnaires Village level: village leaders from 
30 villages 
308 farm households 
Source: author’s survey.  
Because of restrictions on time and resources, it was not possible to include all 
possible oil forest and bioenergy species in the research design (see Table 1.2). Hence, only 
the most representative species were used: jatropha, which is also globally promoted, and 
camellia, the only species promoted in China in a significant way after 2008. Moreover, both 
species have high planting targets and large planting areas, which also indicates that these two 
species are the most influential in large-scale programs in China.  
 
Survey 1: Jatropha planting 
The fieldwork on jatropha was carried out in 2010, with in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with key stakeholders and document analysis as the main research methods. Decision makers 
from the provincial level to village committees were included. More specifically, interviews 
were conducted with officers of provincial forestry departments in charge of jatropha projects, 
officers of county forestry departments in charge of the jatropha plantations, township forestry 
officers in areas where jatropha was planted, and leaders of villages taking part in jatropha 
plantation. Moreover, interviews with scientists as well as NGO spokespeople were conducted. 
Sichuan Province and Guangxi Province were selected as data collection sites (see Figure 1.6), 
as both provinces have suitable subtropical climatic conditions to grow jatropha. Through the 
interviews, project initiation and implementation processes were revealed, as well as reasons 
for ceasing planting. In Guangxi, previous project demonstration plots were also visited.  
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Figure 1.6: Map: Survey Area 
 
 
Survey 2: Camellia planting 
The camellia fieldwork was undertaken in Jiangxi province in 2011 (Figure 1.6), using 
document analysis, in-depth semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and fully 
standardized farm household surveys. Qualitative data on the extent of formal use, income 
and transfer rights in the context of collectively owned forestland were assembled from 
official documents. Furthermore, more detailed information on stakeholders’ participation in 
decision making, contracts and coordination mechanisms were collected through stakeholder 
interviews. In order to examine the regression model, quantitative data were collected through 
farm household surveys.  
First, a pre-test was conducted to examine the questionnaire as well as to decide on 
survey plots. During the pre-test, three offices in the Forestry Department of Jiangxi Province 
were visited. The domestic camellia project and international project policies and their 
implementation were discussed in the interviews, as were tenure reform policies and present 
forestry management governance. Based on secondary data analysis, Ji’an, Suichuan and 
Fencheng counties were chosen among those counties which took part in camellia projects 
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based on economic level and history of camellia tree cultivation. Then, these three counties 
were visited to continue the pre-test of the questionnaires and make decisions on which 
villages to visit. In the counties, officers from county forestry bureaus were interviewed first; 
additionally, in each county, two villages were visited to pre-test and assess the village and 
household questionnaire design. Finally, based on the local visits, Ji’an, Suichuan and 
Fengchen counties were confirmed as the survey area (see Figure 1.6).  
The questionnaire was revised based on the pre-test results, and student survey team 
members were trained. During the survey period, a 12-member survey team travelled to 
different households, filling out the questionnaire through face to face interviews. Village 
questionnaires were administered to collect basic demographic information and 
socio-economic data and were structured in six parts. Part 1 covered the basic information 
about the village leader. Part 2 covered the basic information about the village. Part 3 covered 
the subsidy situation in the village, and part 4 covered the forestry sector situation. Part 5 
covered participation in forestry programs and the implementation of the camellia program. 
Part 6 covered the forestry tenure condition. Farm household surveys were carried out to 
gather qualitative and quantitative data on household characteristics, household forestry 
activities, including camellia plantation activities, and forest tenure regimes. The household 
questionnaire consisted of seven parts. Part 1 covered the farm household structure and its 
basic characteristics. Part 2 covered land holdings and forestry management per plot. Part 3 
covered camellia plantation management. Part 4 covered the knowledge of previous forestry 
programs and camellia program policies. Part 5 covered house assets holding and their value. 
Part 6 covered loans, and part 7 covered forestry tenure. The village and farm household 
questionnaires have been included in Appendix A. In summary, several staff members from 
three forestry offices in Jiangxi Province, the county forestry bureaus in the three counties, 
seven township forestry stations, and village leaders in 30 villages and 12 natural villages 
were interviewed. In Suichuan County and Fengchen County, 14 villages were selected, and 
two villages were selected in Ji’an County. In each village, around 10 households were 
chosen, for a valid sample of 308 households from 30 villages. 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of the paper thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes whether and 
how different tenure regimes affect individual farm households’ investment in forestry 
projects. Chapter 3 discusses the benefit distribution of camellia programs to smallholders at 
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the local level under different local governances with international and national financial 
arrangements. Chapter 4 explores the failure of jatropha projects in China and discusses how 
government- and market-driven arrangements try to involve the various stakeholders, 
particularly under long time horizons, and what may be the source of failure in these 
arrangements. Chapter 5 investigates the determinants of farm household participation in 
national and international camellia projects. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides 
policy recommendations and future research recommendations.  
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Chapter 2. Property rights effects on farmers’ 
management investment in large-scale forestry projects - 
the case of the camellia in rural China3 
 
Abstract: Since forestry plays a crucial role in the ecosystem and as carbon sinks, 
international organizations and governments in developing countries are increasingly setting 
up large-scale forestry projects. Furthermore, devolution from a centralized forestry 
governance structure has become a trend in many developing countries. China’s central 
government has carried out a series of collectivization and de-collectivization attempts of 
forest tenure over time, which led to multiple forest tenure systems and management 
arrangements within a province. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the motivation 
of farmers to maintain forestry is sustained under different forest tenure regimes. First, 
farmers’ incentives to manage forest resources under different forest tenure regimes are 
discussed conceptually based on the notions of tenure security and residual control and 
residual claims to income streams. Second, an empirical model based on the data from Jiangxi 
province is carried out. The estimation results show that various tenure regimes have different 
effects on household labour and variable input use within large-scale forestry projects. The 
fertilizer and pesticides input from a farm household under a partnership regime is 
significantly higher than under the individual property rights regime. Moreover, farm 
households under company and collective-individual regimes have lower variable input 
levels.  
 
Keyword: Forestry, forest tenure, farm household, household investment, China  
 
2.1. Introduction 
Forestry provides a variety of products and services to improve rural livelihoods, but also 
contributes to regional and global ecosystem stability (FAO, 2011; FAO, 2012). One of the 
services that receives increasing attention in recent years is that of serving as a carbon sink. 
As forests remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, the conservation of forests helps to 
                                                   
3
 This chapter is based on Li, J., Bluemling, B. Dries, L., Tenure regime effects on farmers’ investment in 
large-scale forestry projects - the case of the camellia in rural China, submitted to World Development.  
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mitigate climate change. Therefore, international donor organizations and governments in 
developing countries have been setting up large-scale projects in which farmers are provided 
with financial and technical support for continued forest conservation and afforestation. 
Recent examples are REDD+ and domestic carbon offset projects (see e.g. Ristea and Maness, 
2009).  
These projects however have been criticized for creating incentives towards 
centralized governance, as well as for putting community tenure rights at risk (Sandbrook et 
al., 2010; Larson, 2011). Starting in the 1980s, governmental forest tenure regimes in 
developing countries have been increasingly devolved to community-based forest tenure 
institutions (Edmunds et al., 2003). In many parts of Africa and Asia, customary land tenure 
institutions were furthermore formalized into clearly defined land tenure institutions (Otsuka 
et al., 2000; Place and Otsuka, 2000; Suyanto et al., 2001), therewith recognizing 
decentralized customary institutions as institutions in their own right. The devolution of forest 
tenure, and the recognition of customary land tenure institutions, aimed at a more equitable 
resource management under the responsibility of communities. Community-based resource 
management is furthermore assumed to lead to a more sustainable use of a resource (see e.g. 
Suyanto et al., 2005; Sandbrook et al., 2010; Ambus and Hoberg, 2011).  
Particularly in Asia, forest tenure regimes have undergone significant changes in 
recent decades (Dahal et al., 2011). China is one of the countries where the central 
government, since the 1980s, carried out a series of forest tenure reforms. In the early 2000s, 
it started a further forest tenure reform allocating a large share of decision-making power over 
forest tenure and use rights to the village level. Under a variety of local socioeconomic 
conditions, this led to villages establishing a diversity of forest tenure and management 
arrangements within a province (Liu, 2008; Sun, 2008). With such a variety of local forest 
tenure regimes, China is an interesting case for comparing the effects of large-scale forestry 
projects under different kinds of decentralized forest tenure regimes. 
The aim of this paper is hence on the one hand to investigate whether large-scale 
forestry projects have indeed led, against previous devolution trends, to a (re)centralization of 
forest tenure. On the other hand, for achieving a forestry project’s long-term goals, the 
motivation of farmers to maintain forestry, i.e. to invest labour effort and inputs in forestry 
under different forest tenure regimes, becomes important. A number of recent contributions to 
the literature have investigated the relationship between tenure rights and investments in 
China (see e.g. Ma et al. (2013) for an analysis of investments in agricultural land 
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improvements and Qin and Xu (2013) and Xie et al. (2013) for an analysis of investments in 
forest management practices). This chapter contributes to the literature by looking at the 
impact of property rights on farmers’ investment incentives not only from the conventional 
tenure security perspective, but by adding a dimension of analysis based on the New Property 
Rights Theory. In line with this theory, incentives are not only affected by the security of 
property rights but also by the distribution of residual control and income rights as a result of 
the incompleteness of property rights definition. The second objective of this chapter is 
therefore to apply this extended framework of property rights to different tenure regimes in 
the context of Chinese oil and bioenergy forestry projects and to derive implications for 
household incentives and management investments in forestry projects. 
In this respect, it is important to point out that throughout the chapter I will refer to 
management investments measured in terms of labour and variable input use. While this use 
of the term investment differs from the traditional interpretation in the field of (agricultural) 
economics, it is in line with studies by Qin and Xu (2013) and Xie et al. (2013) which refer to 
farmers’ investments measured by chemical fertilizer and labour input and forest management 
investments measured by labour and money input, respectively. In line with these authors, I 
believe that property rights can also have a substantial effect on these types of incentives and 
investment decisions, and this holds especially in the case of forestry crops where the benefits 
from management investments today may only be accessible after a long gestation period. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second part provides 
background to the forestry reforms that the Chinese central government has carried out since 
the 1980s. It describes why the devolution of forest tenure rights led to a multitude of tenure 
regimes. In section three, I introduce the conceptual framework for analysis of the different 
tenure regimes and their link with household investment incentives. Section 4 explains survey 
site selection and data collection, and presents the model to be used for the analysis of the 
survey data. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. This section starts with qualitative 
results of the surveyed tenure regimes. I show whether, with the realization of plantations 
within forestry projects, a recentralization of tenure rights has taken place. Through the 
application of the previously developed framework, I furthermore provide assumptions about 
the likely level of incentives under the different regimes. After a brief presentation of 
descriptive statistics in section 5.2, I develop assumptions in section 5.3 and provide evidence 
of the effect of the different tenure regimes on farmers’ management investment in forestry. 
These results are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2.2. Background 
China experienced a series of property rights reforms since the foundation of the People’s 
Republic. These reforms on the one hand resulted in the present complexity of China’s forest 
tenure regime. On the other hand, they created uncertainty over forest property rights and 
respective investment returns for farmers. Three phases of tenure reforms can be distinguished, 
i.e. a centralized phase, and two phases of devolution of forest tenure rights. 
 
Centralized phase (1950-1982) 
When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, some forest areas were distributed to rural 
households, while the rest was nationalized.
4
 However, the forests that had been distributed 
to households were collectivized in 1955
5
 and from then on, only scattered trees around 
homesteads were still managed by households (Liu, 2001). These scattered trees finally also 
became collective property with the creation of the People’s communes in 1958 (Liu, 2001), 
only to be designated as household property again in 1961.
6
 However, from 1966 until the 
1980s, in the frame of the Cultural Revolution, the rights to these trees were de facto taken 
away once more by the collective (Liu and Edmunds, 2004). In conclusion, during the 
centralized phase, only the scattered trees were private for a while, and finally became 
collective; forests that belonged to households in the very beginning of the People’s Republic 
became collectivized.  
 
First Devolution (1981-2003) 
In China, ownership of forestland, according to the Constitution and the ‘People’s Republic of 
China Forest Law’, belongs to the state or collective. In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council started a reform to transfer the management of collectively owned 
forestland to farm households. This devolution, as well as the following one, addressed 
collectively owned forestland mainly.  
                                                   
4 ‘People’s Republic China Land Reform Law’ published by the People’s Government Committee in 1950. 
5 ‘Agreement on Agricultural Cooperatives’ published by the Chinese Communist Party in the 7th committee 
meeting. 
6‘Regulation on Property Right Settlement, Forest Protection and Forestry Development (Pilot draft)’ (‘Forestry 
18 regulations’ in short) published by the Chinese Communist Party. 
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The reform introduced the so-called “forestry responsibility system” for 
collectively-owned forestland
7, comparable to the “household responsibility system” that had 
been established for agricultural land. The purpose of the reform was to better define 
forestland property rights to offer security of investment, i.e. to stimulate households to plant 
trees and manage forest resources sustainably (Xu et al., 2010; Enters et al., 2003). Two 
important laws were issued that can be considered the foundation of forestland property rights 
in China.8 According to these laws, the ownership of forestland remains with the government 
or the collective, however, individuals can exercise varying degrees of authority over species 
selection, harvesting practices, sale and use, as well as the distribution of benefits (Edmunds 
et al., 2003).  
After its implementation in some pioneering provinces, the reform led to large-scale 
deforestation. Given the experiences of collectivization between the 1950s and 1970s, farmers 
lacked confidence in forest tenure (Liu and Edmunds, 2004), which is why they aimed for 
short-term gains and logged trees. In 1987, in an attempt to stop deforestation and to 
strengthen forest resource management, a new policy directive was issued by the Chinese 
Communist Party and the State Council. The new directive stopped the further devolution of 
large areas of timber forestland to households. Townships had to organize the protection of 
already devolved forestland, and in some areas, the village reclaimed the forestland from the 
households (Xu et al., 2010). 
In conclusion, the first devolution of forest tenure, which is a milestone in Chinese 
forestland property rights history, was not fully and successfully implemented.  
 
New round of devolution (2003 – present) 
After the first devolution failed, forestry went back to de jure collective management, and 
logging was strictly controlled through cutting permits. However, a new devolution attempt 
started in 2003, with the issuing of the ‘Decision about accelerating the development of 
forestry’. Fujian, Jiangxi, and Liaoning provinces began the new collective forestland tenure 
reform as pilot provinces. With the issuing of further supportive policies to strengthen the 
                                                   
7 The Chinese Communist Party and the State Council publishedthe ‘Decision about several questions in forest 
protection and forestry development’. 
8 ‘People’s Republic of China Constitution’ accepted in the fifth Standing Committee meeting of  the National 
People’s Congress in 1982; and ‘People’s Republic of China Forest Law’ accepted in the sixth Standing 
Committee meeting of the National People’s Congress in 1984(revised in the ninth Standing Committee meeting 
of the National People’s Congress in 1998). 
42 
 
reform by the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in 2008, also other provinces 
started the devolution of forest tenure rights. 
The devolution foresaw that a new forest use regime should be decided by a majority 
vote of two-thirds of all villagers or of the village council (Xu et al., 2010). The user rights of 
collective forestland then are devolved through a lease contract of 70 years (forestry 
responsibility system). While the main objective of the reform is to devolve the user rights of 
forestland to farm households, it does not provide blueprints for the kind of management 
schemes to be applied. Some villages, for example, chose to keep collective management 
(interview with county Forestry Administration Officer). Under the premise that the most 
efficient management mode shall be implemented, and that a majority vote within the village 
will decide about the kind of management regime, the government would not intervene into 
such a decision.  
 
The resulting forest tenure regimes 
As a result of the devolution, multiple forestry management practices under various tenure 
regimes exist, involving a diversity of actors (Liu, 2008). Tenure regimes furthermore are the 
result of the different physical and socio-economic conditions as well as different governance 
arrangements at the village level. 
Based on these local variations, the literature so far has categorized different kinds of 
forest tenure regimes in China. According to Holden et al. (2011) and Xu et al. (2008), five 
tenure categories can be identified. Three of them resemble tenure categories in other 
countries, i.e. Family Management (managed by an individual farm household), Partnership (a 
group of farmers form a partnership on a voluntary basis), or Outsider Management Contracts 
(contracted out to an individual or organization). Two further tenure categories are closely 
related to China’s administrative structure. In China, an “administrative village” (xingzhencun) 
is an administrative entity for several “natural villages” (zirancun). While the administrative 
village is headed by a village council, the natural village does not form part of the formal 
political structure. It is ruled by what Xu et al. (2008) refer to as the “villagers’ group” or “a 
cluster of families”. Accordingly, they distinguish two further forest tenure categories, i.e. 
Management by a Villagers’ Group (managed by a cluster of families living in the same 
neighborhood, often comprising one natural village), and Collective Management (managed 
by an administrative village council). 
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Sun (2008) defines four types of property rights regimes, i.e. Individual (equal to 
Family Management), Partnership, Natural Village Collective Management (equal to 
Management by a Villagers’ Group), and Administrative Village Collective Management 
(equal to Collective Management). The following section will outline the conceptual 
framework with which we will analyze in how far these tenure regimes may have different 
impacts on farmers’ investment in forestry. 
 
2.3. Conceptual framework 
Our analysis is based on the concept of tenure security. It is claimed that tenure security is 
crucial for farm households’ production incentives in forestry. I first provide a brief 
discussion of the concept of tenure security. Next, I introduce the New Property Rights 
Theory (NPRT) which will be applied in the analysis of the tenure regimes in section 5. I 
argue that the NPRT allows to add more depth to the analysis because it complements the 
conventional notion of tenure security. Finally, I review the literature that relates property 
rights to investments in agriculture and forestry.  
2.3.1 Tenure security 
Land tenure is an institution. It exists of the legal or customarily defined rules that define how 
property rights to land are allocated within societies. Rules of tenure define how access to 
land is granted, who has rights to use, control and transfer the land and which associated 
responsibilities and constraints exist. In other words, land tenure systems determine who can 
use what resource for how long and under what conditions. Land tenure security can then be 
defined as the certainty that a person’s rights to land will be recognized and protected against 
the acts of others (FAO, 2002).  
 Land tenure security can be weak because of conflicts of interest between different 
parties in society. FAO (2002) distinguishes four potentially intersecting interests: (i) 
overriding interests exist if a sovereign power can expropriate and reallocate land; (ii) 
overlapping interests occur when different parties are assigned different rights to the same 
land; (iii) complementary interests exist when different parties share the same interest in the 
same parcel of land, for instance on communal grazing grounds; (iv) competing interests exist 
when different parties contest the same interests in the same parcel. In the case of China, for 
example, overriding interests over land may occur because government authorities have the 
power to expropriate land for further land reforms. Furthermore, overlapping interests can 
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exist in the case of a collective tenure regime in which individuals share the rights to use and 
benefit from the land.  
 Arnot et al. (2011) provide an overview of the concept of tenure security in a forest 
management context. They distinguish between on the one hand tenure security based on 
assurance and on the other hand tenure security based on substance of rights. Tenure 
insecurity in terms of assurance refers for example to the uncertainty of rights, the probability 
of losing rights, uncertainty over changes in government policy or the probability of 
non-extension or renewal of rights. Studies that investigate tenure security in terms of 
substance have used indicators such as the duration of rights, the legal title to land, 
renewability of rights and the right to sell or transfer land.  
 An important distinction that can be made is that assurance type tenure security is 
based more on individuals’ perceptions of security, while substance type security relates to 
actual attributes of tenure as defined by customary, legal or contractual rules. According to 
FAO (2002) security of tenure cannot be measured directly and people’s perceptions about 
security will therefore be the basis for their investment decisions. The reason for this is that 
attributes of security will change depending on the context (e.g. length of the growing season 
or gestation period). In line with this view, several authors have criticized the use of substance 
attributes of tenure security, such as holding a legal title to land, for not adequately 
representing the perceptions of individuals about tenure security (see Arnot et al. (2011) and 
Ma et al. (2013)). The majority of studies that have investigated the effect of tenure security 
on investments from the assurance perspective have focused on the risk of expropriation, or in 
terms of the FAO’s intersecting interests, the effect of overriding interests on land.  
 In general, there are two main ways in which security of property rights over land 
can encourage investments: through increased assurance that investors will be able to reap the 
benefits from their investment; and through improved access to funds, also called the 
collateralizability effect (Arnot et al., 2011; Besley, 1995; Ma et al., 2013). In the case of 
management investments, i.e. the investment of variable inputs and labour effort, the focus 
will be especially on the former effect. In section 3.2, I will provide an extension to the 
discussion of the role of tenure security for explaining management investment decisions. My 
claim is that household incentives are not only affected by uncertainty over the protection of 
property rights but also by the allocation of property rights in itself. In other words, even with 
secure property rights – in the sense that the perception of expropriation risk is minimal – 
investment incentives may be low if there is uncertainty over the claim to the benefits of the 
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effort and variable input investments that have been made. It could be argued that such 
uncertainty may arise for example in the case of overlapping or complementary interests over 
land (see FAO, 2002) and hence presents an additional dimension of land tenure security. At 
the core of this discussion is the notion that all contracts – no matter if they are based on legal, 
customary or contractual rules – are incomplete. Investment incentives are therefore also 
importantly driven by what is not specified in laws or contracts. This novel perspective was 
formalized in the New Property Rights Theory (NPRT). To clarify the distinction with the 
“old” property rights theory, I start the following section with a discussion of this perspective. 
2.3.2 Property rights theory 
Furubotn and Richter (2005: 5) defined property rights as embracing “the rights to use and to 
gain benefits from physical objects or intellectual works and the rights to demand certain 
behavior from other individuals”. Property rights have long been considered as a bundle of 
rights (see Table 2.1), with property being defined as a set of rights that describe what people 
may and may not do with resources; the extent to which they have them at their disposal, can 
use, transform, transfer them or exclude others from their property (Furubotn and 
Richter ,2005; Slangen et al., 2008). Empirical research on farmers’ land tenure often has 
used this understanding of property rights as a bundle of rights (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 
2002). Following this approach, investment incentives would be higher, the more rights an 
individual can capture from the total bundle of rights to land. In other words, the incentives 
for an individual to invest in an asset, e.g. forestland, are stronger if he/she holds a larger 
share of the bundle of rights. However, this “old” property rights theory may not capture the 
complexity at stake in developing countries, and particularly not of current multiple forest 
tenure regimes in China.  
Table 2.1: Components of the bundle of property rights on forestland  
Description  Type of right 
The right to use the forestland User rights 
The right to capture the returns of the forestland Income rights 
The right to change the functions of forestland Alteration rights 
The right to exclude others from the forestland Exclusion rights 
The right to transfer the forestland to others through the market Transfer rights 
Adapted from Furubotn and Richter (2005) and Slangen et al. (2008). 
The New Property Rights Theory (NPRT) – also referred to as the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore model of property rights (see also chapter 1.4.2.) – came to the 
forefront with the development of transaction costs economics and incomplete contract 
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theories (Coase, 1960). Two basic questions lie at the heart of the NPRT: (i) how can a 
society (or organization) create incentives for its members that will lead to efficient behavior?; 
(ii) how can resources be allocated efficiently among members of the society? The starting 
point for NPRT is that these two questions are closely related because the allocation of 
resources also affects the incentives of individuals. In essence, the NPRT then investigates the 
optimal allocation of property rights with respect to the incentive alignment of economic 
actors. However, property rights are considered as incomplete contracts because under 
conditions of bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty it is impossible to specify 
complete contracts. Hence, some details of allocation and use of the resource are left to future 
specification or the discretion of economic actors. This leads to the notion of residual rights 
and claims over resources (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Segal and Whinston, 2013). 
The notion of property rights is closely related to that of residual claimancy, which 
depends on the owner’s ability to exercise residual control rights over the property and to 
derive residual income from it (Barzel, 1997). Central in NPRT is the question of who has the 
residual control rights and who has the residual income rights (Slangen et al., 2008). The 
residual control right is the right to make any decision concerning an asset that is not 
explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another person (or organization) by contract. The 
residual income rights are the rights over the residual income which is the amount that 
remains from the gross-return of a company, activity, good or service after all the contractual 
commitments are fulfilled (Slangen et al., 2008). In the discussion of property rights and the 
respective incentives to make productive investments in land, NPRT states that incentives will 
be maximized if residual control rights and residual income rights are with the same 
decision-maker. Separating control of the assets would therefore reduce the incentive to invest 
(Hart and Moore, 1990). Moreover, rights to determine how to use the land are regularly 
ignored but have significant impacts on households’ inputs (Markussen et al., 2011). 
In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of existing studies on the 
relationship between property rights and investment incentives. Most studies focus on the 
effect of tenure security, either from the assurance or the substance perspective. My analysis 
in section 4 will contribute to the existing literature by adding the dimension of residual 
claimancy to the discussion of property rights effects on management investments. 
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2.3.3 Property rights and investments 
The evolution of property rights and their effects on investment are central issues in the 
development literature (Besley, 1995). Land tenure security is expected to positively influence 
investment in land, as it improves the claims on benefits from the investment, access to credit 
markets and gains from land trading with other farmers (Besley, 1995; Fenske, 2011; Ma et 
al., 2013). Several studies have investigated the relationship between land tenure security and 
investment (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Zikhali, 2010; Deininger et al., 2011; Beekman and 
Bulte, 2012).  
For crops with long gestation periods like trees, property rights are essential for 
providing management incentives (Holden et al., 2011). Since forestry requires long-term 
investment, the security and capacity to reap future benefits is crucial. Zhang and Pearse 
(1996) present empirical evidence on the relationship between different kinds of forest tenure 
and investment in silviculture in British Columbia, finding that investment under private 
ownership is higher than under forest licenses. They support the hypothesis that more secure 
forms of tenure over forestland lead to improved reforestation and more intensive silviculture. 
Nautiyal and Rawat (1996) find that the duration of tenure and its security are crucial 
attributes for investment by forestry firms; longer and / or more secure tenure will attract 
more capital. In a literature review, Godoy (1992) discusses the factors that affect 
smallholders’ tree cultivation. Tenure security appears to be the most important determinant, 
next to output prices. Simmons et al. (2002) found that tenure security affects tree plantation. 
Also Mekonnen (2009) shows that land-tenure insecurity influences the decision to grow trees. 
The study of Ali et al. (2011) suggests that more secure and transferable land rights promote 
long-term investment such as in perennial trees. Koo (2011) found that formalizing land rights 
induces farmers’ investment including the planting of trees.  
For China, only a few studies exist that discuss the influence of forest tenure on forest 
management. Land rights do have impact on household decision-making because village 
collectives officially own the land but some individual households have fixed-term contracts 
to use the land for their own production activities (Mullan and Kontoleon, 2011). Based on a 
comparative qualitative analysis, Gao and Zhang (2012) find that the recent forestland reform 
that intended to increase households’ forest tenure security and decision-making power, 
indeed increased farmers’ motivation to invest. As a result, rural farmers’ income increased 
and natural resource conservation and biodiversity improved. The forestry reform furthermore 
gave farmers greater power to make decisions about their forest management (Liu, 2008; Gao 
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and Zhang, 2012). The study of Sun (2008) found, based on qualitative research, that 
monetary investment and labour investment per unit of land is higher for individual 
management than under partnership management. The lowest investment intensity was 
observed under systems with management by the collective. Finally, a number of recent 
academic contributions has also quantitatively investigated the impact of property rights 
reforms, land rights and tenure security on forestry management investments in China (Qin 
and Xu, 2013; Xie et al., 2013). 
Literature hence suggests that for long-term forestry projects, tenure security is crucial 
to maintain farmers’ investment. In section 4, we will add the dimension of residual 
claimancy to this discussion of property rights effects on incentives.  
 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Data collection 
Jiangxi province was selected as the survey area because it is the second province to start the 
new forest tenure reform, and collective forest tenure covers around 85% of the total forest 
area. Furthermore, a number of large-scale forestry programs have been implemented in 
Jiangxi.  
Jiangxi province is located in the south of China (see Figure 2.1) and is one of the 
most forest-abundant provinces with 158 million mu9 (10.54 million hectare) of forestland 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). The forest coverage rate is 58.32% which is 
nearly three times higher than the national average of 20.36%. Jiangxi ranks second among 
China’s provinces in terms of forest coverage (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011).  
During the first devolution of forest tenure in the early 1980s, Jiangxi devolved the 
majority of forestland to farm households. However, in the late 1980s, much of the forestland 
was reclaimed by the collectives when the redistribution stopped (see Holden et al. 2011). 
From 2004 onwards, Jiangxi started the new devolution reform as a pioneer province.  
In Jiangxi, a number of large-scale forestry programs have been carried out, covering a 
variety of forest functions, e.g. the mitigation of erosion, the promotion of bio-energy forests 
for increasing energy security, carbon sequestration, food security, afforestation and 
reforestation (Forestry Department of Jiangxi Province, 2012). This paper takes the case of a 
                                                   
9
 1 mu = 1/15 hectare. 
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current governmental program to promote camellia in Jiangxi. Camellia are traditional, 
tropical, oil-bearing species in China. Their seeds can be processed to cooking oil and 
biodiesel, however, their promotion furthermore aims at the establishment of carbon sinks and 
the prevention of soil erosion. The Chinese government set a target to plant 24,870,000 mu (1, 
658, 000 hectare) of camellia by 2020 in the whole of China (State Forestry Administration, 
2009). A subsidy program has been devised for large-scale camellia projects, and Jiangxi is 
one of the key provinces in the government’s large-scale program. With a plantation area 
target of 4, 000, 000 mu (266, 667 hectare) by 2020, it accounts for 16% of the total target 
(State Forestry Administration, 2009). Plantation took place from autumn 2008 until 2011, 
forest plantations hence are still in the initiation stage. In this study, two large-scale camellia 
projects were selected, one making use of subsidies from the central government, the other 
from foreign loans. 
 
Figure 2.1: Location of survey areas  
 
 
For this research, a survey was carried out in Jiangxi province from July to August 2011. Two 
counties were selected based on the difference in economic development levels, geographic 
conditions and camellia development levels. Suichuan county (with both a domestic and a 
foreign loan project) is located in the south of Jiangxi province (see Figure 2.1) which is 
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relatively poor and less developed, while Fengchen county (with a domestic project) is 
located in the north of Jiangxi which is relatively rich and more developed. Both counties 
have a long camellia plantation history (Development and Reform Commission of Jiangxi 
Province, 2011). Table 2 .2 summarizes the main characteristics of these counties.  
In each county, 14 villages were randomly selected. For each village, around ten 
villagers were randomly selected and interviewed. After checking the survey, we found that 
139 out of the 280 interviewees participated in the camellia projects, with 182 camellia 
forestry land plots belonging to the projects. Apart from basic household characteristics (age, 
gender, education, family size, assets), we included questions on the investment for each 
forest plot and the characteristics of each plot (slope, soil quality, distance to home), as well 
as on the kind of forest tenure regime.  
Table 2. 2: Summary description of the two counties 
Characteristics  Suichuan Fengchen 
GDP per capita （RMB/person） 9, 746 17, 556 
Forestry output value (10, 000RMB) 35,646 15, 938 
Forest area (Hectare) 177, 490 103, 319 
Primary Industry Value-added in total (percentage )  19.8% 18.0% 
Secondary Industry  
Value-added in total (percentage ) 
47.8% 52.8% 
Tertiary Industry Value-added in total (percentage ) 32.4% 29.1% 
Rural Employed Persons (1, 000 persons) 264, 837 489, 303 
Number of Employed Persons in Secondary Industry (1, 000 persons) 3, 393 28, 975 
Number of Employed Persons in Tertiary Industry (1, 000 persons) 12, 041 27, 735 
Degree of urbanization 41% 45% 
Population density (person/square kilometer)  175.88 482.25 
Rainfall (mm/year) 1, 421.2 1, 552.1 
Altitude (m) 82-2, 120.4  20-1, 169.1  
Mean temperatures (℃) 15.1-18.7 15.3-17.7 
Average yields of grain crops (ton/hectare) 5.49 6.37 
Source of data: Own calculations based on Bureau of Statistics of Jiangxi Province (2011)  
 
2.4.2 Empirical model and variables 
Equation (2.1) presents the regression model that I use to examine the link between land 
property rights and farm household management investments (based on Besley (1995), 
Fenske (2011), Ali et al. (2011)).  
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       (2.1) 
 
where  is the measure of investment by household i on a given plot . I estimate two 
investment models. In the first model, the dependent variable  includes labour use 
(Labour) and in the second it includes capital investment (Capital) defined as purchased 
inputs (i.e. fertilizer and pesticides). Labour refers to the labour use (including hired labour) 
on the plot during the second year after plantation, divided by the size of the plot. The unit is 
Working days/Mu. For both, Capital and Labour, data of first year investment was not used 
since the government, the natural village or the camellia processing company financially 
supported first year investment in seedling and soil preparation for part of the survey 
households. Therefore, second year investment after the establishment of the plantation is a 
better proxy to estimate individual households’ investment in their forestry land. Capital 
comprises the expenditures for fertilizer and pesticides on the plot during the second year 
after plantation, divided by the size of the plot. The unit is Yuan/ Mu.  
 refers to the different tenure regimes. Dummy variable are created to estimate the 
impact from the different regimes. A dummy is 1 for a plot under a certain regime, and 0 
otherwise.  
TSij is a proxy for tenure (in)security and is measured as the risk of expropriation in 
the next ten years as perceived by the respondents. It takes the value of 1 if expropriation risk 
is perceived as high. 
 is a vector of plot-specific characteristics. It comprises Slope, Soil quality, Size, 
and Distance. Slope is defined as a dummy that is 1 for plots that have an inclination of 25 
degrees or more, and 0 otherwise. Soil quality is defined as a dummy, where 1 indicates good 
quality soils, and 0 medium or bad quality soils. Distance is the distance from the household 
homestead to the forest plot. Size is the area of the plot.  
 includes measures of household characteristics. Age is the age of the household 
head. Gender is the gender of the household head. Education is the years of schooling of the 
household head. Household size denotes the number of household members. Value of house 
presents the value of the house and is often recognized as a more accurate measure of wealth 
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than income (Uchida et al., 2007). I therefore use Vaulue of house as a proxy for wealth, also 
because homeownership is very important for villagers in Jiangxi province.  
 
2.5. Results 
Three different kinds of results are presented. The qualitative results in section 5.1 show in 
how far a recentralization of forest tenure regimes has taken place with the implementation of 
large-scale camellia forestry projects. Combining the property rights dimension of tenure 
security with the NPRT, I develop hypotheses about the extent to which the different tenure 
regimes that were identified may provide different incentives for farmers’ management 
investments. After presenting some descriptive statistics to provide insight into the survey 
sample, I will test the hypotheses in section 5.3.    
2.5.1 Tenure regimes 
From the survey, five types of forestry management tenure regimes are identified, which are 
distinguished based on the different kinds of property rights (see Table 2.3). The table shows 
that even if these plantations are realized within the frame of large-scale projects, no 
recentralization of forest tenure is observed for the case of Jiangxi. Furthermore, as will be 
shown in section 5.2, with the exception of Partnership, the observed regimes are rather 
equally distributed in their occurrences. A variety of tenure regimes persists under the 
large-scale projects.  
Table 2.3 shows that the forest tenure regimes of the survey have some similarities but 
also some differences with those in literature (Xu et al., 2008; Sun, 2008; Holden et al., 2011). 
The regimes “Individual” and “Partnership” are the same as those mentioned by Sun (2008), 
Xu et al. (2008) and Holden et al. (2011). The regime “Company” is a kind of “Outsider 
contract management” described by Xu et al. (2008). Management by a Villagers’ Group (Xu 
et al., 2008) / Natural village (Sun, 2008) is divided into two different regimes, i.e. the 
“Collective” and the “Collective-Individual” on the level of the natural village. In both 
regimes, the village representatives are of crucial importance. In general, village 
representatives are responsible to manage the collective land (forestland and agricultural land) 
as well as public goods such as infrastructure. In Jiangxi, representatives are not formally 
elected but become representatives based on e.g. their influence, membership of a larger clan, 
or previous professional activities (e.g. teacher, soldier) (interview with the natural village 
representative). Under the Collective-Individual regime, the village representatives coordinate 
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the start of the plantation with all villagers, and then the village representatives distribute the 
forestland plots to individual households to manage the forest afterwards. Under Collective 
regime, the village representatives manage the forest together with the villagers. Even if under 
these two regimes, benefits and income formally belong to all villagers, malversation and 
corruption is reported for the activities of some villages’ representatives.  
Collective regime by an administrative village council (Xu et al., 2008; Sun, 2008; 
Holden et al., 2011) was not part of the survey sample, which is why it will not be considered 
in the analysis. 
Table 2.3: Tenure regimes in the survey area  
  Collective Company 
Collective 
-Individual 
Partnership Individual 
 
Residual 
control rights  
 
Labour Individual Individual Individual 
Individual in  
partnership 
Individual 
Capital 
Natural 
village 
Individual Individual 
Individual in 
partnership 
Individual 
Residual 
income rights 
 
Natural 
village 
Individual 
/ Company  
Individual 
Individual in 
partnership 
Individual 
Tenure 
security 
 LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Management 
investment 
incentives 
 LOW -----------------------------------------------------------------> HIGH 
Source of data: Own survey.  
Next, I discuss the different tenure regimes in terms of the associated property rights. 
In line with section 3, I distinguish two dimensions of property rights, on the one hand tenure 
security and on the other hand residual control and income rights. Tenure security is 
interpreted here in terms of assurance, namely whether individual households hold land rights 
and hence can control the future destination of the land (security is high) or not (security is 
low).10 In the discussion of the tenure regimes in terms of the residual control and income 
rights, I distinguish between residual control over capital input and labour input. The reason 
for this is that different parties may be responsible for decisions over labour and capital. This 
is also reflected in the empirical approach that we will undertake in section 5.3.  
Under the Collective regime, management of forests is coordinated by the natural 
village representatives. Natural village representatives control the level of capital investment. 
Individuals are assigned the tasks of working on the forestland and making day-to-day 
                                                   
10 Note that in the Chinese context, forestland can only belong officially to the government or the collective. 
Individual land titles should hence be interpreted as user rights for a certain duration set by the central policy. 
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decisions about the labour effort they put in and the care they take in performing the assigned 
tasks. Hence, individuals have residual control rights over labour. The natural village 
community, however, has residual income rights. Tenure security under the Collective regime 
is low as land titles are held collectively. In the case of the Company regime, the company and 
village representatives agree on the management of the camellia plantation at the start of the 
project. Households are involved in the daily management and have the residual control rights. 
The company and the natural village representatives are monitoring the project. Residual 
income rights are shared between individuals and the company in the short-run, where the 
contract specifies that the company receives the largest share of the residual. However, in the 
long-run, the company and the village representatives hold the power to decide on the future 
of the forestland and as a consequence, tenure security is low under this regime. Under the 
Collective-Individual regime, the village representatives distribute the forestland plots to 
individual households who manage them, thus the residual control and income rights are 
transferred to the farm households, and the farm household decides on the labour and capital 
use. However, as the households do not receive a forestland certificate, the representatives 
still have the power to redistribute the forestland at a later stage, which means that farmers’ 
tenure security is low in the long-term, where uncertainty about the duration of use rights 
exists. Under Partnership, individual farm households join together in a partnership and take 
joint decisions on the plantation and inputs and outputs, more specifically, the labour and 
capital use are generally decided by a joint decision in the partnership. Residual control rights 
belong to the individuals in the partnership. The individuals in the partnership decide to share 
the residual income. Incentives are expected to be stronger under the partnership regime than 
under the previously discussed regimes because residual control and income rights are 
assigned to the same parties. However, decision-making – especially in the long-run – is the 
result of mutual agreement between the members of the partnership. This may mean that there 
remains some uncertainty over long-run residual income distribution as partner motivations 
and the impact of future events on partners’ decision-making is not known. Furthermore, 
tenure security may be lower for the partnership as a whole as individual land rights are 
bundled in the partnership. Under the Individual regime, residual control and residual income 
rights belong to the individual. Moreover, land tenure rights are assigned to individuals and 
hence the tenure security is strong.  
In conclusion, these five forms of forest tenure regimes differ in various property 
rights dimensions, implying different degrees of tenure security and residual claimancy for 
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farm households. Based on the qualitative results in table 2.3, we hypothesize that the regime 
with the highest incentives for individual investment is the Individual regime. In this case, 
residual control rights and residual income rights are with the same decision-maker and tenure 
security is high. The Partnership regime may also motivate individuals to make management 
investments since the individuals in the partnership hold both the residual control rights and 
income rights. However, some uncertainty remains with respect to the other partners’ 
decision-making motivations and the security of tenure rights for the partnership as a whole. 
Investment incentives hence will be lower than in the Individual regime. While residual 
claimancy is high, tenure security will be relatively low in the Collective-Individual regime 
since it will be uncertain for the farmers if the village representatives intervene in their land 
property rights in the future. This will negatively affect the incentives of individuals under 
Collective-Individual. Under Company regime, residual control rights are with the farmer, 
however, residual income rights are shared with the company and in the long-run, also village 
representatives play a role in residual income distribution. Incentives for investment hence 
will not be as high as with the above regimes. Finally, Collective is the least optimal regime 
because residual income rights and residual control rights are not with the same 
decision-maker. Furthermore, tenure security is low under this regime, investment hence is 
assumed to be low.  
In the following, I will test these assumptions based on our survey data.  
2.5.2 Descriptive statistics of survey sample 
Descriptive statistics in table 2.4 show that many of the survey villagers, i.e. 36.3%, were part 
of the Collective-Individual regime, and 35.2% were part of the Individual regime. 21.4% of 
the interviewees cooperate with a company, and only 7.1% joined in a Partnership with other 
farmers.
11
 The distribution of these different tenure regimes again shows that large-scale 
forestry projects do not seem to result in a centralization of forestry tenure in the case of 
Jiangxi. A multitude of different tenure regimes exists. Furthermore, perceived tenure 
insecurity seems to be high: for more than 75% of the sampled plots, households indicate that 
there is a high risk of expropriation in the next ten years. 
                                                   
11 Note that the Collective regime is not included in the analysis because survey households were not much 
involved in forestry management under this regime and are hence not familiar with the situation. 
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Second year investment in the cultivation of camellia cannot be considered high with 
an average labour intensity of 3 days / mu, and a capital input intensity of 35 Yuan per mu. It 
is lower than the general technical requirements stipulated by the government.  
While cultivation conditions are favorable in terms of slope (only 25.1% of the trees 
grow on land with a slope of more than 25 degree steepness), and a relatively short distance to 
the households (on average around 1.2 kilometers), plot size is small (average size of 15 mu 
or 1 hectare), and also the percentage of good soil quality is only 17.6%, with the majority of 
plots being of medium quality. However, in general, the conditions for forest plantations may 
be considered as favorable.  
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis 
 Mean/Percentage Std. dev. Min Max 
Investment 
    
Labour (Days/ Mu) 3.20 3.54 0 30 
Capital (Yuan/Mu) 34.76 56.87 0 300 
Partnership (Dummy) 7.1%  0 1 
Collective-Individual (Dummy) 36.3%  0 1 
Company (Dummy) 21.4%  0 1 
Individual (Base) 35.2%    
Tenure insecurity (Dummy) 76.9%  0 1 
Size (Mu) 15.69 28.53 0.23 200 
Distance (Kilometre) 1.19 1.13 0.05 7.5 
Slope (Dummy) 25.1% 0.43 0 1 
Soil quality (Dummy) 17.6%  0.38 0 1 
Gender (Dummy) 97.8% 0.15 0 1 
Age (Years) 49.68 11.21 24 78 
Education (Years) 6.87 3.07 0 14 
Household size  5.16 2.02 2 13 
Value of house (thousand Yuan) 55.72 72.15 0.02 600 
Source of data: Own survey.    
For the remote mountainous areas in China, household characteristics may to some 
extent be considered representative. Survey household heads are male and on average 50 
years old, with a rather low education level of 7 years (first year middle school). Elder 
generations are not well educated, however, younger generations typically spend 9 
(compulsory) to 12 years in school. While the younger generation still lives together with 
their parents, young adults have migrated out of the village to work in urban areas. 
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Interviewees however still consider them as part of the household, so that the average 
household size is 5 members, consisting of three generations in a household. The average 
housing value is 55,000 Yuan which is around 10 times higher than the average net income 
per capita in the rural areas of Jiangxi province. It shows that households considerably invest 
in their housing estate, which again proves that the value of house is a good indicator of 
wealth. 
2.5.3 Regression results 
Because household investments in labour effort and input use are censored at the lower bound, 
i.e. the lower bound is zero when no effort or inputs are applied, I used a Tobit regression 
model. This was especially relevant for estimating the capital investment model because 53% 
of the sampled plots received no fertilizer or pesticide inputs in the second year after 
plantation.   
 Before turning to the results, I want to draw attention to two issues related to the 
inclusion of the tenure security variable. First, as table 2.3 shows, tenure security and tenure 
regimes may be correlated. An investigation of the correlation coefficients between the four 
tenure regimes and tenure insecurity confirms the existence of such correlation, especially in 
the case of the Collective-Individual regime. This is important because high degrees of 
multicollinearity may result in insignificant coefficients in the estimation model. However, I 
think it is useful to include both these indicators of property rights in the model because it 
allows me to separate the effect of tenure insecurity from the residual control and income 
effects related to the tenure regimes, as hypothesised in section 3. Second, there is an 
extensive debate in the literature about the potential endogeneity of the variable tenure 
security in investment models (see Ma et al. (2013) for a comprehensive overview). I 
therefore also present a discussion and an estimation model that takes into account this 
endogeneity effect in Appendix IV. Because the endogeneity model and the Tobit model 
provide largely similar results, I limit the following discussion to the results of the Tobit 
estimation, presented in table 2.5. 
 The results show that the only management regime that has, in comparison to the 
Individual regime, a positive impact on capital investment, is management under Partnership 
(significant at 5% level). Labour use under Partnership is however not significant. This result 
leads to the conclusion that Partnership has higher fertilizer and pesticide inputs than the 
Individual regime. This result contradicts our assumption in section 5.1 that incentives are 
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lower under Partnership than under the Individual regime. A reason for this may be that 
farmers who join a Partnership are often friends and relatives, which means that they may put 
more trust in the long-term stability of the arrangement and therefore perceive a high security 
of investments within this relationship. Furthermore, since partners have joint responsibility 
for the partnership, they may not be likely to abandon the plantation afterwards. As a result, 
farmers in a Partnership may have a higher management investment intensity compared to the 
Individual regime. Trust in the continuation of the current arrangement
12
 hence seems to be a 
crucial factor for farmers’ management investment. This finding is supported by other 
research having pointed at the importance of trust in economic decisions (Tu et al., 2011). A 
further reason for higher capital investment can be related to partnerships’ easier access to 
credits (interview with county officer), which increases partners’ financial capacity to buy 
capital inputs. Findings to some extent are supportive to the central and local government’s 
policy to promote partnerships. During the survey, some farmers indicated that they join 
together to get access to subsidies and credit, but the management was practiced individually 
which might result in the impact on labour investment not being significant. 
Results show that under the Company regime, investment is significantly lower than 
under the Individual regime, both for labour and capital. This is in line with our expectations 
and confirms that under the Company regime, the residual control and income are not 
completely under the authority of the individual. Similarly, the farm household investment 
level is quite low under the Collective-Individual regime. A reason for this may lie in the fact 
that the village representatives decided about the realization of the forestry project, while not 
all farmers may be interested in participating (interview with farmers). Labour use intensity 
under Collective-Individual is even lower than under the Company regime. This may be 
explained by the village representatives’ or company’s random monitoring visits. During 
these visits, they check whether farmers work on the field and monitor the seedlings survival 
rate. Such monitoring does not exist for the Collective-Individual regime. In conclusion, the 
regression results prove that under the different tenure regimes, farm households’ investment 
of labour and capital differs. The Partnership regime turns out to be the regime with the 
highest investment. Individual investment under Collective-Individual regime and Company 
regime have lower investment levels.     
                                                   
12 Note that the continuation of a (contractual) relationship can be related to the assurance perspective of tenure 
security. This is, however, distinctly different from the perception of long-term tenure security as captured by the 
variable TS (tenure insecurity). 
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Next, I discuss the results related to tenure insecurity, i.e. the perceived risk of 
expropriation. Because both tenure insecurity and tenure regimes are included in the model, 
the interpretation of the coefficients should be done under the ceteris paribus assumption. In 
other words, all else equal what will be the effect of increased tenure insecurity? The results 
show that there is a significant effect of tenure insecurity on households’ management 
investment incentives, regardless of the property rights effects that were already discussed for 
the different tenure regimes. Specifically, I find a significantly negative effect of tenure 
insecurity on labour investments. This result supports the hypothesis that uncertainty about 
the future forestland distribution may be an obstacle for security of investment. 
Table 2.5: Regression results for household investment  
Variable Labour Capital 
Coef. z-statistic Coef. z-statistic 
Partnership  -0.82 -0.84 85.45*** 3.25 
Collective-Individual -2.66*** -4.25 -80.20*** -4.20 
Company -1.72** -2.50 -81.24*** -3.73 
Tenure insecurity -1.02* -1.73 25.69 1.46 
Size -0.03*** -3.08 0.43* 1.72 
Distance -0.13 -0.57 7.31 1.17 
Slope 1.35** 2.38 -5.96 -0.36 
Soil quality -0.57 -0.90 6.53 0.34 
Gender -2.21 -1.36 68.51 1.46 
Age 0.06** 2.52 0.72 1.01 
Education -0.01 -0.08 -6.34** -2.46 
Household size -0.48*** -3.87 0.78 0.22 
Value of house -0.01* -1.68 0.00 -0.04 
Constant 7.63 *** 3.17 -64.61 -0.89 
Pseudo R
2 0.06  0.05  
Number of observations 182    
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, and *** Significant at 1%.  
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Apart from the tenure regimes and tenure insecurity, results in Table 2.5 show that 
characteristics of plots also affect farm households’ labour and capital investment levels. The 
size of the plot has a negative impact on labour intensity and a positive impact on capital 
investment. For each mu increase in size, the labour use intensity decreases and the capital use 
intensity increases. Smaller farm households hence use relatively more labour and spend less 
money to purchase fertilizers and pesticides. Furthermore, in China, forestland is allocated 
based on household size. This means that small forest areas relate to small households which 
may have less monetary capital to invest and then use labour to substitute for capital. The 
positive and significant slope coefficient in the labour investment regression implies that a 
plot with a steeper slope requires more labour input. However, steep slopes are not 
compensated for with higher capital input. Interestingly, distance and soil quality prove not to 
have a significant influence on investment intensity. 
At the household level, results show that the age of the household head has a positive 
impact on labour use (significant at 5% level), i.e. the older the household head, the higher the 
investment of labour on forestland. Education has a negative impact on capital input 
(significant at 5% level), which is in line with studies on agricultural production costs (Tan et 
al., 2008). The reason may be that farmers with a higher education level are more skilful in 
forest activities, which decreases investment inputs. Moreover, household size has a negative 
impact on labour use (significant at 1% level), because the larger households may adopt better 
management methods and may be more able to manage the crop in a timely manner (Tan et 
al., 2008). However, for the capital variable, household size is not significant. Finally, the 
value of the house estate has a negative impact on labour use intensity which means that 
wealthy households spend less labour on the plot (significant at 10% level). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Many international organizations and developing countries are taking measures to facilitate 
farmers’ participation in forest cultivation and management by establishing large-scale 
forestry projects. Also in China, a lot of projects have been initiated with multiple functions, 
e.g. to prevent erosion, for carbon sequestration and for poverty alleviation. The findings of 
this research provide some important insights for the design and implementation of 
large-scale forestry projects. 
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Qualitative results of my research show that in the case at hand, large-scale forestry 
projects did not lead to a centralization of forest tenure. A variety of tenure regimes exist, 
with none of them dominating. From the persistence of this variety of tenure regimes, it can 
be conclude that, after a series of forest tenure reforms, forest tenure regimes in China may 
have become more stable. 
This paper furthermore examines whether property rights, and more specifically tenure 
security and different tenure regimes, affect household investment, measured by labour use 
and capital use intensity. We find that in Jiangxi Province, China, the tenure regime with the 
highest level of farmers’ investment in pesticides and fertlizers is the Partnership regime. The 
success of the Partnership regime may be explained by factors of trust and associates’ 
authority over alteration rights. A further reason for the high level of capital investment may 
be the easier access to bank loans. With only 7.1% of the sample farmers having joined a 
partnership, investment of the large majority of farmers is hence not optimal within the given 
projects. The constraint in accessing credits may be a reason for farmers under the Individual 
regime not revealing the highest level of management investment. 
 It is also worthwhile to place these results within the specific context of China. First, 
some uncertainty on land property rights remains because of the redistribution rights of 
natural villages, hence the tenure security of Collective-Individual regime is lower than that of 
Partnership and Individual regimes. I also find evidence of this in the data where uncertainty 
is higher and investment incentives are lower, i.e. in the Collective-Individual regime.  
Finally, the dominance of the Partnership regime in the results on investment 
incentives can also be viewed in light of the specific Chinese context, namely the importance 
of guanxi (connection) within family relations. High levels of trust in these relations may lead 
to strong incentives in partnerships. 
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Chapter 3. Benefit distribution among smallholders in 
large-scale forestry projects: the case of camellia in 
China13 
 
Abstract: While internationally, large-scale forestry projects have gained in importance for 
climate change mitigation (e.g. CDM, REDD+), the implementation of such projects, 
particularly in regions with smallholder forestry like Southeast and East Asia, faces various 
obstacles. Hereby, the equity of benefit distribution is generally considered vital to support a 
balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guarantee long-term project 
success. China presents an especially interesting case of smallholder forestry. The conversion 
from 2003 onwards from collectively-managed to household-managed forests has increased 
the number of small farmers in large-scale forestry projects substantially. Using two cases of 
(inter)national camellia plantation projects, this research analyzes the distribution of benefits 
under different so-called forestry project implementation regimes. Empirical research was 
undertaken in thirty villages in three counties of Jiangxi province, China, applying 
semi-structured stakeholder interviews and a survey among over 308 smallholders. Results 
show that five implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. 
Individual, Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own 
specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. Collective-individual, 
Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes perform better in terms of program 
access and equal benefit distribution than Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the 
former three regimes, village leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit 
reducing the benefits to and marginal smallholders. These conclusions are policy relevant as 
in formulating (inter)national forestry projects the local implementation regimes need to be 
taken into account, reducing the possibility for standardized forestry projects in China.  
 
Keyword: Governance, institutions, forest tenure, EIB, Jiangxi  
 
                                                   
13 This chapter is based on Li, J., Bluemling, B., Mol, A.P.J., Feng, S., Benefit distribution among smallholders 
in large-scale forestry projects: the case of camellia in China, to be submitted to Journal of Rural Studies. 
66 
 
3.1. Introduction 
According to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, deforestation and forest 
degradation contribute to about 17% of all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide (IPCC, 2007). 
This makes forestry the third most important sector for climate change mitigation after global 
energy supply (26%) and industrial sectors (19%). Afforestation and reforestation increase 
global carbon sinks, which remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Afforestation and 
reforestation projects also contribute to income increase, poverty alleviation and ecological 
benefits. China achieves great success in increasing its forest area by afforestation and 
reforestation projects for both ecological purposes and economic interests. A list of large scale 
forest projects such as Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP) and the Sloping Land 
Conservation Program (SLCP) have been undertaken. After years of afforestation, China has 
the largest area of forest plantation in the world (FAO, 2011; Liang and Mol, 2013).   
In developing countries, forestry is often carried out in a smallholders’ context. The 
payment for carbon sequestration accordingly needs to reach a large number of smallholders 
in a project. In these contexts, projects face high transaction costs for the coordination of 
smallholders’ contribution to carbon sequestration, as well as for setting up local institutions 
to monitor and distribute benefits (Reynolds, 2012; Roshetko et al., 2002). As collaboration 
with many and dispersed smallholders imposes high transaction costs, mechanisms “need to 
be created to overcome the obstacles that transaction costs can create to the participation by 
the poor” (Pagiola et al., 2005: 245), so that it will be possible for smallholders to access 
international funds (Roshetko et al., 2002; Coomes et al., 2008). To overcome transaction 
costs, capacity building, simplified modalities and monitoring, as well as ‘pooled projects’, 
are considered suitable measures (Smith and Scherr, 2003). Moreover, various organizations 
(e.g. governments, non-governmental organizations and international research organizations) 
have a potential role in minimizing transaction costs in smallholder forest-carbon projects 
(Cacho et al., 2003). Setting up cooperation between local people and NGOs is considered 
crucial to minimize transaction costs.  
Such collaborations are particularly important for the remote poor to enhance 
participatory monitoring in forest management (Skutsch, 2005). Empirical research has shown 
that local involvement in project implementation is a vital determinant for project success 
(Reynolds, 2012). To this end, community-based management has been considered crucial as 
communities will know best how to integrate local conditions into a management regime. In 
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community based environmental management, collective action is important to coordinate 
individual or group activities, and a strong internal organization is necessary to establish 
management and to settle disputes (Rosa et al., 2004). For a large-scale carbon sequestration 
project, this would imply that groups of smallholders join the project collectively rather than 
individually via a system of collective contracting, as exemplified by Pagiola and colleagues 
(2005). Smallholders projects thus need careful design and implementation so that they can 
take into consideration the complexity of the local context (Boyd et al., 2007). 
Forestry projects in developing countries hence have the potential to benefit the poor, 
if their design both encourages the participation of smallholders (Cacho et al., 2003) and 
reduces transaction costs. Apart from this, an equal distribution of benefits within a project 
has been considered important for the long-term success of large-scale forestry projects 
involving smallholders. ‘Pro-poor’ or at least not increasing inequity is one of the principles 
identified in international carbon stock projects (Hoang et al., 2013). Beneﬁt-sharing, 
including providing access to non-timber forest products (NTFPs) on carbon forestry sites, 
was another clear determinant of project success (Reynolds, 2012). Moreover, equity is also a 
key component of sustainable development (Brown and Corbera, 2003). Equity and benefit 
distribution in rural poor areas are crucial concerns in developing countries, and are also aims 
of most international projects and donors.  
Although equity and benefit distribution in forestry projects have raised increasing 
concern, there are few studies that analyse benefit distribution mechanisms and their impacts, 
particularly on the level of local communities. The aim of this study is accordingly to 
understand the mechanisms of benefit distribution and how smallholders benefit from 
large-scale forestry projects under different project implementation regimes, taking China as 
example. China presents a particularly suitable context for such an analysis as in recent 
decades, China’s forestry sector underwent devolution, i.e. the user rights of forestland have 
increasingly been transferred to households (Lu et al., 2002). Moreover, the Chinese 
government promotes large-scale afforestation and reforestation projects.  
In this research, we understand forestry projects as nested multi-level governance 
arrangements, where stipulations on the upper levels will have distributional impacts on 
community and smallholders on lower levels. However, such stipulations will be co- and 
re-defined in the context of the community. We hence will find project stipulations being 
adapted to the context of local communities, which will influence the distribution of benefits.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section describes the analytical 
framework used to analyse benefit distribution of two large-scale forestry projects. The third 
section introduces the research site and data collection methods. The fourth section introduce 
the major factors that determine benefit distribution: local governance institutions, forest 
tenure and forestry project design. The fifth section analyses and compares the five forest 
project implementation regimes on their benefit distribution mechanisms and outcomes across 
various scales. The last section concludes the article. 
 
3.2. Analyzing forest project implementation: an analytical framework 
Forestry projects can be understood as nested multi-level governance arrangements, which 
have effects on the distribution of benefits among stakeholders. The design and 
implementation of forest projects determine how benefits are distributed among forest 
smallholders. The first section develops the notion of forest project implementation regimes 
and discusses the factors that influence these regimes and thus benefit distribution. The 
second section operationalizes benefit distribution as the dependent variable of this research.  
3.2.1 Analysis of forest project implementation regimes 
As projects are understood as nested multi-level governance arrangements, their analysis will 
focus on their “implementation regimes” which cross different governance levels. Project 
implementation regimes can be defined as the rules and decision making actors that govern 
the implementation of (forest) projects. As such, they are similar to “institutional 
arrangements” as defined by Adger et al. (2003: 1100) who sees these arrangements as 
“(particular sets of rules) through which ... decisions are implemented”.   
This study focuses on two major factors that co-determine the project implementation regimes 
that function at the local level where forest smallholders operate: local governance institutions 
and forest tenure. The design of forest projects, a third factor included in this study, does not 
directly influences the forest project implementation regime but is essential in benefits 
distribution (Figure 3.1). 
Previous research has shown that local governance institutions play a critical role in 
explaining variations in local forest resource management (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997; Geist 
and Lambin, 2001; Gibson et al., 2005; Andersson and Gibson, 2007). Agrawal and Yadama 
(1997) suggest that local governance institutions mediate the influence of exogenous and 
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higher level drivers of forest management. Anderson and Agrawal (2011) equally show that 
local institutional arrangements moderate the effects of higher level socioeconomic factors 
and thus affect socioeconomic outcomes in local contexts. Local institutions for resource 
access and control mediate benefit distributions outcomes (Mcdermott, 2009). Hence the 
implementation of supra-local forestry projects is moderated and specified by local 
governance institutions.  
But higher level institutions, including formal (e.g. forestry policies, collective action 
institutions) and informal (e.g. traditional practices for natural resource management) 
institutions (Corbera et al., 2007), do still (strongly) influence the local governance of projects. 
Forestland property rights or forestland tenure forms an important example of how formal and 
informal institutions are affecting the effectiveness of local forest management (Agrawal and 
Ostrom, 2001). However, the devolution of forest tenure in developing countries not only 
affects local forest management, but also the implementation of forestry investment projects 
(Sunderlin et al., 2009). Larson (2011) has shown that land tenure reform and different land 
tenure regimes can have detrimental impacts on the implementation of REDD+ climate 
change mitigation projects. Hence, among the higher level institutions, forest tenure is an 
important institution in shaping forestry projects implementation regimes.  
A further factor that is assumed to determine benefit distribution among smallholders 
and stakeholders comes from the forestry projects themselves. Here, the most important 
determinants are located on the local or intermediary project level (Hoang et al., 2013). This 
is why it is important to focus the analysis on project design and project management, as well 
as on the behavior of key stakeholders within the project (Reynolds, 2012). Within this study, 
the focus of analysis for international and national projects will hence be on how they 
translate to and are operational zed on the local levels.  
At the local level, the five different forest project implementation regimes that are 
empirically determined are labeled Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership 
and Individual regimes. This denomination is based on their different tenure regimes.   
3.2.2 Benefit distribution and equity 
For the analysis of benefit distribution, we will focus mainly on the forest smallholders, while 
paying some attention to benefits distributed to natural village cadres and involved companies. 
We analyse benefit distribution on two levels (Figure 3.1). First, we look at the access to 
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project resources of those smallholders willing to participate in a project. Through the project, 
participants will get access to resources from the project, which is why access determines 
final benefit distribution. Also other studies have taken access rights as a parameter to 
measure benefit distribution (Pagdee et al., 2006; Brown and Corbera, 2003).  
Distribution or allocation of resources within a project is the second level of analysis. 
In addition, among the project participants, benefit distribution differs among different local 
villages due to different project implementation regimes. Benefit distribution is differentiated 
into the distribution of direct and indirect gains (Angelsen et al., 2012). Direct gains include 
monetary gains from international and national finance, forest products and income from 
providing ecosystem services. Indirect benefits relate to institutional improvements that lead 
to better governance, such as clarifying tenure rights and law enforcement that come with 
project implementation (Angelsen et al., 2012). Clarifying tenure rights refers to the fact that 
the project implementation can clarify and reinforce informal user rights of farmers without 
legal certificate, which increases certainty to these farmers regarding forestland user rights for 
a specified period. Finally, project implementation regimes might result in substantial benefits 
for villages cadres (also through corruption) and companies involved in project 
implementation, reducing total benefits left for distribution among forest smallholders. 
Figure 3.1: Analytical framework 
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Figure 3.1 shows the analytical framework which will be applied to study various villages 
and projects. Benefit distribution results will then be further assessed against the notion of 
equity or equal/just distribution of benefits (Pagdee et al., 2006; Mahanty et al., 2006; 
Lawrence, 2007; Mcdermott and Schreckenberg, 2009). Mahanty and colleagues (2006) have 
analyzed how and to what extent equity comes with the distribution of benefits. While benefit 
distribution in this article is an analytical term to reveal how (through what mechanisms and 
factors) benefits are distributed, the concept of equity is a normative concept related to the 
fairness of benefit distribution. 
 
3.3. Study sites and data collection 
In order to explore mechanisms of benefit distribution through large-scale forestry projects, 
this paper looks at current governmental programs to promote camellia in Jiangxi province. 
China’s central government began to focus on camellia projects in 2008. Camellia is a typical 
Chinese perennial oil-producing wood species, native to sub-tropical areas. Jiangxi province 
is located in the southeast of China and is one of the most forest-abundant provinces with 
about 158 million mu (or 10.54 million hectare) of forestland, and a forest coverage rate of 
58% compared to a national average of 20% (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). 
The province ranks second among China’s provinces in terms of forest coverage. Jiangxi 
province was also selected as a study area because it is the second province to start forest 
tenure reform (see section 4 for further explanation of the reform). Furthermore, a number of 
large-scale forestry projects have been implemented in Jiangxi, covering a variety of functions, 
e.g. the mitigation of erosion, the promotion of bio-energy forests for increasing energy 
security, carbon sequestration, food security, afforestation and reforestation (Forestry 
Department of Jiangxi Province, 2012). Two of these projects have been selected and will be 
introduced in the next section. 
For the fieldwork, three counties were selected from the counties taking part in the two 
projects of the camellia Program, and thirty villages were randomly selected from these three 
counties. To understand the nested multi-level project implementation regimes of this 
program, as well as their impacts on participants and non-participants at the local level, the 
fieldwork is based on semi-structured stakeholder interviews and a farm household 
questionnaire. Interviews and survey were conducted in June through August 2011. The 
stakeholder interviews included staff from three sectors in the Provincial Jiangxi Forestry 
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Administration, the county Forest Administration (FA) in the three counties, seven township 
FAs, village leaders in thirty administrative villages and twelve natural village
14
 leaders. 
From a survey among randomly selected farm households 308 valid questionnaires were 
obtained, both from participants and non-participants in camellia projects and equally 
distributed over the thirty villages.  
At the time of the survey, camellia projects had just had started, and thus the analysis will 
not reveal a quantification of the benefit distribution among smallholders and other 
stakeholders. 
 
3.4. Project implementation regimes of camellia projects 
Based on the theoretical framework, analysis will be done across three parts, i.e. the camellia 
projects, the local governance institutions, and forest tenure.  
 
Project policy 
Within the camellia promotion programme, two distinct projects have been selected for this 
study of Jiangxi: a project financed by central government subsidies, and an international loan 
project. The project “Modern Camellia Demonstration County (MCDC)” (Xiandai Youcha 
Shifan Xian Xiangmu) is subsidized by the central financial budget. The foreign low-interest 
loan project is called the “Jiangxi Biologic Energy Forest Demonstration Base Construction 
Project” and is funded by the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB project is the first 
project financed by the EIB within the China Climate Change Framework Loan. As EIB 
offers loans which are required to be paid back within 25 years, there is a guarantee 
requirement from project participants. In Suichuan and Ji’an counties where the project is 
realized, the EIB project has a limitation requirement which stipulates that participants in the 
project should bring into the project a forestry area of at least 50 mu (see below). The MCDC 
does not have a scale requirement. 
Financial support from these two projects differs across different counties. In Ji’an, the 
subsidy consists of 200 RMB/Mu from central finances, 50 RMB/Mu from provincial 
                                                   
14 The natural village derives from the production team and the family clan, and is a subgroup of the 
administrative village.  
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finances, and 75 RMB/Mu from county finances in 2009, with an increase of the latter to 200 
RMB/Mu in 2010. In Suichuan, subsidies in 2009 were composed of 200 RMB/Mu from 
central finances, and 50 RMB/Mu from provincial finances in the frame of the MCDC project, 
and an additional 625.55 RMB/Mu loan from the EIB project. Finally, in Fengchen, the 2009 
subsidy consists of 200 RMB/Mu from central finances, 50 RMB/Mu from provincial 
finances, and 200 RMB/Mu from the county. This basically means that the subsidies from the 
MCDC are the same in Ji’an and Fengchen, while the subsidies in Suichuan from the 
government are lower, however, the EIB project provides low-interest loan.  
 
Local governance institutions  
Local institutions are examined in how they co-determine forest project implementation 
regimes. In China, the government political system generally consists of five levels: the 
central level, provincial level, city level, county level and township level. An administrative 
village is the lowest level in the government hierarchy although it does not formally form a 
government level (Zhang et al., 2004). Each level of government contains a variety of organs, 
e.g. a council, commissions, ministries and respective administrations and authorities, which 
are ordered by function as well as by rank, so that each ministry sits atop a 
functionally-defined hierarchy of government units that exist at each territorial level of the 
government (Lieberthal, 2000). This means that the State Forestry Administration (SFA) sits 
atop of a hierarchy of Forestry Administrations (FA) at five lower levels. In some areas, 
however, the hierarchy stops at the fourth level, as no township FAs exist.  
Camellia projects in this study are implemented at the level of the county, so the 
county context and governance institutions are very important. The county government and 
FA work as the coordinators between the local level and higher levels. Because the set-up of 
the administrative structure varies across counties, various county governance structures exist 
(see Figure 3.2). 
For the implementation of camellia projects Ji’an county set up a leadership group 
(“board” in Figure 3.2), which consists of representatives from the county committee, the 
Ji’an county FA, the Development and Reform Committee of Ji’an county (DRC), the county 
74 
 
Legend  
A1 Administration Jurisdiction 
(appointment and financial resource 
decided by higher level) 
A2 Governing by Provision (The higher 
level governing the lower level by 
resource provision) 
A3 Horizontal Cooperation 
A4 Market Cooperation. 
Figure 3. 2: Local governance structure for forest project implementation in the three counties 
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Department of Finance (DOF), the county Agricultural Development Office (ADO), 
the County Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC) and the township government. The camellia 
project is implemented within the vertical government structure, as well as the structure of the 
FA, i.e. from the county government/FA to the township government/FA and then to the 
village committee and natural village. In Ji’an, the board set a 50-mu scale requirement for 
project participation, which means that the natural village and farm households can only 
participate if the forest land under the project is larger than 50 mu. 
Also Suichuan county has set up a board for the implementation of camellia project, 
including representatives from the county government, the DOF of Suichuan county, the FA 
of Suichuan county, the county DOA, the county DRC, the county Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the township government. From previous experiences with foreign 
forestry projects, the county FA also set a scale limitation of 50 mu in Suichuan county. The 
reason is that villagers plant on small-sized and scattered plots. Coordinating a large-scale 
project with many smallholders will increase management/transaction costs. Furthermore, 
single smallholders may face difficulties in following the requirements for camellia 
cultivation, which in the end may not lead to the expected camellia outputs. The scale 
limitation, however, sets a barrier for individual smallholders to participate.Smallholders are 
therefore encouraged by the county FA to construct partnerships to take part in the project. 
Furthermore, a company also cooperates with farmers who individually want to participate in 
the project. This collaboration is called ‘Company Plus Farm Household’ (Gongsi Jia 
Nonghu), because the use rights of forestland are with the farm household, while the company 
applies for the project.  
Like in Ji’an county, the implementation of the projects takes place from the county 
government/FA to the township government/FA, and then to the village committee. However, 
as the scale limitation reduced the number of participating farmers, the natural village is not 
involved as an intermediary between smallholders and the upper level government.  
Fengchen county set up a high-yield camellia development leadership team (see 
“board” in Figure 3.2), which included the governor and vice governor of Fengchen county, 
and representatives from the county FA, the county Land and Resources Office (LRO), the 
county Agricultural Office (AO), the county DRC, the county New Rural Construction Office 
(NRCO) and the township government. In Fengchen, the implementation of the project 
involves the county government/FA, and then the township government, the village 
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committee and finally the natural village. On the level of the natural village, various actors 
participate, i.e. individual smallholders, a company which cooperates with smallholders, and 
the natural village leaders which coordinate implementation. When the company cooperates 
with farmers, the natural village leaders function as a coordinator/mediator between the 
company and farmers, to set trust between them and to lower transaction costs. This 
collaboration is called the “Three Unified-One separate” (San Tong Yi Feng) implementation 
scheme, which means that only cooperation with the natural village is needed in order to 
reduce monitoring and transaction costs, compared to interacting with small households 
individually. At the same time, the involvement of natural village leaders can lead to an 
unequal distribution among smallholders due to favoritism; corruption in the natural village 
has been reported by villagers during fieldwork.  
The implementation structures in the three counties share some characteristics. First, 
the implementation of the plantation involves various levels, i.e. from the county government 
to the township government, to the village and then to the natural village and/or farmers. Only 
in Suichuan, we can see a difference as the natural village is not involved. The 
implementation is partly structured by the administrative system. There are however also 
some differences in the implementation structures. Ji’an county and Suichuan county have 
township FAs, but Fengchen county do not have a township FA, which means that the 
monitoring and coordination power in the local area is weak compared to the other two 
counties. Furthermore, access to the projects will be affected by the 50 Mu scale requirement 
in Ji’an and Suichuan counties. A further difference is the involvement of private companies 
in Suichuan and Fengchen counties, which adds a further stakeholder in the governance of the 
camellia projects.  
 
Forest tenure  
Since 2003, China’s central government has started a forestland reform, the main objective of 
which is to distribute the use rights of forestland to village households. The reform stipulated 
that the new forest use regime should be decided by a majority vote of two-third of all 
villagers or by the village council (Xu et al., 2010). The new regime only manages the use 
rights of land: the forestland still remains collective property, i.e. the legal owner of the 
forestland is the administrative village. The use rights of the collective forestland are 
devolved through a lease contract of 70 years. In general, most of the collective forestland is 
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required to be distributed to all village households, but if over two-third of all villagers agreed 
not to distribute the forestland, the forestland can still be collectively managed by the natural 
village. This is why, apart from individual forestland management, also other kinds of 
management regimes exist, such as collective management of forestland and contracting land 
use rights to private actors.  
As a result, in Jiangxi province a diversity of forest tenure regimes exist. Jiangxi started this 
reform from 2003 on and finished it around 2007. For most natural villages in Ji’an county, 
and some villages in Fengchen county, the forestland was not distributed to the farmers and 
the forestland is still managed by the natural village. In Suichuan county, the majority of the 
forestland was distributed to farm households when the forestland reform started in 2003. As 
included in the analytical framework, we assumed that these different forest tenure regimes 
will also have their impact on the implementation of the national and international project in 
terms of local benefit distribution from the projects.  
 
3.5. Benefit distribution among smallholders in five project implementation regimes 
In this section, benefit distribution will be analyzed by looking at project access, and benefit 
distribution within the project, including direct benefits and indirect benefits. “Project access” 
indicates the share of farm households participating in the project. It is assessed qualitatively 
with the dimensions “high” and “low”. Direct benefits include monetary benefits and 
(expected) forest output. More specifically, in the camellia programme context, monetary 
benefits include subsidies, land preparation, and other benefits like wages and rent. The 
monetary benefits are evaluated in terms of whether smallholders get them or not. Forest 
output is the (expected) output from camellia. Distribution rules of final camellia output can 
be “distribution per household” or “according to family size”. Finally, indirect benefits in the 
case at hand refer to an improvement of clarifying land tenure.  
Above we have indicated that county level stipulations create different pre-conditions 
for local forest project implementation. “Company Plus Farm Household” is a type of 
arrangement where the company directly interacts with farmers for camellia plantation. In the 
following this regime will be referred to as the “Company regime”. The “Three Unified-One 
Separate” arrangement involves the natural village as a coordinator between individual 
smallholders and company. This forms the basis for a regime referred to as the 
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“Collective-Individual regime”. Apart from these regimes, three other regimes could be 
identified in our survey. These are labeled the Collective regime, the Individual regime and 
the Partnership regime. The five regimes will be further defined and analyzed below.  
3.5.1 Collective regime 
In the Collective regime, the natural village (hamlet) participates in and implements the 
project collectively. The use rights of forestland are collectively owned and managed by the 
natural village. Among the 30 villages of our sample, 3 villages in Ji’an and Fengchen 
counties are under the collective regime. All villages implement the MCDC project. One 
reason for the collective implementation of the project may be local institutions such as good 
relations (“guanxi”) between villagers and the natural village leaders. However, their 
collective forest tenure is the primary reason to result in a collective regime for the 
implementation of the camellia project. In Ji’an county, a further reason is the 50-mu scale 
requirement. It is easy to reach the requirement by implementing the project under the 
collective regime. In Ji’an, natural villages with collective forestland tenure have a 
comparative advantage to join the project, in comparison to villages with individual land use 
rights.  
As the entire village participates in the forest project under a Collective regime, access 
to the project is assessed as high. The natural village leadership group organizes the plantation. 
The costs for productive resources, such as fertilizer and seedlings, are spent by the collective, 
and the subsidy is also distributed by the leadership of the collective. The subsidy for the 
natural village is 450 RMB/Mu for 2010, both in Ji’an and Fengchen counties. The 
implementation process is slightly different across different counties. In Ji’an county, in one 
village, each household should offer one labour to work for a couple of days, and if the labour 
is absent for one day, then the household will lose 25 kilogram of camellia seeds in the end. 
The leader will organize the labour every day at a certain location within the village by 
whistle. They will reap the fruits of their labour in the end, when camellia seeds are 
distributed to farmers on a per household basis.  
In Fengchen county, the land preparation is done by hired machines, paid by the 
village leaders from subsidies. After the land preparation is finished, the natural village 
organizes the villagers to plant trees. For working on the forestland, farmers get wages in the 
range of 15-30 RMB/day for men and 15-28 RMB/day for women, which is considerably 
lower than the market price of local labour (about 80-100 RMB/day). The final product will 
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be distributed to farmers based on family size. We can see from these cases that direct 
benefits can differ greatly across villages in different counties. In Fengchen county, subsidies 
are used to pay villagers for the time they spent on the camellia plantation and for hiring 
machines. This benefit distribution may not be equal but is fair, from which poorer 
households can benefit. Project implementation does not involve indirect benefit of clarifying 
land tenure, as land tenure remains collectively owned.  
Figure 3.3: Benefit distribution within the Collective regime 
 
 
3.5.2 Collective-Individual regime 
Under this regime, forestland use rights are also collectively owned. Accordingly, the natural 
village initiated the camellia projects; however, it distributes the management of plots to 
individual households. All households within a village have hence access to the project. In our 
survey of 30 villages, the Collective-Individual regime is found in 6 villages. The regime only 
exists in Fengchen county, which can be attributed to a high rate of collective forest tenure in 
the county. Furthermore, as Fengchen county does not have a township FA, it also promoted 
the Collective-Individual regime as it makes the coordination of smallholder easier for the 
county FA because natural villages serve as intermediate. Moreover, a good collective 
management history and good relations within villages also explain the prevalence of this 
regime in these villages in Fengchen county.  
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Under this regime the natural village applies for the subsidy from the county FA, and 
the 450 RMB/Mu are not distributed to the households, but spent by the natural village 
leadership on land preparation, which is done with the help of a hired machine. The seedlings 
are also provided to the farmers from the subsidies. After land preparation, management 
'rights' are distributed to farm households within the natural village, based on family size. 
Then farm households are in charge of planting and the management of the camellia 
plantation. Accordingly, the output belongs to the households. Moreover, as an indirect 
benefit, clarifying land tenure exists because the management 'rights' of forestland are 
distributed to each farm household informally.  
Figure 3.4: Benefit distribution within the Collective-Individual regime 
 
 
3.5.3 Company regime 
Under the Company regime, a company rents land from the natural village or farmers, and 
therewith obtains the user rights of forestland. Contracts span over a period of 30 years. As 
the company applies for the camellia project, the government subsidy is distributed to the 
company. Companies have different arrangements with different contracts with the farmers. 
Among the 30 villages of our sample, 3 villages in Suichuan and Fengchen counties are under 
the Company regime. 
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One company in Fengchen rents land from a natural village with a collective tenure 
regime. Access to the project is hence equally distributed within the village. The company 
provides land preparation, seedlings and wages (160 RMB/Mu, paid annually to the 
households) to the farm households. Moreover, as the land has originally a collective tenure 
regime, the forestland is then distributed to individual farmers to manage the land according 
to the terms of the contract. How land is distributed to the villagers differs across natural 
villages. In one natural village of our sample, the plots are distributed per household, in 
another village, distribution takes place based on family size. Farm households are then 
responsible for planting and cultivating the camellia trees. In the initial stage without harvest, 
the company pays a rent for the forestland of 60 RMB/year/Mu. When it comes to the fruit 
stage, a farm household will get 40% of the final output, the other 60% are for the company. 
Different from wages, the company pays the rent to the natural village leaders, and then the 
leaders distribute the rent to the farm households. Some villagers reported corruption in the 
rent distribution. Hence, direct benefits like wages and seedlings are equally distributed, while 
forestland rent is not equally distributed. An indirect benefit is that the company regime in 
Fengchen county clarifies forestland tenure as it distributes land management 'rights' to 
farmers per family size or per capita.  
The other company rented land from farmers directly, because here the forestland was 
earlier distributed to individual households. Our data provide evidence that all farmers had 
access to the company if they wanted to participate in its plantation project. But the area 
distribution might be not that equal. The company only provides land preparation and 
seedlings to farmers, while farm households are responsible for the planting, the cultivation 
and harvest. The company and farm households share the output in the proportion of 3:7 in 
the first 10 years and 4:6 in the remaining 15 years.  
Comparing these two companies, the distribution of benefits in the second case seems 
to be rather straightforward, while there are less benefits on the whole for smallholders. 
Furthermore, smallholders will only earn money in the harvesting stage. It is unclear how 
farmers can gain access to the company. The first company provides more direct as well as 
indirect benefits to farmers, i.e. annual wages and rent from the first year onwards. 
Furthermore, the access to the project is in principle equal across the villagers. However, with 
the natural village leaders being intermediaries, the distribution of rent gets distorted. 
 
82 
 
Figure 3.5: Benefit distribution within the Company regime 
 
The kind of forestland tenure, i.e. whether it is collective or individual forestland 
tenure, is the main reason for the differences in the Company regime. Moreover, local 
institutions such as market access are also one of the factors shaping the Company regime, for 
example when there exists a local camellia processing market in the county. In addition, in 
Suichuan county, the scale requirement set by the county for the EIB project, was a reason to 
attract a company to participate in project implementation, as a mechanism to allow small 
farmers also to join. 
3.5.4 Partnership regime 
Under a Partnership regime, several households join together to participate in the camellia 
project. In eight of the 30 sample villages, Partnerships exist. Partnerships were formed under 
conditions of individual forestland rights in Suichuan county, especially in order to fulfill the 
50 Mu scale requirement that the county board set for the EIB project. In Ji’an county and 
Fengchen county, under this regime natural villages with collective forestland use rights lease 
the forestland to individual households or directly to partnerships. But this is a contract 
relation, which does not clarify land tenure rights for farmers without legal certificate, and 
hence brings no such indirect benefits. As also in Ji’an county, the 50 Mu scale requirement 
exists, and partnership regimes can be found here in large numbers.  
In principle, as every household has the possibility to set up a partnership, access to 
the project can still be considered as high. However, in our sample villages only 7% of the 
smallholders join a partnership. Partnership requires the trust between smallholders who are 
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capable to join together to plant at least 50 mu camellia trees. Furthermore, in Suichuan 
county, where the EIB project is realized, smallholders do not get—as is the case in the 
national camellia project—450 RMB/Mu subsidies, but 250 RMB/Mu subsidy, and a 
low-interest loan of 625.55 RMB/Mu. The higher risks that are involved under the EIB 
project have to be shouldered by the Partnership, and that may be one reason why partnership 
participation of smallholders is low.  
Individuals under the Partnership regime have user rights of the forestland. The 
farmers in the partnership jointly apply for the subsidies which they then distribute among 
themselves. The planting and management of camellia trees are decided within the partnership. 
For example, in one case, five households established a partnership. Each member has a 
specialized function in the partnership; for example, one person is in charge of the financial 
budget, and another is in charge of management of the forestland. The division of the final 
product depends on the forestland area shared in the partnership. 
Figure 3.6: Benefit distribution within the Partnership regime 
 
 
3.5.5 Individual regime 
Based on our survey, 30% of the farm households in our samples participate in camellia 
projects under an “Individual regime”. In 19 out of the 30 surveyed villages individual 
regimes can be found. They exist more often in Suichuan county where the user rights have 
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been distributed to individual farm households. Fourteen villages in Suichuan have individual 
regimes because the individual farm households have the user rights of the forestland before 
the projects had been implemented. In the other cases in Ji’an county and Fengchen county, 
natural villages choose to lease the land with originally collective use rights to few individual 
households, so that they can participate in the project. But when the contract is over, the 
forestland will have to be returned to the natural village. These cases are different from the 
Collective-Individual and Company regimes, as no clarifying of land tenure rights takes place.  
In these cases, an individual farm household applies to the camellia project and 
receives the subsidies, implements the planting and manages the plantation individually. The 
farm household gains the full final output. In counties where the 50 Mu requirement exists, 
individuals with less than 50 Mu land do not have access to the benefits of the project. 
Furthermore, these benefits will differ depending on the project, i.e. under the EIB in 
Suichuan county, the subsidy is only 250 RMB/Mu and a 25 year low-interest loan of 625.55 
RMB/Mu, while for the MCDC project subsidies were 450 RMB/Mu in 2010.  
Figure 3.7: Benefit distribution within the Individual regime 
 
 
3.5.6 Comparison of benefit distribution 
Local governance institutions, forest tenure regimes and forestry project characteristics all 
influence the implementation of large-scale forestry projects and the related benefit 
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distribution among smallholders. The distinguished five different forestry project 
implementation regimes bring about different mechanisms and outcomes of benefit 
distribution across smallholders and other stakeholders. Table 3.1 compares the five regimes 
regarding smallholder benefit distribution.  
Table 3.1: Distribution of benefits from forestry projects to smallholders of different regimes 
Items 
 
 
Regimes 
Project 
access 
Monetary Benefits Forest 
output 
Clarif
ying 
land 
tenur
e 
Distribution equity* 
Subsid
y 
Land 
preparati
on 
Other 
benefits 
(wages, 
rent) 
Between 
participant
s and 
nonparticip
ants 
Among 
particip
ants 
Collective  High Yes Yes (in 
some 
villages) 
Wages (in 
some 
villages) 
Per 
household/ 
family size 
No 5 5 
Collective-In
dividual 
High Yes Yes No Family size Yes 5 5 
Company High No Yes Wages, 
rent (in 
some 
villages) 
Per 
household/ 
family size 
(40%/60%/7
0% for 
family) 
Yes 
(some
) 
3 5 
Partnership Low Yes No No Individual 
land size 
No 1 5 
Individual Low Yes No No 
 
Land size No 1 5 
*1 to 5 indicates the estimated level of equal access and fair distribution; 1=low, 5=high. 
In conclusion, different regimes have a different benefit distribution effects on farm 
households. As shown in Table 3.2, all villagers have access to the project and subsidies 
under the Collective regime. Some villagers even get further benefits and final outputs. The 
distribution of the final product among smallholders is based on either family size or per 
household, which can be considered fair and this rule is used for a long time in natural 
villages. However, Collective regimes do not clarify the forestland holdings. Hence, the 
benefits for individual farm households are still uncertain compared to the other regimes with 
(some form of) individual user rights or clarifying of forestland tenure.  
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Under Collective-Individual regimes, villagers also get equal project access. Besides 
project access, subsidies and land preparation are also shared by the smallholders. 
Significantly, farm households in the natural villages obtain informal management/user 
'rights' of the forestland as well as the forest product on the distributed forestland, as the 
natural village distributed the management of the land to farm households after land 
preparation. Hence, the informal clarifying of land tenure brought by this regime provides 
more security of benefits for the farm households. The distribution of forestland is based on 
family size, as a common and fair rule, in order to provide incentives to the farmers. 
The Company regime also provides equal project access to farmers because the 
company cooperates with farmers by using farmers’ land. Therewith, the companies reduce 
farmers’ individual investment uncertainty. The company in Suichuan county cooperates with 
farmers directly. The company in Fengchen county cooperates with the natural village, and 
the natural village leaders coordinate between the company and the households. Farm 
households hence get access to the project and get direct benefits provided by the company. 
But the company will get a significant proportion of the final product, and some companies 
even get more than 50% of the outputs. Moreover, the Company regime also clarifies land 
tenure for farm households. Farm households work on the land distributed to them and get 
part of the final output at the fruiting stage. The objective of distribution is to guarantee 
smallholders’ commitment, and at the same time it brings security and indirect benefits to 
farm households. But not only companies obtain a significant proportion of the final product, 
also reported corruption of natural village leaders interfere in the benefit distribution between 
smallholders and other stakeholders. Hence the distribution equity is slightly lower (3) 
between participants and nonparticipants. 
Under the Partnership and Individual regimes smallholders have lower access to the 
project within a village compared to the other regimes, because most farmers have less 
incentives and capability to participate. Because the Partnership is supported by the projects 
and local officers, this regime also gets access to international financial supports from EIB. 
The farm households under Partnership and Individual regimes obtain the final product. The 
Individual regime and Partnership regime provide security to the smallholders who participate 
in the projects. However, a number of other smallholders, particularly marginal farmers, do 
not have access to it. 
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3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
Forest conservation, afforestration and reforestation raise a lot of attention internationally as a 
climate change mitigation strategy. However, the implementation of large-scale forestry 
projects in smallholder contexts involves high transaction costs, and requires a project design 
that integrates the particularities of the local context, as well as the active participation of 
smallholders. Furthermore, for the long-term success of projects, as well as for a balanced 
socio-economic development in poor rural areas, a fair distribution of benefits from such 
projects among smallholders is assumed pivotal.  
China presents a smallholder forestry context that is particularly interesting for the 
implementation of large forestry projects. But little is known on benefit distribution 
mechanisms and outcomes for smallholder from large scale forestry projects in China. This 
study into the implementation of large-scale forestry projects suggests that local governance 
arrangements are critical in the translation of national and international forestry projects into 
the local context where smallholders become involved. Five different forest project 
implementation regimes at the local level were distinguished for China, i.e. the Collective 
regime, the Collective-Individual regime, the Partnership regime, the Company regime and 
the Individual regime. The regimes are mainly determined by local governance institutions 
and forestland tenure regime. Together with the forest project characteristics these regimes 
determine the mechanisms and output of benefit distribution across forestry smallholders in 
the project locations. The Collective, Collective-Individual and Company regimes provide 
better project access and equal benefit distribution among smallholders. However, in cases 
natural village leaders and involved companies can take some of the (financial) project 
benefits, they lower the benefits for smallholders. Access to the Partnership and Individual 
regimes is more difficult and unequal, and benefit distribution between smallholder more 
unequal.  
Analyzing project access of and benefit distribution among smallholders is important 
to understand equity and livelihood of smallholders when projects are implemented. Although 
the discourse of national and international forestry projects is in general pro-poor, and 
projects are often formulated with such objectives, implementation of (inter)national projects 
through various levels in the local village often is quite a different story. This study 
contributed to understanding why forestry project formulation and local implementation are 
two different things, as local institutions, project design and forest tenure regimes come in 
between. Hence, forestry projects need to be designed for local-specific forestry project 
88 
 
implementation regimes. Only then realistic goals of pro-poor development and equal benefit 
distribution among smallholders can be met.   
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Chapter 4. Stagnating jatropha biofuel developments in 
China: does time matter?15 
Abstract: For some time biodiesel from jatropha has been considered as a promising 
alternative to fossil fuels. However, in many smallholder contexts, biodiesel production from 
jatropha did not bring about the expected results. This paper claims that we can better 
understand this failure by taking into consideration the dimension of time among stakeholders 
involved in biodiesel production from jatropha. In analyzing two cases of failed jatropha 
plantations in China, we find that expectations and time perspectives do not match across 
governmental levels, rural households and business, contributing to the failure of jatropha 
plantations. Furthermore, while farmers and government agencies are mutually dependent on 
each other, involved companies are not, making it easy for the latter to withdraw from 
jatropha plantation projects. Disaster insurances for companies, better implementation of the 
rule of law, mandatory blending requirements and consistent financial support may improve 
continuation of jathropha plantation schemes.  
Keywords: oil companies, smallholders, discourses, biodiesel, Sichuan, Guangxi 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Global warming, high fossil fuel prices, an increasing alertness for energy security and greater 
recognition of the environmental consequences of fossil fuels create an urgent need to enlarge 
the development of renewable energy sources (Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008; Hill et al., 
2006). At the same time liquid biofuels, as one of these renewable energy sources, have been 
criticised among others regarding their competition with food crops for arable land. Policies 
to promote liquid biofuels have mushroomed world-wide over the past decade (van Eijck and 
Romijn, 2008; Mol, 2007 and 2010; Oosterveer and Mol, 2010). Not unlike most countries, 
China has also shown an interest in promoting liquid biofuels as one of the options to 
                                                   
15 This chapter has been submitted to Energy Policy in July 2012 as: Li, J., Bluemling, B., Mol, A.P.J., Herzfeld, 
T., Stagnating jatropha biofuel developments in China: does time matter? (Under review). 
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diversify energy sources, to meet its ever increasing energy consumption, and to prevent 
environmental problems related to fossil fuel based energy use. Because of China’s limited 
per capita farmland and in the face of potential food security risks and global food price 
spikes in 2006-2007, the Chinese government prohibited the production of biofuels from grain 
(i.e. corn, rice, wheat) and other major food crops. In this situation, biofuel production from 
oil trees on marginal lands appears as a promising alternative (Wu et al., 2010). Especially 
jatropha (Jatropha curcas) is considered to be a promising crop for generating raw material for 
biodiesel production. The Chinese government consequently started to promote jatropha; but 
also the Chinese biodiesel industry started to show interest in jatropha.  
Jatropha trees produce seeds rich in oil that can be easily converted into biodiesel 
(Maes et al., 2009). Processing of the seeds involves low technology and low cost equipment 
(Boerstler, 2010). Ideally, plants are to be exposed to 1000 and 1400 mm rainfall per year. 
They cannot stand frost.Trees are said to be vigorous, drought resistant and pest-resistant, and 
to be able to grow on marginal land (Francis et al., 2005), which makes them less 
criticisedthan other energy crops that compete for land, water and nutrients. However, 
jatropha cultivation is labour and fertilizer intensive. 
Globally, jatropha trees are planted both as community and large-scale plantations. 
While community plantations have shown signs of success, the “road to large-scale biofuel 
production for developing countries is bumpy” (Gilbert, 2011, p.19). Moreover, the largest 
share of investment in biofuel production goes into the establishment of large-scale 
plantations (Gilbert, 2011). However, in smallholder contexts of developing countries, the 
implementation of large-scale plantations involves a considerable number of stakeholders 
who need to cooperate for a lengthyduration of time, i.e. from plantation to seed harvesting.  
A number of authors analyzed the context and conditions under which jatropha is 
planted as an energy crop for biofuel productionin India (Ghosh et al., 2007; Gonsalves, 2006), 
Latin America (Ghosh et al., 2007) and Africa (Openshaw, 2000). Such research shows that 
often the initiative for setting up jatropha production is taken by governmental departments, 
while the actual implementation (plantation, cultivation, harvesting and processing) is realized 
by local stakeholders (farm households, commercial farms, large-scale plantation holders, and 
processing companies). Frequently, problems occur in the process of implementation, related 
to a lack of community commitment and involvement, ashortfall in supervision and 
participation of private companies and investors, and proven evidence of too optimistic initial 
(economic) assumptions and predictions in terms of yields. In Zambia, a company reneged on 
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the contract and disappeared after farmers just started to harvest seeds (Gilbert, 2011). An 
empirical study in Tamil Nadu, India, found that a lack in agricultural labour, low government 
involvement, and the non-fulfillment of company promises (e.g. on loans) in contract farming 
led to the failure of jatropha plantations (Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). While companies and 
governments faced low risks, high incentives and long timeframes in the Indian case study, 
farmers faced high risks, short time frames and limited room for alternative action 
(Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). In Kisarawe district, Tanzania, the widespread introduction of 
jatropha was not accompanied with a regulatory framework. Implementation suffered from a 
lack of information on compensation to village farmers for using their land, and from the 
postponement of the benefits for farmers (Habib-Mintz, 2010). These kinds of failures of 
large-scale jatropha projects led Kant and Wu (2011) to coin current developments as the 
‘collapse of jatropha as a global biofuel’. The last two cases have in common that within these 
projects, the time perspectives of stakeholders differed. “Time perspectives” are “composite 
cognitive structures that characterize the way an individual projects, collects, accesses, values, 
and organizes events that reside in distinct temporal loci” (Hoogstra 2008, 14f). In India, the 
government and companies had projected different temporal loci for jatropha returns than 
farmers. In Tanzania, the postponement of farmers’ benefits brought about a negative 
valuation of their future returns. Physical realities of jatropha production include a rather long 
time horizon. There is almost no harvestable production within the first three years (Ye et al., 
2009). Jatropha trees reach full production potential in the fifth year and produce seeds for up 
to 50 years (Ye et al.2009; Sigh et al., 2008). In China, the large-scale jatropha plantations are 
usually set up at one time. Thus, plantations are of one age class.  
In China, so far, two different institutional arrangements to establish plantations have 
been identified. Whereas market driven arrangements, where farm households cooperate with 
private companies, appear as the standard in Western contexts, government driven 
arrangements with a high involvement of local and higher level government offices are still 
quite common in China today. To what extent and how each of these institutional 
arrangements can help to overcome the differences in time perspectives that we have depicted 
above, has, to the best of our knowledge, hardly been looked at. Our main objective is to 
investigate in how far the two institutional arrangements contribute to reducing uncertainty of 
future outcomes, comparing two case studies from China. First, we will analyse the 
expectations and time perspectives of the different stakeholders involved. Second, we will 
compare the development of the two different—market and government driven 
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—arrangements in the time perspectives that they create. Finally, we develop conclusions 
how arrangements could be redesigned to lead to more enduring jatropha plantations.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Chinese policies to promote jatropha and introduces theoretical concepts applied in the 
analysis. Section 3 discusses the research methodology and analytical framework. Section 4 
reports on the detailed case studies in Sichuan and Guangxi. Section 5 discusses our findings 
and the last section concludes the paper.  
 
4.2. Background and theory: policies, institutions and time 
4.2.1 China’s jatropha biofuel policy 
As biofuels are new energy sources that have currently higher production costs than fossil 
fuels, most governments have heavily supported and subsidized initial liquid biofuel 
developments (Mol, 2007). China has been no exception to this rule. In China, the cultivation 
of jatropha was initiated and organized by the central government, while the implementation 
of concrete jatropha projects falls under the responsibility of village committees and farmers. 
The national government devised a series of laws and policies to support and promote 
jatropha plantations (see Table 4.1).   
Table 4.1:National supportive policies for jatropha biofuels（1998~2011） 
Year Name of law/policy Publishing 
authority * 
Most relevant content 
2005 Renewable Energy industry  
development supervision 
catalogue 
NDRC Support the plantation and better variety selection of 
energy crops including jatropha; support technological 
research, demonstration projects etc.   
2006 National energy forest 
construction plan 
SFA 13 Mio ha energy forests including jatrophaas target in 
2020, which will supply raw material for 6 million ton 
biodiesel and 15 million watt electricity.  
2006 “The Eleventh Five-Year” 
construction scheme for 
oil-breeding energy forest base  
SFA During the eleventh five-year plan (2006-2010), 
development of 400,000 ha jatropha in Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Guizhou, and 433,000 ha other oil-breeding 
forest. 
2006 Interim instrument on 
Renewable Energy 
Development Special Funds 
MOF Special fund provided by Central government and 
targets also biodiesel from seeds. Procedures of 
application and approval, financial management and 
monitoring are regulated. 
Setting a subsidy standard of 3,000 RMB per ha for 
energy forest including jatropha 
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Contract farming with pilot company is required.  
2006 Implementation Guideline on 
financial and tax support for 
renewable energy and 
biochemical industry 
MOF 
NDRC 
MOA 
SAT 
SFA 
Introduced the principle "Not compete with grain" and 
encouraged using marginal land. Encourage utilization 
of jatropha seeds to produce biofuels. Financial and tax 
support includes: subsidy for enterprises when crude 
oil price is lower than price for oil from jatropha seeds; 
subsidy for energy forests and demonstration plots; tax 
preferences. Outlines qualifications for getting support 
and monitoring of financial support.  
2007 Medium-long-term development 
plan on renewable energy 
NDRC  Biodiesel production from energy crops one of the foci. 
Several jatropha-breeding biodiesel experimental 
projects in Sichuan and others provinces established. 
Annual target of biodiesel use in 2010 is 200,000 tons, 
in 2020 2 Mio tons. To improve the market, oil 
companies should blend petroleum and diesel with 
liquid biofuel.  
2007 Management instruction on 
financial subsidy supporting the 
crops which produce non-grain 
Renewable energy and 
Biochemical products 
MOF Qualifications to receive and use financial support.  
A refinery and capacity is required to be qualified to 
get the subsidy.  
More than 20 thousand ha plantation and more than 
33.3 ha nursery field are required.  
2007 Biodiesel Blend Stock (BD100) 
for Diesel Engine Fuels  
GAQSIQ 
SA 
Setting a quality standard for biodiesel 
2011 Biodiesel Fuel Blend (B5)  GAQSIQ 
SA 
2%~5% biodiesel blending with 95%~98% diesel  
* NDRCNational Development and Reform Committee; MOF Ministry of Finance; MOA Ministry of 
Agriculture; SATState Administration of Taxation; SFAState Forestry Administration; GAQSIQ General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine; SA Standardization Administration;  
Land area is given in ha, on the base of the original Chinese unit of Mu (15 Mu = 1 ha).  
Table 4.1 shows that especially from 2005 onwards, a national supportive policy to 
promote biofuels from jatropha has been developed in China. Different governmental 
agencies have set numerous measures to facilitate, stimulate and regulate renewable energy 
production from jatropha biofuels. Five governmental agencies have formulated guidelines for 
financial support and facilities to stimulate liquid biofuel production: Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), State Administration of Taxation (SAT), National 
Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), and State Forestry Administration (SFA). 
However, these guidelines have not necessarily contributed to stable long-term favorable 
perspectives for jatropha forestry plantations. SAT's tax exemption for biodiesel, published in 
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2005, has already been abolished in 2008. In 2007, standards were published for biodiesel 
production. The Biodiesel Blend Stock (BD100, 100% biodiesel) for Diesel Engine Fuels was 
published in 2007, and the Biodiesel Fuel Blend (B5, 5% biodiesel) was published in 2011. In 
contrast to many developed countries, which created a liquid biofuel market by setting 
compulsory targets for blending, China has no mandatory blending target for biodiesel. 
National policies have hence so far not yet built up a robust market environment.  
Apart from creating a national niche market for jatropha biodiesel, clearly outlined 
programs and plans can also create clear and shared time perspectives for jatropha plantations. 
In The Eleventh Five-Year construction scheme for oil-breeding energy forest bases, 
published by the SFA in 2006, a Forestry-Oil Integration (FOI, linyou yitihua) plan was 
formulated in which jatropha plantations were to be increased in 3 provinces: Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan (SFA, 2006). In this plan, a policy arrangement was set up between 
state-owned oil companies and SFA to promote energy forest plantations and biofuel 
production. CNPC, China's largest state-owned oil company, first entered in a collaborative 
relation with SFA, and two other major state-owned oil companies, SINOPEC and CNOOC, 
later joined this cooperation. Following these state-owned companies and further attracted by 
governmental promotional policies, private companies became also involved in jatropha 
plantation. 
In China, provinces often complement such national programs and plans with 
regulations and policies. Sichuan and Guizhou provinces put jatropha promotion in their 
Eleventh Five-Year Development plan (Sichuan People’s Government, 2006; Guizhou 
People’s Government, 2006), aiming for 600,000 and 400,000 hectares planted with jatropha 
in 2020 respectively (Wu et al., 2010). Biodiesel industry development from jatropha was also 
written into the No 1 document
16
 of Guizhou People’s Government in 2007 (SFA, 2006). But 
besides these three, also other south-western provinces have developed policies to stimulate 
jatropha plantation, and downstream biodiesel production and use.  Provincial programmes 
and plans hence may provide some common time perspective for jatropha stakeholders. 
 
 
                                                   
16 Guizhou provincial party committee and People’s government, “Comments on developing modern agriculture 
and promote socialist new rural construction” (in Chinese) ([2007] No 1). 
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4.2.2 Institutional arrangements 
The Forestry-Oil Integration plan set up a “policy arrangement” between state-owned oil 
companies and SFA to promote energy forest plantations and biofuel production. A policy 
arrangement is a temporarily stabilized actor network with a certain division of power among 
its actors, specific rules of the game, and an underlying discourse. While useful for 
higher-level policy-making, the concept was deemed less applicable to arrangements that, 
while implemented within the frame of a policy-arrangement, do not involve policy actors. 
For arrangements that implement policies and targets on the ground, the concept “institutional 
arrangement” will be used. “Institutional arrangements” are “(particular sets of rules) through 
which ... decisions are implemented” (Adger et al. 2003: 1100). They can be related to a 
variety of actors, and do not necessarily have to include policy actors. The analysis of such 
institutional arrangements will draw from the variables of the policy arrangements approach: 
actors and their coalitions; the power to mobilize and deploy resources; the rules of the game 
and current discourses (see below for their operationalization). 
As briefly mentioned above, we can roughly divide the currently existing jatropha 
institutional arrangements in China as government driven and market driven. The term 
government driven arrangements refers to plantation projects that are initiated by 
governmental stakeholders and implemented by governmental and/or other stakeholders. In 
these arrangements, governmental authorities might use fiscal incentives (e.g. subsidies) or 
power to get things done. The term market driven institutional arrangements refers to 
plantations that are initiated and implemented by market actors such as companies and 
smallholders. In such arrangements companies usually have a rather direct interaction with the 
farm households or their representatives and will optimally motivate them by using 
appropriate incentives. Market driven institutional arrangements have no direct involvement 
of government departments or officers.  
Institutional arrangements might reduce uncertainty about future outcomes via three 
different ways. First, we assume that uncertainty is reduced when each stakeholder 
contributes with resources to the arrangement and rules prevent the withdrawal of different 
stakeholders. Resources can be land property, seedlings, financial and staff support, 
knowledge, access to certain actor groups or means of communication, legal power or 
committee membership, market channels (Van Gossum et al., 2011; Liefferink et al., 2006). 
Contribution with any of these resources shows commitment as well as vulnerability in case 
the agreement fails. Furthermore, actors are vulnerable to other actors withdrawing their 
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resources, which is referred to as “mutual resource dependency” (Arts and van Tatenhove, 
2004). The contribution of resources to the arrangement will be examined for both, the 
stipulations within the institutional arrangement, as well as its implementation. Crucial is 
furthermore the contribution of resources over time. It is assumed that future outcomes for 
actors will be clearer where actors are involved over several time steps, bridging to future 
outcomes.  
Second, the rules of the game, such as executive sanctioning mechanisms, will prevent 
stakeholders from withdrawing from the agreement and bring protection of vulnerable 
stakeholders. We follow Arts et al.(2006: 99) in defining rules of the game as the ‘actual rules 
for political and other forms of interaction’. Ideally, sanctioning mechanisms lead to a 
reduction of uncertainty. 
Third, uncertainty of future outcomes is reduced when actors share a discourse around 
the arrangement. The concept of discourse refers to “the views and narratives of the actors 
involved” (Arts et al., 2006: 99). A discourse is here understood as “a dominant interpretative 
scheme” by which meaning is given to the respective joint initiative (Arts and van Tatenhove, 
2004: 343). Given the long duration of the jatropha institutional arrangements, “discourse” 
gets the notion of a “vision”, which has the potential to mobilize stakeholders (Olsson and 
Folke, 2004). However, a discourse may also imply persuasion, employing the “power of 
arguments” and defining what legitimate behavior is (Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004). Hence, 
convergence of different discourses around the arrangement would keep the persistence of the 
institutional arrangement over time by reduce uncertainty. However, if the discourse is 
divergent, then uncertainty might increase.  
4.2.3. Diverging time perspectives 
Obviously, actors in these institutional arrangements might differ in expectations, and time 
perspectives. “Time perspectives” are “composite cognitive structures that characterize the 
way an individual projects, collects, accesses, values, and organizes events that reside in 
distinct temporal loci” (Hoogstra 2008, 14f).Long-time horizons are known to fail in evoking 
commitments (Hoogstra and Schanz, 2009) as they involve a “range of uncontrollable and 
unpredictable factors operating in the future” (Hoogstra and Schanz, 2008a: 316). Under such 
conditions, institutional arrangements are crafted to create time perspectives which bring 
added value to today’s risk-taking decisions (Hoogstra and Schanz, 2008b). 
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Long-term profitability and short-term liquidity are important characteristics in a 
plantation’s planning (Kurttila et al., 2001). Delay in investment return is a crucial aspect for 
planters with liquidity constraints (Mary et al., 1998). Some actors in jatropha institutional 
arrangements (farmers, local government staff) focus on annual income revenue to cover their 
cost, especially when their yearly expenses are relatively high. For other actors (companies 
and central government), biofuel production from jatropha might just form a minor share of 
their total activities and budgets. Therefore, for them future income or general profitability of 
the project is more important in determining success. These diverging (time) perspectives in 
jatropha investments are to some extent comparable to other sectors. For instance, investment 
in forestry needs to deal with a long time horizon before returns capitalize, which is 
problematic for small forestry farmers (Convery, 1973; Hoogstra and Schanz, 2009). Even 
more similar to jatropha, investments in orchards face a distribution of financial returns over a 
long period with a time lag of several years (Dorfman and Heien, 1989).  
 
4.3. Methodology: case study 
Case study methodology is employed to analyse large-scale jatropha projects in China. Case 
study methodology is especially valuable when investigating a contemporary complex 
phenomenon within its real-life context, where boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident, and ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being asked (Yin, 1989; 
Verschuren, 2003). In comparing government and market driven arrangements in their 
contribution to creating a long-term perspective and actor commitment, in depth analysis of a 
limited number of cases is considered appropriate.  
As case study methodology has its limitations in terms of generalization of results and 
external validity, the selection of case studies is crucial. A two-step selection process was 
performed. First, two Chinese provinces were selected out of those provinces that have 
favorable conditions for jatropha cultivation and have installed policies to stimulate jatropha. 
Sichuan and Guangxi were selected, as both provinces are located in southern China and have 
suitable subtropical climatic conditions to grow jatropha. Secondly, a case of government 
driven jathropha plantation arrangement was selected in Sichuan and a case of market driven 
arrangement was selected in Guangxi. Sichuan has the largest area of established jatropha 
plantations in China (Qian et al., 2007). Moreover, the first project in the FOI scheme, in 
which the state-owned CNPC cooperated with SFA on jatropha, started in Sichuan. Since 
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Sichuan has its own jatropha related policies, the province is a representative case for a 
government-driven institutional arrangement where both, the national and provincial 
government have devised a long-term perspective for jatropha biodiesel production. Guangxi 
also has established jatropha plantations, but does not belong to the initial three provinces of 
the FOI and has no jatropha projects involving state-owned companies. In Guangxi, jatropha 
plantations are predominantly initiated by private companies and hence are typically market- 
driven institutional arrangements. As such, the two provinces differ substantially in how actor 
configurations and policies approach the development of jatropha plantation and related liquid 
biofuels production.  
In each of the provinces, provincial level representatives of the SFA provided an 
overview of the large-scale jatropha plantation projects that had been initiated over the past 
years. From their list, one project in each of the provinces was selected, based on the criteria 
of accessibility, available information and minimum scale.. The fieldwork on the two cases 
was carried out in 2010, using in-depth semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and 
document analysis as the main research methods. Key stakeholders included decision makers 
from four administrative levels and from the village committee, scientists and company 
officials. More specifically, interviews were held with state forestry administrations in charge 
of energy crops including jatropha (2), provincial forestry department officers in charge of 
jatropha projects (2), county forestry department officers in charge of the jatropha plantation 
(2), township forestry officers where jatropha was planted (2), as well as village leaders of 
villages taking part in the jatropha plantation (2). Moreover, interviews with three scientists, 
one previous staff of the private company, two staff from the state-owned company as well as 
three NGO spokespersons were conducted. The semi-structured interview was designed by 
mapping out the relevant actors, resources, rules of the game and discourse characteristics 
around the two jatropha projects (Arts et al., 2006). Time perspectives of different actors are 
measured by comparing the stakeholders’ views and expectations about past experience and 
present situation and future developments related to the respective jatropha projects. 
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4.4. Analysis of two institutional arrangements 
This section introduces and analysesthe two institutional arrangements. Each case will be 
described by starting with the respective arrangement and itsimplementation, with a focus on 
actors’ contributions, resource dependencies and the arrangement’s embedding in a discourse. 
Subsequently, the performance ofeach institutional arrangement will be presented in terms of 
de facto plantedarea and realized biodiesel production.  
4.4.1 Government driven arrangement: Sichuan province 
 
Institutional arrangement  
Within the FOI plan, the long-term planning target for new jathropha plantations in Sichuan 
province is 600,000 ha until 2020, while the five-year plantation target from 2007 onwards, is 
200,000 ha (interview Sichuan FA officer). To achieve these targets, the Sichuan provincial 
government set up an arrangement in which CNPC plays a pivotal role (see Figure 4.1). 
CNPC is a financially independent state-owned company, developed out of the Ministry of 
Oil Industry in 1988 as part of China’s development towards a market economy. However, 
CNPC still has close ties to the government, as the leaders of CNPC are appointed by the 
Chinese Communist Party and CNPC is considered a ministry level state-owned company 
(hence, its highest leader is equal to a minister). The cooperation between CNPC and SFA as 
well as the Sichuan provincial government can be considered as a horizontal cooperation 
between different government sectors.  
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Figure 4.1: Jatropha project governance structure in Sichuan province 
 
 
Arrow1 Horizontal Cooperation, Arrow 2 Administration Jurisdiction (appointment and financial resources 
decided by higher level), Arrow 3 Supervision (the lower level implements policy from higher level and is under 
higher level supervision), Arrow 4 Governing by Provision (the higher level governs the lower level by resource 
provision) (Kern and Alber, 2009) Arrow 5 cooperation based on agreement (the actors work together according 
to oral agreement or written contract). VC Village Committee, GOV Government, FA Forest Administration 
 
These two parties signed an agreement on jatropha projects in 2006. According to this 
agreement, both parties will work together to realize a ‘100 thousand – ton scale’ jatropha 
based biodiesel pilot plant. The provincial FA did a survey of marginal land suitable to grow 
jatropha and of the original distribution of wild jatropha, and presented survey results to 
CNPC. Based on the results and a field trip, the provincial FA and CNPC selected project 
plots and set a planting target for a five-year period. They agreed upon the realization of 
jatropha plantations in Panzhihua City and Liangshan minority autonomous city. Also for 
these levels, it applies that the cooperation between the branch of CNPC in charge of these 
projects, and Liangshan city government and Panzhihua city government can be considered as 
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cooperation on an equal footing. CNPC signed an agreement with Liangshan city government 
to plant an area of 120,000 ha jatropha demonstration plots, and with Panzhihua city 
government to plant an area of 80,000 ha jatropha demonstration plots. The realization of this 
long-term goal was to be realized in several steps. In 2007, Panzhihua and Liangshan 
governments were obliged to plant together 13,330 ha with jatropha, and in 2008, 16,670 ha.  
In these agreements, Liangshan and Panzhihua city governments would ensure 
forestland availability, promised to coordinate the implementation of plantations, i.e. to 
arrange labour and provide planting supervision, as well as to organize the harvest, the 
collection of the seeds and transport them to CNPC. Township Forest Administrations would 
support the collection of seeds by farmers, and CNPC would pay a small fee to the township 
FA for this service. CNPC ensured to provide subsidies for the plantation as well as promised 
to purchase all jatropha seeds and process them to biofuel. CNPC would buy these seeds at a 
market price, if it exceeded the guaranteed price of 3 RMB/ kg. The collected seeds would be 
transported by the township FA to a simple extracting plant, which produces the raw product 
which was then to be transported to a more centrally located refinery. Nanchong refinery of 
CNPC was a registered project at the NDRC, which consists of a 60 thousand ton production 
line to extract the raw jatropha oil. The realization of this agreement received support by the 
Ministry of Finance MOF and CNPC, who each would contribute 50 % to the planned budget. 
In conclusion, the institutional arrangement sets time-steps and concrete quantitative 
future outcomes. Furthermore, actors of the whole production chain are involved and 
contribute resources. We can assume that future outcomes of the agreement are rather certain. 
National government together with city and county / township governments contribute the 
most in terms of resources (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Contribution of resources to the government driven arrangement 
Actor Resources contributed to arrangement 
Category Description Time dimension 
MOF  Finance  50% of cultivation 
investment (seeds, labour) 
in planned budget 
The subsidy of 2007 
distributed after 
plantation in 2007 
The subsidy of 2008 
distributed in 2010 
Liangshan/Panzhihua 
governments  
Staff  Staff for coordination of 
jatropha plantation, of seed 
harvest, collection* and 
Plantation period and 
harvest period 
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transport  
Technical service staff for 
jatropha cultivation 
 Infrastructure Transportation  Before and during harvest 
period 
 Access  Access to forestland  Before and during 
plantation period  
County FA / township 
government 
Access  Access to farmers : use of 
argumentative power for 
persuasion  
Access to higher level: use 
of subsidies from MOF for 
persuasion  
Access to CNPC 
Before and during 
plantation period 
 
Before and during 
plantation period 
Before and during 
plantation period, harvest 
period 
CNPC Finance  50% of cultivation 
investment (seeds, labour) 
in planned budget 
Purchase of all jatropha 
seeds at 3 RMB/kg or 
higher (market price).  
The subsidy of 2007 
distributed after 
plantation in 2007 
The subsidy of 2008 was 
not paid  
 
Villagers  Labour   Plantation period and 
harvest period  
 *Against a small fee by CNPC.   
For the implementation, the planting task was distributed downwards via the county 
and township governments to the village committee. The Forestry Administrations at each 
level are in charge of implementation. The subsidies of the MOF had to be distributed via the 
county FA to the participants. In the four counties, the county FA and the township 
government employed their access to those realizing the plantation, i.e. they persuaded large 
(institutional) forest landholders and village committees. The village committee persuaded the 
villagers to take part in jatropha plantation by supplying seedlings, fertilizers, paying wages 
and by promising that CNPC will purchase the final product with the help of the township FA. 
Persuasion of farmers did refer to the national level’s discourse around jatropha, but rather 
applied economic arguments of increasing villagers’ incomes. Costs for setting up jatropha 
plantations are covered by the subsidy of the MOF (3,000 RMB/ ha), and CNPC Ltd (3,000 
RMB/ ha). During the implementation, subsidies only address expenses for the first year.  
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The arrangement is furthermore related to higher level policymaking in that it is part 
of the FOI plan. The plan is embedded in general governmental discourses on measures for 
combating global warming, on building on forests’ ecological functions 17  and on the 
contribution of renewable (energy) resources to sustainable development
18.
 These higher level 
discourses however are not fully translated to the local level. More specifically, SFA and 
CNPC legitimate jatropha through discourses of combating global warming and increasing 
renewable energy sources. But for provincial FA, county FA and township FA reporting on 
political achievements, such as plantation targets, are crucial. Also village leaders are held 
accountable on their political achievements in fulfilling orders from higher level government. 
In regard to their time perspectives, SFA, provincial FA and CNPC are especially concerned 
about jatropha seeds and future biodiesel production. For these stakeholders, future outcome 
is more important than present performance. For county FA and township FA, the present 
plantation and costs have priority over future seeds and biodiesel. For village leaders and 
villagers, present cash income is the most important element to cover their daily life and 
consumption.  
  
Performance  
The planted area in 2007 was 14,667 ha, i.e. more than the target for that year; in 2008, 
15,333 ha were planted, which was a bit less than the original target. The average area of the 
two years’ plantations reached the annual targets. Out of the two sources of subsidies, MOF 
and CNPC, the MOF paid its subsidies to the provincial Department of Finance (DOF) after 
inspection. The latter transferred it to the county DOF and the county DOF then to the county 
FA, who transferred the money to the planters and employed farmers. However, subsidies 
from CNPC over 2007 and 2008 did not arrive at the county level until 2010. For the start of 
the FOI scheme, the county government and FA paid this part of CNPC’s investment from 
their own resources. Hence smallholders who were involved in the jatropha plantation of 2007 
received the subsidy on time. However, MOF subsidy for new jatropha plantations in the 
second year, due in 2008, was distributed to the county FA only in 2010. The reason for this 
delay lies in the requirements for receiving MOF subsidies. MOF stipulates that for receiving 
                                                   
17 State Forestry Administration, “Promote forest-based biofuel and biomass- the seventh knowledge learning 
from Hu Jintao speech (in Chinese), http://swzny.forestry.gov.cn/portal/swzny/s/776/content-516699.html, 
accessed May 2012. 
18 Xinhua Web, "China will foster its high-quality energy forest base to 200 Mio Mu until 2020”.   
http://env.people.com.cn/GB/146189/168051/168296/10005369.html, accessed May 2012. 
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subsidies, a jatropha plantation needs a contract with a pilot company, and the enterprise 
needs to have a refinery in its vicinity. In the second year, CNPC withdrew from the project, 
and with the withdrawal, also the construction of Nanchong refinery stopped after 2008, 
before it came into production stage (interview with FA officer). This implied that farmers’ 
jatropha plantations did not have access to a refinery, which led MOF to stopping financial 
flows. However, after farmers lobbied at the local FA, and the latter lobbied at higher level 
FA departments, subsidies were finally transferred to farmers. Even though with considerable 
delay, the national government in the end paid the subsidy and farmer wages could be paid. 
After withdrawing from the arrangement, CNPC did not pay the second year subsidy. As a 
consequence, the local government and farmers stopped planting and cultivating jatropha. A 
county report
19
showed that the county FA had a large debt because of their spending on 
seedlings and fertilizers, causing absence of payments to large forestry farmers and their 
employees. This created conflicts between employed farmers and the local government.  
 Due to low investments for intensive cultivation the productivity and yield of 
jatropha is considerably lower than initially expected. Nowadays, jatropha plantations from 
the first and second year still exist, however, the average production each year is around 750 
kg/ ha compared to the initially expected 4500 kg/ ha.  
4.4.2 Market driven arrangement: Guangxi province 
 
Institutional arrangement  
In Guangxi, private companies rather than state-owned oil companies initiated jatropha 
plantations. Guangxi Zhilian Renewable Energy Company (GZREC) was the biggest and 
most famous private energy company involved in jatropha-based biofuel production. GZREC 
was set up in 2007, cooperating with the International Jatropha Association, specialized in 
jatropha genetic research, seedling cultivation, jatropha forest construction, and biodiesel 
production (Interview with Guangxi FA officer). The company started plantation by using a 
contract farming scheme with the village committee.  
 
 
 
                                                   
19 Report on the problems in jatropha forest base constructions published by Yanbian County People’s 
government (in Chinese). 
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Figure 4.2: Jatropha contract farming scheme in Guangxi province 
 
The company started plantations in Pingguo County because Pingguo has a large area 
of marginal forestland and jatropha has a long history in the county. GZREC came into 
contact with the rather impoverished Burong administration village in Pingguo County 
through the introduction by the office of poverty alleviation. After initial contacts, the 
company negotiated directly with the village leader. The village leader then investigated in 
Nanning city (the capital of Guangxi province) several jatropha biofuel companies, and 
checked information on the internet on the company and on biofuel production. Only then he 
decided to cooperate with GZREC. The private company decided on the planting area after 
discussing with the village committee. The two actors hence had a vision of feasible future 
outcomes in terms of planted area. The company and Burong village committee signed a 
written contract. The cooperation between the company and villagers can be seen as contract 
farming, which is a market arrangement. This contract arranged that the village would supply 
land and coordinate labour, while the company would supply seedlings, fertilizers, 
compensate for labour costs, and provide technical services. The company agreed to offer 
basic labour wages, around 30 RMB per person per day. The company also agreed to buy the 
seeds at a guaranteed price, and if the market price was higher than the guaranteed price they 
would buy the seeds at the higher market price. For the realization of the agreement, GZREC 
applied for subsidy from MOF (interview with village leader). From this arrangement, there 
was not much risk involved for farmers, and income generation was secured for initial labour 
investment.  
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The village leader informed the farmers on the technology, market and policies and 
compiled a handbook. In order to involve farm households in jatropha plantation and 
cultivation, the village committee and secretary on the one hand persuaded farmers to 
participate. On the other hand, the village committee also gave away its control over the use 
rights of collectively-owned forestland and distributed the land among the farmers to 
incentivize farmers’ participation and to organize jatropha planting. Finally, the village 
committee convinced farmers that the company can be trusted. The farmers were highly 
motivated because the private company and village committee took a lot of measures (see also 
table 4.3 for the contribution of resources).  
For establishing a joint vision and discourse, during the planting phase the company 
also invited television for broadcasting this project to a wider public. This publicity increased 
confidence and trust among the villagers (interview with village leader). Furthermore, the 
company organized an introductory meeting and seminar, inviting village leaders from other 
areas and explaining the economic value of jatropha, the technology of jatropha plantation 
and the cooperative arrangement between private company and village committee, to attract 
more participation. GZREC planned to grow 3,333 ha in Pingguo County, and started to grow 
jatropha on 133 ha in 2007 in Burong village. The private company offered important 
resources and attracted more participation through media and a seminar. 
Table 4.3: Contribution of resources to the market driven arrangement 
Actor Resources contributed to arrangement 
Category Description Time 
Village leaders  Staff  Coordination of labour  Plantation period and 
harvest period 
 Access  Access to forestland  
Access to farmers : use of 
argumentative power for 
persuasion 
Access to company 
Before plantation 
Plantation period and 
harvest period 
 
Before and during 
plantation period, harvest 
period  
 Social capital Trust of farmers in village 
government  
Plantation period and 
harvest period 
Company  Finance Production costs 
(seedlings, fertilizer, 
labour cost) 
Purchase of all jatropha 
seeds at 3 RMB/ kg or a 
Plantation period 
 
Harvest period 
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higher market price. 
 Access  Access to market  
Access to media 
Harvest period 
Plantation period 
 Staff   Company staff provides 
technical service to 
villagers.  
Plantation period and 
harvest period 
Villagers  Labour   Plantation period and 
harvest period 
 Expertise   Know-how of jatropha 
cultivation and harvest.  
Plantation period and 
harvest period 
 Land use right*  In the beginning of the 
plantation 
* Provided by the village committee. 
This market driven arrangement was based on market opportunity and economic 
interest. The private company at that time envisaged a market chance and promising 
bioenergy industry support by government subsidies. The village leader wants to spur rural 
development by increasing employment and household incomes. Villagers need continuous 
income streams and are interested in improved living conditions. For the private company, 
jatropha seeds and future biodiesel production are more important. The village leader’s and 
the villagers’ interest focused on liquidity. Thus, the private company’s time perspective 
exceeds the rural household’s time perspective. 
 
Performance  
About 4 months after the initial planting of 133 ha, in the beginning of 2008, frost destroyed 
the young jatropha forest. The program was not continued after the frost and the hills were left 
barren. The company disappeared without fulfilling the contract, and hence the farmers did 
not receive any wages. Although there was a written contract between the village committee 
and company, it was difficult to follow-up on this as the company disappeared and the village 
committee was not capable to effectuate the contract before court.  
One reason why GZREC withdrew after the frost was that it expected (in vain) to 
receive subsidy from MOF. According to the ‘Management instruction on financial subsidy 
supporting the crops bases which produce Renewable Energy and Biochemical products’ 
published by MOF, jatropha plantations receive subsidy only if they reach 20 thousand ha 
plantation and have at least an area of 33.3 ha nursery fields. Even if a refinery was under 
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construction, GZREC did not qualify for the subsidies. The frost may just have been the 
trigger to quit the project.  
 
4.5. Discussion 
This paper’s focus on two cases that both failed might raise concerns of potentially biased 
outcomes of the study. However, these two failed projects are not singular cases. There are 
more failures of jatropha plantations and biofuel production from jatropha seeds in China. At 
the end of 2006, the US Company Beck Ltd withdrew from China, after having invested 2.6 
million RMB in jatropha plantations. The UK Company Sun biofuel left China because the 
company could not agree with Panzhihua city government, Sichuan Province, about how 
much it had to invest in order to continue jatropha production (Huaxi City News, 2011). 
Various other jatropha projects of CNPC, SINOPEC and CNOOC discontinued and CNPC 
and CNOOC have stopped investing money in jatropha projects (Science Times, 2011). 
Moreover, according to Hainan Daily (2011), in the beginning of 2009 the area of jatropha 
plantation has been around 2,660 ha in Hainan, until 2011 the number decreased as several 
private companies withdrew. Our general aim is not to compare successful and unsuccessful 
projects but to discuss whether the two kinds of institutional arrangements result in different 
development paths of the respective plantation. The analysis of the two presented cases 
provides important insights into why arrangements can fail and which mechanisms have been 
missing to prevent failure. 
The rules of the game of government driven institutional arrangements are 
characterized by the embeddedness in the present organization of the Chinese economy, i.e. a 
sort of market style with strong government characteristics and top down administrative 
planning and regulation. The withdrawal of CNPC from the plantation and the closure of their 
Nanchong refinery can partly be attributed to a leadership change in CNPC. The former leader 
was enthusiastic about jatropha and showed commitment and vision. The new CNPC leader 
was hardly interested and terminated the subsidies, a development that is not uncommon in 
China (Wang et al., 2009). Furthermore, the cooperation between the city government/ FA 
and CNPC was based on a quite general agreement, without any provisions on punishment in 
case of non-compliance, and not on a standard contract with legal power. The agreement was 
quite vulnerable to external shocks. What moreover played a role is that CNPC is not a full 
market player. It is a ministry level state-owned company, and higher ranked than SFA, so 
that it is difficult for SFA to control or enforce CNPC’s commitments.  
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However, even with contracts and promises, the private company in Guangxi could 
also withdraw. This case reflects the state of the rule of law in transitional China: the legal 
system is underdeveloped. There is insufficient coordination and supervision to legally 
sanction private (and state) actors not behaving according to written contracts. The lack of 
involvement of higher governmental levels and the non-fulfillment of company promises in 
contract farming reinforced the difficulties of jatropha plantation, not unlike in other Asian 
cases (e.g. Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). A further factor for the failure in Guangxi was the 
strictness of subsidies from MOF, i.e. in terms of the size of plantation area and the 
requirement to have a refinery close to the plantation. This led to the private company not 
getting subsidy. 
In the case in Sichuan, the local government and farmers seem to be in a situation of 
mutual resource dependency: The government depends on farmers’ willingness to contribute 
with labour; the farmers depend on the government for access to programs and monetary 
resources. Both parties lose future options of cooperation if they defeat on the arrangement. 
However, CNPC is not such a place-based actor and can seek future options at other places. 
Compared to local government and farmers, CNPC is less dependent on the other actors and 
more flexible to step out and move resources to other places and investments. If two actors are 
mutually dependent, and a third actor is not, the latter may easily withdraw and hereby harm 
the relationship of the others. Due to the absence of mutual resources dependency uncertainty 
of future outcomes could not be reduced. 
While the national government embedded jatropha plantation in a discourse of 
combating climate change and improving the environment, this discourse did not translate to 
the local level where officials’ goal achievement is on local income increase and on measured 
annual planting area, as in the Sichuan case. The private company in Guangxi made a better 
case of building up a discourse on jatropha as a market opportunity, through trainings and 
seminars. However, this discourse was confronted with the above described weaknesses in the 
rules of the game.   
Finally, liquidity and uncertainty in terms of long time horizon are significant 
constraints. Time perspectives of stakeholders hence do not converge. The national 
government has a long time perspective which spans until the final production of biodiesel 
from jatropha, however, its FOI plan basically offers a one year subsidy for the new plantation, 
i.e. it does not offer long-term security. In the case of Sichuan, time perspectives of local 
governments were accordingly rather short. County and township governments were only in 
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the first year compensated for coordinating jatropha planting. Further support to farmers to 
establish new contacts to biofuel producers would not pay off for them. For local government 
employees, goal achievement moreover is measured on the scale of the first year, i.e. they 
only need to report the area planted to the higher level, and they will not be asked about the 
amount of biodiesel produced. Village leaders and villagers however need liquidity. The 
arrangements did not provide sufficient measures to align these differing perspectives. 
In addition, several other lessons can be drawn from failing jatropha development in 
China. First of all, executive rules to prevent the withdrawal of a company are crucial to keep 
them committed. Hence a powerful sanction mechanism and monitoring will help to reduce 
the probability of moral hazard. Moreover, support through subsidy from the central 
government and disaster insurance services from insurance companies (Shi et al., 2008; Oh et 
al., 2009) for private companies could reduce probabilities of early drop out of private 
companies. Finally, institutional arrangements should provide substantial measures to reduce 
the gap between stakeholders with different liquidity and long-time gains. For example, the 
government and companies may need to provide strong and timely payment support to 
smallholders who need an annual cash income. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Jatropha was seen as a promising fuel stock by the Chinese government, given that jatropha is 
generally known for surviving on marginal land and under harsh conditions, and hence does 
not compete with food crops on agricultural land, and given the country’s large marginal land 
endowment. However, despite the government’s promotion of jatropha, it did not build up a 
robust market environment. The rather late formulation of standards for biodiesel (especially 
the B5) and the absence of mandatory targets for biodiesel illustrate the underdeveloped 
biodiesel policy and regulation during the first decade of the new Millennium in China. 
Through programs and plans, the government nevertheless devised some investment 
environment. China therewith stands also for other developing countries where policies are 
not always well developed but programs are devised for establishing a new sector 
(Habib-Mintz, 2010). 
The focus of this article has been on examining how, through executive rules, mutual 
resource dependency and shared visions, institutional arrangements may help to reduce 
uncertainty over future outcomes and thus sustain commitment of all involved actors over a 
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long time horizon. However, as our case studies show, the institutional arrangements within 
programs of two failed projects have been rather weak. Specific characteristics of the 
technology suggest a list of criteria which might be crucial for project’s success: Like other 
perennial plantations jatropha requires institutional arrangements which keep stakeholders of 
the biodiesel production chain involved over a long time. Arrangements face even more 
challenges where a large number of smallholders are involved. The analysis reveals that, 
while the national government employs a rather comprehensive discourse around the use of 
forests for biodiesel production, and while it shows a rather long-term perspective, subsidies 
for local governments are only for first year investment and relating to the area of plantation, 
not final outputs. Moreover, discourses and time perspectives do not match across 
governmental levels and towards non-governmental stakeholders. Furthermore, with MOF 
subsidy requirements for jatropha plantations (refinery and area size), small-scale private 
initiatives like that of Guangxi are made nearly impossible. At the same time, state-owned 
enterprises are not reliable in devising future perspectives. And sanction rules are not 
sufficient to effectively prevent state-owned and market companies from withdrawal.  
In conclusion, both the government driven and market driven arrangement failed to 
establish sustainable commitments with different actors over a long time period. Potential 
measures to enhance shared long-term perspectives may relate to hazard insurance services 
that could strengthen the commitment of market parties, as well as mandatory blending 
requirements which would increase planning certainty. In addition, independent monitoring of 
contract farming and legal services to farmers are significant to create reliable market 
relations. Moreover, jatropha plantations may need strong payment support from government 
and companies to provide shared long-term perspectives and reimburse smallholders 
according to their annual’s time-horizons.  
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Chapter 5. Smallholder participation in large forestry 
programs: the camellia program in China20 
 
Abstract: In recent years, many forestry projects have been implemented in developing 
countries. Especially in China, a variety of large-scale afforestation and reforestation 
programs have been carried out for multiple objectives such as livelihood improvement, 
ecosystem services or carbon sequestration. Like in many developing countries, these projects 
are implemented foremost in a smallholder context. This paper raises the question what may 
be the determinants for smallholders’ participation in a large scale forestry project? Using the 
case of a camellia project, it explores the determinants of smallholders’ participation using a 
probit regression model. Furthermore, to distinguish between participation in international 
and government-run projects, a bivariate probit regression model is estimated. Findings show 
that only 37% of the households in the sample participated in the camellia project. A major 
reason for the low participation rate is households’ perceived tenure insecurity. Results of the 
bivariate probit model show that the education of the household head and household size have 
a positive impact on the likelihood of a household to participate in the international project. 
The more off-farm activities are taken up in a household, the less likely a household 
participates in the international project. For the government project, household size also has a 
positive impact on the likelihood of participation. It is concluded that Chinese forestry shows 
trends of diversification after the devolution of forestland use rights, with a majority of 
households hesitating to invest, while others take the opportunity and risk for investment, and 
still others depend on government subsidies. If the Chinese government wants to achieve its 
goal of 1,68 million hectares under camellia tree, improving tenure security seems to be 
crucial. 
Keywords: Smallholders, Forestry, Forestry programs, China, Tenure  
 
 
                                                   
20 This chapter has been submitted to Outlook on Agriculture in July 2013 as: Li, J., Bluemling, B., Dries, L., 
Feng, S., Smallholder participation in large forestry programs: the camellia program in China (Under review). 
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5.1. Introduction 
In recent years, the role of forests in mitigating climate change, in sustainable ecosystem 
development, and in improving rural livelihoods has gained increased attention in 
international debates. Forests play a crucial role in climate change mitigation as forests 
globally sequester billions of tons of CO2 every year (Canadell and Raupach, 2008; Bonan, 
2008; FAO, 2011). Furthermore, forests can help enhance ecosystem resilience and 
significantly reduce environmental risks (FAO, 2012). Moreover, forests and forestry 
products and services could be key to improving rural livelihoods, reducing poverty, and 
promoting equity (FAO, 2012). They offer a variety of economic, environmental and 
sociocultural benefits (Canadell and Raupach, 2008; Bonan, 2008). 
As a result, there has been an increasing interest in increasing forestation and 
reforestation in developing countries. In the Asian and the Pacific region as a whole, the forest 
area grew by 1.4 million hectares per year over the period 2000-2010. This was primarily due 
to large-scale afforestation efforts in China, where the forest area increased by 2 million 
hectares per year in the 1990s and by 3 million hectares per year on average since 2000 (FAO, 
2011). This success in afforestation and reforestation was the result of programs such as: the 
Natural Forest Protection Program; the Sloping Land Conversion Program; Protection of 
Forest by Yellow and Yangtze river; and the Fast Growing Timber Program (Xu et al., 2006; 
Liu can, 2010). Since 2006, the Chinese central government is promoting the camellia 
(Camellia oleifera) program with the introduction of a new type of high yield seedling. 
Camellia is a typical perennial oil-producing forest species in the sub-tropical areas of China. 
The objective of the program is to increase the supply with edible oil as well as afforestation 
and reforestation. In addition, the large-scale program will offer employment in rural areas, 
and in this way improve rural household income sources. Furthermore, camellia side products 
can be used to produce biodiesel (Jiangxi Academy of Agricultural Science et al., 2008). 
Finally, some projects of the program explore the possibility of generating carbon credits 
(EIB, 2010). Hence, apart from the potential to improve rural livelihoods, the camellia 
program also targets policy objectives related to diminishing carbon emissions and increased 
biofuel production. 
The camellia program is supported by a number of policies from the Central 
government. The State Forestry Administration (SFA) provides guidance to nine provinces to 
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promote camellia.
21
 Moreover, SFA will offer a subsidy from the central financial budget to 
support the plantation of camellia. In 2007, the state council published a document named 
‘Opinions on promoting oil crops production’ which stresses the importance of exploring the 
development of camellia trees and of increasing productivity. The ‘National camellia industry 
development plan (2009-2020)’ was published by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the 
National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), and SFA in 2009.  This is an 
exhaustive plan that lays out the planning, the technical support and subsidy scheme regarding 
the camellia program. Subsequent to these policies, large-scale programs have been 
established to plant camellia trees. The overall objective of the programs is to have an area of 
1,68 million hectares planted under camellia until 2020 (SFA, 2009b). One project is 
subsidized through the central financial budget (‘Modern Camellia Demonstration County’22, 
hereafter referred to as the ‘government’ project) while the other is an international project 
financed by the European Investment Bank (‘Jiangxi Biologic Energy Forest Demonstration 
Base Construction’, hereafter referred to as the ‘international’ project). The international 
project is the first project financed by the European Investment Bank within the China 
Climate Change Framework Loan.  
Since the last tenure reform within the forestry sector, where user rights to forestland 
have been transferred to households, about 60% of the forestland in China belongs to 
individuals or communities (SFA, 2009a). This means that large-scale forestry programs such 
as the camellia program are implemented foremost in a smallholder context. Not all 
smallholders will be interested in participating in such a large-scale program. Given the 
ambitious goal of 1,68 million hectares under camillia plantation by 2020, the question hence 
arises what kind of smallholders are most likely to participate? The objective of this paper 
hence is to find out which factors affect farmers’ participation in large-scale camellia projects. 
More specifically, we are interested in identifying the factors that drive -or hinder- farmers’ 
participation in government initiated projects on the one hand and internationally initiated 
projects on the other.  
There are several reasons why the investigation of such large-scale forestry programs 
in China can lead to interesting results. First, there is increased global attention for large-scale 
afforestation and reforestation projects that are being implemented under the Reducing 
                                                   
21 The policy is documented in ‘The Opinions on Developing Camellia’ (SFA, 2006) 
22 ‘Xiandai Youcha Shifan Xian Xiangmu’ 
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Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
23
 scheme. Hence, this study 
can provide fruitful experiences for the implementation of other large-scale forestry projects 
as well as REDD+ projects. Second, the behavior of smallholders is crucial for the realization 
of global carbon sinks in developing countries, and understanding the factors that affect the 
decision of smallholders towards participating in large-scale projects, is pivotal for the 
success of such projects (Thangata and Hildebrand, 2012). The Chinese context is especially 
interesting to investigate because a number of large-scale projects meet a huge amount of 
forestry smallholders. This context makes the large-scale forestry program implementation 
challenging, and the question of the constraining and enabling factors for smallholders’ 
participation particularly interesting.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
differences between the government- financed and internationally financed camellia programs. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the conceptual framework of the research based on a 
literature review of technology adoption. The survey area and the econometric model are 
discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the probit regression results, bivariate probit 
regression results, and a discussion. Finally section 6 concludes the article.   
 
5.2. Description of the two camellia projects 
5.2.1 Government project 
In order to develop modern agriculture and improve rural livelihoods, the central financial 
budget established a specialized fund to promote grain and oil production and increase 
farmers’ incomes. In line with this development, the government-financed project to support 
camellia industry development was introduced in 2008 and will continue until 2020. This 
project started in the provinces Hunan and Jiangxi, and was then extended to Guangxi, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei and Anhui. In each province, several counties 
participated and in total around 100 counties were selected by the SFA and NDRC. 
Participating county forestry bureaus have to formulate an implementation proposal.  
During the implementation, MOF and SFA support this project financially and 
through the provision of technical coordination. Counties that participate have the task to look 
                                                   
23 Formally defined as ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; 
and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries’(UNFCCC, 2010). 
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after the implementation of the project. Apart from the central financial support, also counties 
and provinces provide financial support to the project from their budgets. From the overall 
project budget, participating farmers receive subsidies to buy high yielding seedlings. These 
seedlings are identified by a specific label. The subsidy can also be used for soil preparation 
and irrigation. Technical training, extension, and demonstration trips are provided by the 
county forestry department. The project does not set any requirements as to the minimum 
forestland area of a participating smallholder. However, some counties have introduced their 
own rules and limit participation to households that can assign at least 50 mu
24
 to the project 
(based on the interview with a provincial forestry department officer). 
5.2.2 International project 
The internationally funded ‘Jiangxi Biological Energy Forest Demonstration Base 
Construction’ project is an international cooperation project between Jiangxi government and 
the European Investment Bank. The aim of the project is to fulfill the responsibility of low 
carbon emission through the promotion of clean energy, climate change mitigation, and 
sustainable forestry development in China. The project is implemented from 2009 to 2013. 
The total investment is 370 million Yuan, of which 207.97 million Yuan (25 million Euro) is 
funded by a loan of the European Investment Bank. The loan has to be repaid within 20 years, 
after a grace period of the first 5 years after the start of the project implementation period. The 
project plans to plant 378.9 thousand mu (25.3 thousand hectare) camellia and 30 thousand 
mu (2 thousand hectare) bare skin forests.  
The Development and Reform Committee, the Forestry Department, the Department 
of Finance and the Environmental Protection Department in Jiangxi province cooperate with 
European Investment Bank in this project. In this project, county selection is very strict and 
based on the criteria of geographic condition, suitable forestland resources, and availability of 
co-financing funds from the county. The project insists on a voluntary and bottom-up 
implementation process. Hence, the investment and plantation scale are based on the county 
capacity and requirements. Moreover, the structure and implementation of this project are 
stricter. The loan is granted through the MOF to the People’s Government of Jiangxi province. 
From there the money is transferred to the People’s Government in the district and then on to 
the county level. Loan ownership is specified at each level from the MOF to the farmers. 
Participating farmers have to sign a contract with the county Department of Finance.  
                                                   
24
 15 mu=1 ha 
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While both the government and the international project are focused on the 
introduction of better variety seedlings to improve camellia productivity, the implementation 
of the projects differs. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the two 
projects.  
Table 5.1: Comparison between the government and the international project 
Parameters Government International 
Initiation Government funded and implemented Funded by European Investment Bank, 
implemented by the government with 
European Investment Bank 
Period 2008-2020 Plantation stage 2009-2013 
Provinces Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, Anhui   
Jiangxi 
 
Counties 100 counties are selected 19 counties are selected 
Support Subsidy (200 Yuan/Mu)  Loan (630 Yuan/Mu)  
Loan repayment within 20 years 
Seedlings High quality seedlings (labeled) High quality seedlings (labeled) 
Contract No contract is necessary The county forestry bureau or the financial 
bureau signs the contract with the 
participants. 
Access No min. area requirement in general, 
few counties have own area 
requirements but not strict.  
No area requirement at the provincial level, 
but counties have their own area 
requirements, for example, at least 50 mu. 
Implementation 
rules 
Targets and implementation proposal 
submitted each year by the county. 
Feasibility and environmental impact report 
is required, a detailed proposal on input use, 
budget, targets, and technology submitted 
by the provincial SFA with research 
consultancies.   
Targets Ambitious target  
 
More practical target and planning 
      Motivation Political achievement, economic 
incentives. 
Political achievement, economic incentives 
and ecologic benefit 
 
5.3. Conceptual framework 
Risks and uncertainty are at the basis of explaining the obstacles in smallholders’ participat ion 
in technology innovation projects. Differences in the relative rate of adoption of modern 
technologies have been attributed to risk aversion and credit constraints (Feder, 1980). 
Furthermore, uncertainty about the present and future probability distribution of economic 
returns and the value of sunk investment costs from the new technology can play a role 
(Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Ghadim et al., 2005; Marra et al., 2003). A literature review on 
innovation adoption and forestry project participation led to three categories of determinants, 
each linked to the effect of risk and uncertainty: tenure security; access to information; 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
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5.3.1 Tenure security 
Property rights and tenure security have an impact on smallholders’ forestry behavior because 
property rights security determines whether and how smallholders will benefit from 
participation. Tenure insecurity leads to long-term risk and uncertainty and is therefore 
especially relevant in forestry because of the long gestation period of investments in forestry 
plantation (Pattanayak, et al., 2003). Empirical results on the impact of tenure security on 
forestry innovation and plantation vary widely. Reasons for this diversity in results may be 
related to the difficulty of assessing the level of tenure security and the fact that different 
researchers have used different indicators. A positive relationship between forestry investment 
and tenure security was found by Otsuka et al. (2000), Fenske (2011), Coulibaly-lingani et al. 
(2011), Thacher et al. (1996), Zbinden and Lee (2005) and Dolisca et al. (2006). Others have 
found that the relationship between tenure security and new forestry investment is not 
significant (Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002). In this article we follow the theoretical 
expectation that tenure insecurity will lower the likelihood of participation in innovative 
forestry projects.  
5.3.2 Information access 
Better access to information about a project or an innovation will decrease uncertainty and 
hence increase the likelihood of participation in the project or adoption of a new technology 
(Rogers, 1983; Besley and Case, 1993). Several studies have found that better information 
transfer to local communities strongly affects participation rates in farmer projects (Raintree, 
1983; Nagubadi et al., 1996; Skaggs, et al., 1994). On the other hand, the effect of extension 
services has a more ambiguous influence on project participation. While Thacher et al. (1996) 
and Zbinden and Lee (2005) find a significantly positive effect of extension, Dolisca et al. 
(2006) and Coulibaly-lingani et al. (2011) find opposite results. We hypothesize that better 
access to information increases the likelihood of project participation. 
Social networks can be important channels through which information is transferred 
and as such can also influence adoption (Wejnert, 2002). Studies have found a strong 
correlation between the social network and local project participation (Nuggehalli and 
Prokopy, 2009; Lise, 2000; Dolisca et al., 2006). In the Chinese context, political status is an 
important determinant for access to information within a certain socio-political network, 
especially in rural areas. Membership in the Communist Party is one of the most important 
forms of political status in rural China, as party members belong to a select group, through 
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which they can gain access to valuable political and economic information (Morduch and 
Sicular, 2000). Party membership is restricted to individuals who distinguish themselves and 
have proven their political commitment and involves several kinds of privileges (Secondi, 
1997). Party membership is also examined to be significant in the participation in the Sloping 
Land Conversion Program (Xu et al., 2010). In this case of large-scale camellia projects, both 
the government-funded and the international project are implemented by government agencies. 
We therefore expect that party membership will be an important determinant of participation 
in these projects.  
5.3.3 Socioeconomic characteristics 
Several household characteristics have been examined in existing studies as potential 
determinants of project participation and innovation adoption. We will include: age, gender, 
education, household size, wealth, off-farm activities.  
There are several ways in which age can affect participation. On the one hand, old 
farmers are expected to be more risk averse, which would suggest that younger farmers are 
more likely to adopt new varieties. On the other hand, old farmers are more experienced, 
giving them an advantage over young farmers in terms of knowledge and skills required to 
adopt new technologies. As a result, empirical results are ambiguous (Otsuka et al., 2000; 
Uchida et al., 2007; Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009; Skaggs, et al., 1994; Dolisca et al., 2006; 
Lise, 2000; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
Gender is assumed to affect decision-making behavior because it is linked to different 
attitudes towards risks and differences in social status. The effect of gender is also likely to 
differ depending on region, culture and level of economic development. Some studies have 
found a significant relationship between gender and participation in forest conservation 
(Besley, 1995; Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011). Surprisingly, Dolisca et al. (2006) found that  
female farmers were more likely to participate in social and environmental activities such as 
reforestation than male farmers. Finally, Lise (2000) found that the link between gender and 
participation is highly dependent on the specific case that is investigated. 
Education is expected to affect participation because highly educated people are less 
risk averse and have a better capacity to process information and master new skills. This 
relationship is confirmed in a number of studies (Lise, 2000; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Dolisca 
et al., 2006).  
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Larger households are expected to show a higher likelihood to participate in new 
projects because they have better capacity in facing the uncertainty and risk. Results from 
previous studies confirm this expectation for different forest management projects (Dolisca et 
al., 2006; Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011). Uchida et al. (2007) also find a positive effect of 
household size on participation in the Sloping Land Conversion Program in China. 
Afforestation includes labour-intensive activities in the short run, but may be 
perceived as a way to decrease labour demand in the long run (Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
Employment in off-farm activities not only decreases labor availability but may also generate 
positive externalities such as better information access and the acquisition of administrative 
skills (Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Smallholders that are involved in non-farm activities are 
therefore more likely to be enrolled in reforestation incentive projects (Skaggs, et al., 1994; 
Thacher et al., 1996; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Dolisca et al., 2006). Moreover, off-farm 
employment and migration become increasingly important in the Chinese context and their 
impact on the availability of rural labour should therefore not be ignored (Zhang, et al., 2001; 
Taylor, et al., 2003; De Brauw, et al., 2008).  
Wealthier households are more risk tolerant and are therefore more likely to 
participate in forestry plantation projects in rural areas. Smallholders that are financially 
constrained have less opportunity to overcome the loss of income during the first years of 
plantation (Boulay et al., 2012). Family income was shown to have a positive influence on the 
level of participation in Dolisca et al. (2006). On the other hand, Lise (2000) found that the 
relationship between household wealth and participation was ambiguous and differed between 
cases. Moreover, the poverty status of a household did not seem to be a determining factor of 
participation in the Sloping Land Conversion Program in China (Uchida et al., 2007).  
 
5.4. Methodology and data 
5.4.1 Survey and data collection 
A survey was carried out from July to August 2011 in Jiangxi province. Jiangxi province is 
located in the southeast of China and is one of the most forest-abundant provinces in China 
with about 158 million mu (or 10.54 million hectare) of forestland (National Statistical 
Yearbook, 2012). Jiangxi can be considered an important forestry province in China because 
the forest coverage rate is 58% which is much higher than the national average of 20% 
(National Statistical Yearbook, 2012). Furthermore, Jiangxi was selected as a survey area 
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because it is one of the first provinces to promote the adoption of the high yielding camellia 
seedling. Moreover, as described in section 2, two large forestry projects were set up in 
Jiangxi province to promote the adoption of a new type of camellia tree and the provincial 
target of the total plantation area in the large-scale camellia program is 14, 746 thousand mu 
(or 983 thousand hectare) which accounts for 22% of the total target at national level. At the 
same time, Jiangxi is also one of the more underdeveloped provinces, with a GDP per capita 
of 17, 335 yuan in 2009 (which is well below the national average of 25, 575 yuan). In other 
words, Jiangxi also reflects an underdeveloped economy with a high share of small household 
farms and hence can render important insights for the future introduction of large-scale 
forestry projects in small farm communities in other provinces in China and in other 
developing counties. 
Data were collected in a cross-section survey of households in two counties: Suichuan 
and Fengchen (see figure 5.1). County selection was based on a number of criteria, such as 
economic development level, geographical conditions and involvement in camellia programs. 
Suichuan county is located in the southwest of Jiangxi province and is less developed than 
Fengchen county located in the middle of Jiangxi. Fengchen has one demonstration site and 
has started adoption of the high yielding camellia seedlings earlier than Suichuan county. 14 
villages were selected for the survey in each county, and around 10 villagers were interviewed 
per village. However, only four villages in Fengchen county are finally included in the data 
analysis, because in the other 10 villages, the natural village is the main decision-maker in 
regard to project participation. Determinants on the household level will here not play a role 
for the participation in the camellia project. Apart from basic household indicators (age, 
gender, education, family size, assets), the survey questionnaire also covers questions about 
tenure security, and information access variables.   
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Figure 5.1: Location of survey areas  
 
 
The government-financed project and the international loan project have both been 
implemented in Jiangxi province. Suichuan county has combined the international and the 
government projects, meaning that people who participate in the international project also 
receive government subsidies. On the other hand, there may also be some cases of households 
that receive the government subsidy but do not participate in the international project. An 
interesting observation is that participation in the international project is limited to those farm 
households with an area of at least 50 mu in Suichuan county. As mentioned in section 2, the 
government project does not apply such strict access limitations. Fengchen county only has 
the government-funded project. Fengchen was one of the first counties in the government 
program because it has one of the best seedling experimental sites. Furthermore, a lot of 
trainings are offered by the county SFA to farmers in which experts are invited for lectures.    
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5.4.2 Regression model 
Participation in camellia projects is estimated based on the following model:  
 
 
 
Where Participation is a measure that is 1 if the household participates in a project and 0 
otherwise. Moreover, Participation requires an individual decision to plant trees and to 
manage the forest plantation after it has been planted. For this reason, forest plantations under 
collective or collective-individual management have been excluded because under these 
regimes, the planting decision is made at the collective level and not at the individual level.  
Tenure_insecurity is an indicator of the risk of expropriation in the next ten years as 
perceived by the respondents and it takes the value of 1 if expropriation risk is perceived as 
high. Different measures of tenure (in)security have been used in other studies: the value of 
property rights based on a cluster of rights that are held and different types of property rights 
relations (Fenske, 2011); the possession of a legal land title (Thacher et al., 1997; Zbinden 
and Lee, 2005; Dolisca et al., 2006); and risk of expropriation (Jacoby et al., 2002; Kazianga 
and Masters, 2006; Laurent-Lucchetti and Santugini, 2012; Kung and Liu, 1997). The risk or 
frequency of land reallocation (Mullan et al., 2011; Kung and Liu, 1997; Krusekopf, 2002), 
the length of time households have farmed their land (Guo et al., 1998; Krusekopf, 2002) are 
also used as measures of land-tenure security. In China, holding a forestland certificate does 
not necessarily reflect security of tenure because forestland certificates have just been 
distributed and not all farmers know the function of the certificate. Moreover, the certificate is 
regarded more as part of a rental relationship instead of a proof of ownership. We have 
therefore chosen to include the perceived risk of expropriation in this study as an indicator of 
tenure insecurity. 
Information_access is a vector of two variables: Knowledge and Political_status. 
Existing studies have measured information access based on the use of extension services and 
participation in field trips (Thacher et al., 1997; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Dolisca et al., 2006; 
Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011). However, both these indicators may potentially suffer from an 
endogeneity problem because seeking extension and participating in field trips may be driven 
by the fact that you are participating in a certain project. In other words, the causality of the 
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effect may be reversed. To overcome this flaw, we use the knowledge of past forestry projects 
as an exogenous indicator of access to information of a certain household. The variable 
Knowledge is defined as the number of past forestry projects that are known by the household.  
Political_status is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the household head 
is a party member. This variable was also used by Xu et al. (2010) and is a proxy for the 
social network of the household head.  
Household_characteristics includes various household variables. Age represents the 
age of the household head. Gender denotes the gender of the household head and is 1 for male 
and 0 for female household heads. Education represents the education level of the head of the 
household and is measured as the years of schooling. HH_size is the household size defined as 
the number of people living in the household. Off-Farm is a proxy for off-farm employment 
by household members and is measured by the number of migrant household members. 
Wealth refers to the wealth of the household and is measured as the value of durables. All the 
household variables refer to the year 2008, i.e. before the decision of whether to participate in 
the camellia project.        
County is the county dummy that is 1 for Suichuan county and 0 for Fengchen. This 
control dummy is included to account for the effect of differences in economic conditions and 
locality.   
 
5.5. Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 5.2. 
The participation rate is 37%, meaning that 37% of the interviewed households participate in 
the government and/or the international project. About 71% of the households perceive that 
there is a risk of expropriation in the next 10 years. Project participants perceive less risk than 
non-participants. In terms of information access, farm households know about the 
implementation of on average 2 forestry projects in the past, which is considerably lower than 
the actual number of implemented forestry projects which is around 10. Knowledge of past 
projects by project participants is also slightly higher than that of Non-participants. 
Furthermore, about 22% of the household heads are party members and therefore have access 
to this social-political network. However, the party membership percentage among not 
participating households is 23.5%, which is higher than that of participating households. 79% 
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of the interviewed households are located in Suichuan county. The underrepresentation of 
households in Fengchen is due to the fact that 10 out of 14 villages in Fengchen are 
collectively managed and participation in projects cannot be interpreted as the result of an 
individual decision-making process. These villages were therefore excluded from the sample. 
Household heads are predominantly male, on average 49 years old and with a rather low level 
of education (only 7 years which corresponds to the first year of secondary school). The 
average household includes 5 members, consisting of three generations in a household. The 
education year and household size of participating households is slightly higher than of 
households that do not participate. Migrant workers are also still counted as part of the 
household. On average there are 1.3 migrants per household, which shows the importance of 
migrant labour in rural China.  
Table 5.2: Statistical results of variables  
Variables Total Sample (189) Participant (70) Non-participant (119) 
 Meana Std. Dev Meana Std. Dev Meana Std. Dev 
Participation 37% - - - - - 
Tenure_insecurity 71% - 61.4% - 76% - 
Knowledge 1.92 1.71 2.06 1.77 1.85 1.68 
Political_status 22% - 20% - 23.5% - 
County 79% - 64.3% - 88.2% - 
Age (years) 49.48 10.20 48.59 11.38 50.01 9.46 
Gender 95% - 92.9% - 95.8% - 
Education (years) 6.96 3.17 7.19 3.48 6.82 2.98 
HH_size 4.80 1.93 5.2 2.19 4.57 1.73 
Off-Farm 1.28 1.30 1.34 1.49 1.24 1.18 
Wealth (thousand yuan) 4.49 7.19 6.35 9.99 3.40 4.55 
a Percentages are presented for dummy variables 
 
5.5.2 Participation in general 
Before identifying the determinants of participation in the government and international 
project separately, we first analyse the effect of different variables on camellia project 
participation in general. The results of the probit regression model – with the dependent 
variable being Participation –are presented in table 5.3.  
The coefficient for tenure insecurity is -0.38, which confirms the hypothesis that 
tenure insecure households are less likely to participate in forestry projects. The risk of 
expropriation reduces the farm household’s incentive to invest in camellia tree plantation in 
the frame of a project. Because participation in a camellia project involves a long-term 
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investment (the fruiting stage is only 5 years after plantation), tenure insecurity is a crucial 
determinant in the individual participation decision.
25
  
The information access variables are not significant. Being informed does not lead to a 
higher likelihood of participation. Party membership also does not affect the participation 
behavior. Information diffusion is easier within the party network and party members were 
often considered to be pioneers in government initiated programs. However, the results do not 
confirm this in the case of the camellia program.  
Household size has a significant impact, meaning that with every increase in the 
number of household members, the likelihood of participating will increase. Large farm 
households have a better capacity to face events of uncertainty and risk and as a result, they 
have a higher likelihood to invest in camellia plantations. The wealth variable is also found to 
have the expected effect on participation in the camellia projects. Richer families are more 
likely to participate because they have a higher resource endowment and can overcome the 
high investment intensity in the first years of plantation, before the time of fruition of the 
camellia trees.  
The county dummy is significant with a negative coefficient. This indicates that 
farmers in Fengchen county are more likely to participate than in Suichuan county. The 
reason for this may be that Fengchen introduced the pilot earlier than Suichuan county. Other 
local differences, such as economic development level, may also help to explain this result.   
 
 
 
                                                   
25 Note that a potential endogeneity problem is created by the inclusion of the variable Tenure_insecurity in the 
participation model. Most of the existing studies on tenure security and land investments – of which forest 
plantation and management could be seen as a sub-set – in China, do not address this endogeneity problem. The 
reason for this is that land reforms are generally decided at the village level and are independent of 
household-level investment decisions (Brandt et al., 2004; Liu et al., 1998; Ma et al., 2013; Qin and Xu, 2013). 
However, endogeneity can also occur because of unobserved variables that create correlation between 
Tenure_insecurity and the participation model error term (Ma et al., 2113). Following Knapp and Seakes (1998) 
I performed a Hausman test for endogeneity by performing a bivariate probit model with Participation and 
Tenure_insecurity as dependent variables. The chi2 test statistic showed that (the correlation parameter, which 
reflects the extent of correlation between the error terms of the two probit models) was not significantly different 
from zero at the 5% significance level. Hence, I conclude that there is no problem of endogeneity in my analysis. 
A similar test procedure was followed for Participation in the international and the government project in section 
5.3, where separate bivariate probits were performed for the two projects and Tenure_insecurity. The 
insignificance of the correlation parameter again shows that there is no problem of endogeneity. 
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Table 5.3: Probit model showing the influence of tenure, information and socio-economic 
characteristics on participation in general  
Variables Coefficient z-statistic 
Tenure_insecurity -0.381* -1.71  
Knowledge 0.066 1.07 
Political_status -0.028 -0.11 
Age -0.015 -1.40 
Gender -0.185 -0.40 
Education -0.005 -0.15 
HH_size 0.148** 2.29 
Off-Farm -0.010 -0.11 
Wealth 0.033* 1.85 
County -1.038*** -4.13 
Constant 0.727 0.93 
Observations 189 
Pseudo R² 0.142 
Log likelihood -106.8 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, and *** Significant at 1%.  
 
5.5.3 Participation in the international and the government project 
To understand the determinants of participation in the two different camellia projects, we 
have also performed a bivariate probit regression analysis. The first dependent variable is 
therefore defined as follows: =1,  if the household participated in the international project, 
=0, if the household did not participate in the international project; the second dependent 
variable is =1, if the household participated in the government project, =0, if the 
household did not participate in the government project. Only the data from Suichuan will be 
included in the bivariate probit regression, because the international project was not 
implemented in Fengchen county. Thus, we did not include the county dummy in the bivariate 
regression. The regression results are presented in table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Bivariate probit model showing the influence of tenure, information and 
socio-economic characteristics on participation in the international and the government 
project 
Variables Coefficient z-statistics 
International project   
Tenure_insecurity 0.217 0.71 
Knowledge 0.060 0.67 
Political_status 0.156 0.46 
Age -0.018 -1.06 
Gender -0.487 -0.76 
Education 0.080* 1.82 
HH_size 0.310*** 3.87 
Off-Farm -0.373*** -2.66 
Wealth  -0. 003 -0.16 
Constant -1.925* -1.85 
Government   
Tenure_insecurity -0.375 -1.52 
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Knowledge 0.042 0.63 
Political_status 0.129 0.49 
Age -0.007 -0.59 
Gender -0.339 -0.64 
Education 0.021 0.58 
HH_size 0.131** 1.93 
Off-Farm -0.070 -0.67 
Wealth  0.023 1.45 
Constant -0.523 -0.62 
Observations 150 
Log likelihood -105.300 
/athrho 12.388 
Rho 1 
Likelihood-ratio, chi²(1) 49.879 
Test of =0, Prob>chi² 0.000 
* Significant at 10% level, ** Significant at 5% level, and *** Significant at 1%.  
The estimated correlation of the error terms is positive and significantly different from 
zero. This result indicates that a bivariate probit model, rather than two univariate probit 
models, is more appropriate because of the correlation between participation in the two 
projects. 
We observe several interesting differences between the relevant determinants of 
participation in the two projects. The significant determinants for participation in the 
international project are education of the household head, household size and migrant 
household members. Education is found to have positive impact on participation in the 
international project. Learning improves the farmer’s ability to implement a new technology 
and allows the farmer to make better decisions about the new technology (Marra et al., 2003). 
Larger households also show a higher likelihood of participating in the international project. 
This result may be linked to the 50 mu area requirement for participation in the international 
project. Because camellia is a labour intensive forest species in the fruit season, large families 
have an advantage in providing the necessary labour. This reasoning is in line with the result 
that households with more migrant labour are less likely to participate in the international 
project.  
Participation in the government project is significantly affected by household size. 
Larger households also show a higher likelihood of participating in the national project. This 
result is the same with the finding for the international project above that, as camellia is a 
labour intensive forest species in the fruit season, large families have an advantage in 
providing the necessary labour.  
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5.5.4 Discussion 
The recent property right reform of 2004 distributed the user rights of forestland to the farm 
household in an attempt to offer more stable rights to forestland. However, the results of our 
analysis show that smallholders still perceive a high insecurity over their forestland. This may 
be because the reform was only completed as recently as 2007 in Jiangxi province. In addition, 
at the local level, the distribution and implementation of the property rights reform did not go 
smoothly and many conflicts occurred, contributing to the perception of insecurity. Hence, a 
stable forestland user rights system has not yet been established. Moreover, the probit 
regression results indicate that the risk of expropriation reduces a farm household’s incentive 
to invest in the better variety camellia projects. This result confirms other empirical studies on 
the relationship between forestry investment and tenure security (Otsuka et al., 2000; Fenske, 
2011; Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011; Thacher et al., 1996; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Dolisca et 
al., 2006).  
The insignificant results for the indicator of political status are to some extent 
contradictory to other studies that showed that party membership plays a significant role in 
household decision-making in rural China (Cook, 1999; Gustafsson and Shi, 1998) as well as 
in large-scale forestry program participation (Xu et al., 2010). In this study, the likelihood of 
participation did not increase with party membership for either project. The assumption that 
party membership improves information access, especially in regard to the government 
project, cannot be confirmed. A possible reason is that, with the development of information 
technology and media, information diffuses more quickly and people, not only party members, 
have equal opportunity to access project-related information. 
Findings of this research are in line with the general assumption that larger households 
have a better capacity to cope with uncertainty, and therefore more easily undertake long-term 
investments. These results also confirm that richer households are more likely to participate in 
long-term projects, as they can overcome the high investment intensity of the first years. If 
separated for difference across projects, results show that particularly for the international 
project the higher the education level of the household head, the more likely a household will 
participate in the international project. We may explain this result with the fact that during the 
implementation of the international project, households need to be capable to understand 
contract related issues and capture the large quantity of information relevant for the 
international project. This will be difficult for less educated household heads.  
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Results also show that forestry in China is starting to diversify. This might be a result 
of the forest tenure reform that led to a devolution of use rights to households. According to 
the results of this study, households take up different strategies for the use of their forestland. 
Only 37% of the households decided to participate in one of the two projects, which can be 
explained by the low level of trust in tenure security. Those who invested in camellia 
plantations, again differ in their profiles. For households that participate in the government 
project, forestry may only be one source of household revenues. For households in the 
international project, this may be different. As the international project provides a loan, not 
subsidies, these households took the risk to take a credit, which may imply that they see 
forestry as an important future source of household income. The finding that households with 
less off-farm labour are more likely to participate in the international project, may show a 
trend that this rural credit program supports a move of rural inhabitants back to the 
countryside. This is also a target of the agricultural development plan of the central 
government that tries to initiate migration back to the countryside to develop agriculture and 
forestry. However, interestingly, rather the international than the national project contributes 
to this target.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Since forests play an important role as a global carbon sink, many afforestation and 
reforestation projects have been implemented in developing countries. Especially in China, a 
variety of afforestation and reforestation programs have been carried out that fulfilled 
different targets of providing ecosystem services, improving rural livelihoods or contributing 
to climate change mitigation. The Chinese government often pursues rather ambitious area 
targets for such forestry projects, as in the presented case of a camellia tree program, where 
until 2020, 1,68 million hectares should be planted by camellia.  
In China, like in many developing countries, these projects are implemented foremost 
in a smallholder context, which means that, after the forestland tenure reform in 2007, the 
participation of smallholders in the camellia forestry project is voluntary. Against this 
background, this paper raises the question what kind of smallholders are most likely to 
participate in the camellia project? The objective of this paper hence was to find out which 
factors affect farmers’ participation in large-scale camellia projects.  
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The paper finds that only 37% of the sample households participated in the camellia 
project. A major reason for the low participation rate is households’ perceived tenure 
insecurity. If the Chinese government hence wanted to achieve its goal of 1,68 million 
hectares under camellia tree, improving tenure security seems to be crucial.  
Among those households that participate in the camellia projects, two different kinds 
of households were identified. Households participating in an international project, take up a 
loan and are requested to have a certain minimum area of forestland. These households are 
more likely to have a higher educated household head, more household members and less 
members working off-farm. The camellia project seems to be understood as an opportunity 
for investment in a more prominent role of forestry in the household’s income. Households 
that participate in the domestic project led by the government, receive subsidies for their 
investment. Survey results do not reveal distinct characteristics, only that with more 
household members, these households are more likely to participate in the camellia project. It 
is concluded that Chinese forestry shows trends of diversification after the devolution of 
forestland use rights, with a majority of households still hesitating to invest, while others 
seem to take up the opportunity and risk for investment, and still others depend on 
government subsidies to take initiative and invest in forestry.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It is widely agreed that the forestry sector plays a vital role in climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. A number of large-scale forestry programs, sometimes under international 
schemes, are implemented in developing countries with the objectives of forest conservation 
and afforestation. Forestry can also bring economic benefits and improve the rural livelihoods 
of smallholders. Accordingly, increasing the forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic meters above 
2005 levels by 2020 is one of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of China (Asian 
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank Institute, 2013). Hence, China has put 
major efforts in promoting forest plantation programs for achieving both ecological and 
economic benefits. Recently, with energy and oil security high on the political agenda, the 
central government of China has begun to promote bioenergy and oil forest crops plantation 
programs. Bioenergy and oil forest crops can be categorized as Economic Forests that 
generate Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). These and other forestry programs (see Liang, 
2012) resulted in a dramatic increase in the area of natural forests and man-made forests in the 
current Millennium. After years of afforestation, China has now the largest area of forest 
plantation in the world (FAO, 2011a). Despite these successes in forest growth, large-scale 
forestry programs experienced severe institutional challenges. A “top-down” administrative 
approach, a lack of integrated cooperation and long-term planning, and poor coordination 
have largely been identified as major barriers in forestry program design and implementation 
(Xu et al., 2006). Furthermore, the engagement and participation of local people has so far 
been neglected in program design and implementation, and farmers have gained only 
moderate benefits from these projects (Xu et al., 2006; Uchida et al., 2007). An institutional 
analysis on the strengths and limitations of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs 
could provide significant insights for the design and implementation of future forestry 
projects in China.  
Large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China are embedded in a general 
governmental discourse on measures for combating global warming, as well as on a discourse 
that sees forests in their ecological functions, i.e. as forest resources and renewable energy 
resources. Beyond the discourses, the programs however face institutional barriers related to 
142 
 
complicated transitional forestry management and local governance after the recent forest 
tenure reform. Since 2003, China experienced a reform of forestland rights, where user rights 
of collective forestland were redistributed to individual households. Simultaneously, other 
management regimes such as collective management and contracts to other private sector 
entities also emerged after the reform. Hence, multiple forestry management practices under 
various tenure regimes involve a wide range of public and private actors, all aiming at 
promoting investment in the forestry sector, on generating benefits for market actors and on 
maintaining a large area as forest (SFA, 2009). Moreover, the bioenergy and oil forestry 
programs intend to increase farmers’ incomes and alleviate rural poverty, but as forest 
investment is a long-term investment, the involvement of smallholders is still limited and 
problematic in China.  
Against this background, this study aimed to explore the role of property rights, the 
governance structure, and farmers’ incentives in the design and implementation of large-scale 
bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and how these three institutions influence and condition 
farmers’ participation in such programs. The following research questions with respect to 
bioenergy and oil forestry have been addressed.  
1. How and to what extent do different forest property rights affect the investment of farm 
households to maintain the forestry project sustainability?  
2. How do smallholders benefit from large-scale forestry projects under different project 
implementation regimes?  
3. How are various stakeholders involved in forestry project governance, particularly under 
long time horizons? And which factors determine a sustained governance of these projects? 
4. Which household-level factors determine farmers’ participation in large-scale forestry 
projects?  
This study on large-scale forestry program implementation in rural China adopted 
institutional theories and applied qualitative and quantitative empirical methods. Throughout 
the four chapters, the governance and institutions of forestry programs and forestry resource 
management are explored. Moreover, some of the challenges of implementing large-scale 
forestry programs in rural China are addressed by linking socio-economic factors and 
institutional factors in farm household econometric models, in an attempt to contribute to a 
discussion about farmers’ investment, participation and benefits in forestry programs. In 
doing so, the research revealed and confirmed the governance aspects that are critical in the 
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design and implementation of large-scale forestry programs. It also found that forest tenure 
devolution has significant impacts on farmers’ participation and investment. And it can be 
concluded that large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs bring different benefits to 
smallholders under different projects implementation regimes.  
This final chapter summarizes the main findings and conclusions for all four research 
questions. It also links the findings from the four empirical chapters to the broader context of 
forestry devolution and how the design of large-scale forestry projects may incorporate a 
sustained participation and cooperation among different stakeholders. The next section (6.2) 
presents and discusses the findings on the design and implementation of large-scale forestry 
projects in the transition to a market economy (research questions 3 and 4). Section 6.3 
provides a concrete analysis of how forestland property rights influence present forest 
resource management and affect the individual investment of smallholders (research questions 
1 and 4). Benefit distribution to smallholders in bioenergy and oil forestry programs is 
discussed in section 6.4 (research question 2). Section 6.5 discusses how this research 
contributes to theory. Finally, this chapter concludes with policy recommendations in section 
6.6 as well as research limitations and a future research agenda in section 6.7.  
 
6.2 The design and implementation of large-scale forestry programs 
Many developing countries lack mechanisms to ensure the participation and involvement of 
all stakeholders in forestry planning and development. Good governance, which includes 
stakeholder participation, plays a crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. 
As forestry entails long-term investment, how to set-up a good and sustainable governance 
architecture is very important, but also challenging. Moreover, in developing countries 
without a perfect market and absence of a transparent and effective legal system, this task is 
even more difficult. It is evident that large-scale forestry programs in China are moving from 
government-organized, centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and 
multi-actor governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private 
actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and individual 
farmers. This study aimed to find out how a better governance structure and institutional 
environment should be designed and implemented, to make forestry programs sustainable 
over the long-term. The findings can be summarized in four aspects linked to program 
implementation: the role of government and markets; the international investment regime; the 
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monitoring mechanism; and the time horizon for large-scale forestry programs. These four 
crucial factors for the successful introduction of governance arrangements are discussed 
below.  
6.2.1 The role of government and market in forestry programs 
Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be distinguished into those driven and 
implemented by the government and those driven and implemented by market arrangements. 
Both government-driven and market-driven arrangements have been defined and investigated 
in chapter 4, using the case of jatropha. The concept of government-driven arrangements 
refers to forestry plantation projects that are initiated by governmental stakeholders and 
implemented by governmental and/or other stakeholders. The concept of market-driven 
institutional arrangements refers to forestry plantations that are initiated and implemented 
primarily and mainly by private market actors, such as companies and smallholders. In the 
latter arrangements, companies usually have direct interaction with farm households or their 
representatives and will attempt to motivate them by using suitable market incentives. The 
cultivation of camellia (see chapter 2 and chapter 3) was initiated and organized by the central 
government or by the government in conjunction with an international agency, while the 
implementation of the projects fell under the responsibility of village committees and farmers. 
The camellia projects that were developed with assistance of an international agency can be 
seen as an in-between arrangement, as these were initiated by market and governmental 
stakeholders and implemented by governmental and private stakeholders.  
 In a large-scale forestry program, various county governance structures exist across 
counties (as detailed in chapter 3). In general, in government-driven programmes,  the 
implementation of bioenergy and forestry oil programs is based on the administrative 
structure from the county level to the township level, to the village and then to the natural 
village and/or farmers. In addition, the county Forestry Administration is important for 
implementation (chapters 3 and 4). This structure is in line with bureaucratic or government 
administration structures. The structure is different for the projects where an international 
agency is involved. If a county had applied for subsidies, then companies could directly apply 
for these subsidies at the county government, and realize the project with farmers or a natural 
village. Administrative villages and natural villages in both cases play an important role in 
project implementation, as village committee members and natural village representatives 
serve as coordinators who use their argumentative and authoritative power to motivate and 
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direct farmer participation in the projects (chapter 2, 3, and 4). This result is in line with the 
political and economic transition in China, from a centrally planned economy to a market 
based economy, in which both government and market actors participate.  
Both the government-driven and the market-driven forestry projects try to attract 
participation of market actors such as private companies and individual farmers. For example, 
the private company (GZREC) invited a television station for advertising the jatropha project 
to a wider public to enhance farmer participation (chapter 2). Furthermore, the company 
organized an introductory meeting and seminar, inviting village leaders from other areas to 
explain the economic value of jatropha cultivation, the technology of jatropha plantation, and 
the cooperative arrangement between the private company and village committees, to attract 
more farmer participation. Moreover, international actors also helped to set up a market 
mechanism and institutions, such as market contract relations with farmers (chapter 3 and 
chapter 5). This research shows that contracts are common within collaborations between 
forestry stakeholders (Chapter 3, 4 and 5). In Ji’an county, the county Forestry Administration 
signed a contract with the natural village and with farmers. In Suichuan county, the county 
Forestry Administration signed contracts with farmers, which clearly indicated the rights and 
responsibilities of both sides (chapter 5). In Fengchen county, the private company signed 
contracts with natural villages and farmers (chapter 3), while in the jatropha case the private 
company signed a contract with the village committee (chapter 4).While hence contracts are a 
common instrument for collaborations, their implementation still falls short or is ineffective 
(see 6.2.3). 
This thesis contributes to the literature on governance of large-scale bioenergy and oil 
forestry programs by an analysis of multi-level hybrid governance arrangements in which 
governmental authorities and market actors interact. As such it adds to the general literature in 
new institutional economics, which identifies firms, markets, hybrid contracting and public 
bureaus as different modes of governance (cf. Williamson 1998). It also adds to the literature 
in political sciences/public administration, which considers governance no longer the 
privilege of governmental agencies, but de facto and even de jure the common responsibility 
of a variety of governmental bodies, market agencies and civil society organizations (Leroy 
and Arts, 2006). The multi-level hybrid governance structure in bioenergy and oil forestry 
programs involves a number of governmental departments, state-owned companies, private 
companies, international agencies, villages, local communities and farmers based on 
bureaucratic power and market contracts. As such this structure confirms that new roles and 
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interaction patterns between government and markets are present in contemporary transitional 
China.  
The contribution of this thesis to literature is especially important because of the focus 
on China. Economists claim that the market theoretically has advantages in resource 
allocation and use efficiency under resource-constraint conditions (Arrow, 1969). There exists 
a discussion on the relation between governments and markets in East Asian economic 
development, whether governments should intervene little in the market or should govern 
markets (Aoki et al., 1998). This study proves that the market has transformed the state-led 
economy into a hybrid market economy, still characterized by significant government 
involvement (Guthrie, 2012; Fligstein and Zhang, 2011). The present state of the market in 
China’s forestry sector is constrained because of the path-dependent and developmental stage 
of China. But in a dynamic analysis, we see significant and increasing roles of the market 
actors and a widespread use of contracts in forestry collaborations.  
6.2.2 International investments’ and their effectiveness on the local level 
International agencies, including private companies and NGOs, invest a lot in bioenergy and 
oil forestry projects globally, particularly in developing countries (Gexsi, 2008; Gilbert, 2011; 
IPCC, 2012). Many biofuel projects start with safeguarding support from farmers in planting 
biofuel crops and then linking them to companies and international agencies (Bijman et al., 
2009). The local impact of international bioenergy projects has been analyzed using the case 
of jatropha investment. There are several failures of jatropha plantations and biofuel 
production from jatropha seeds in China because of the withdrawal of foreign companies. At 
the end of 2006, the US Company Beck Ltd. withdrew from China, after having invested 2.6 
million RMB in jatropha plantations but before finalizing the project (Chapter 4). The UK 
Company Sun biofuel equally left China because the company could not agree with 
Panzhihua city government, Sichuan Province, on the investment level to continue jatropha 
production (Huaxi City News, 2011).  
This study provides general insights into the international bioenergy and oil projects’ 
effectiveness on the local level in developing countries. Some foreign companies that have 
abandoned a jatropha project in one country are active also in other developing countries 
(Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; Ariza-Montobbio and Lele, 2010; Habib-Mintz, 2010; Gilbert, 
2011; Nielsen, et al., 2012). In such projects foreign companies hold most of the cards, while 
local farmers and officials often lack the experience to negotiate favorable terms and have 
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little power to hold the companies accountable (Gilbert, 2011). However, there are 
internationally supported projects that continue with donor aid such as the EIB project in 
camellia case.  
International projects (EIB project) on camellia are also more widely observed and 
analyzed (chapter 5). In our case-study, the adoption of new high-yielding camellia varieties 
was stimulated in two ways, first by a government project subsidized through the central 
financial budget, and second by an international project providing low-interest loans financed 
by the European Investment Bank. The international project was the first project financed by 
the European Investment Bank within the China Climate Change Framework Loan. Several 
interesting differences regarding participation of farmers in the two projects have been 
identified (chapter 6). Participation in both projects was significantly affected by household 
size, with larger households showing a higher likelihood of participation in the international 
project. In the international project, education of the household head was found to have a 
positive impact on participation, probably because learning improves the farmer’s ability to 
implement a new technology and allows the farmer to make better decisions about the new 
technology (Marra et al., 2003). Households with more migrant labour are less likely to 
participate in the international project. Overall, farmers who participate in the international 
project have quite different household characteristics from those in the government project. 
This may be explained by the fact that households participating in the international project 
took the risk to take a credit, which may imply that forestry is seen as an important future 
source of household income. Moreover, the international credit program may support a move 
of rural inhabitants back to the countryside, a trend that matches with the target of the 
agricultural development plan of the central government to develop agriculture and forestry. 
Finally, our camellia case also contributes to the literature on how farmers adapt their 
behavior to project characteristics (Dolisca et al., 2006; Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011; Lise, 
2000; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
6.2.3 Effective monitoring and sanctioning in forestry program design and 
implementation 
Jatropha’s failure in China can also be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor 
implementation and enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the 
withdrawal of a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed 
(Chapter 4). Hence, a powerful sanctioning mechanism and monitoring arrangement help to 
reduce the probability of moral hazard (Chapter 4). The withdrawal of the private company in 
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the jatropha case may reflect the state of the rule of law in transitional China: the legal system 
is underdeveloped and there is insufficient coordination to legally sanction private (and 
state/international) actors not behaving according to written contracts (see chapter 4). 
Coordination and supervision to sanction private actors not behaving according to written 
contracts is also vital for successful project execution. Findings show that random monitoring 
by village representatives or the company helps to sustain investment from other parties, like 
farmers (chapter 2).  
Lack of involvement of higher governmental levels and non-fulfillment of company 
promises in contract farming are also found in African cases of failed jatropha projects 
(Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010). Effective monitoring and legal services to farmers are crucial 
in program design and implementation. This is in line with Nee (1992)’s claim that creating 
legal norms and regulations and means to enforce them facilitates the functioning of market 
structures. Explicit mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of contracts are required too 
in afforestation and reforestation projects (Stringer et al., 2009) and in long-run natural 
resource management (Barrett et al., 2005).  
6.2.4 Time perspectives in forestry programs 
The failed jatropha project in this study indicates that convergent “time perspectives” of 
different actors in forestry institutional arrangements are important. Forestry, and thus also 
bioenergy and oil crop forestry, has a long-time horizon with long-term profitability, which 
contrasts with short-term liquidity requirements (see chapter 4). In the jatropha project, some 
actors (farmers and local government staff) focus on annual income revenues to cover their 
costs and expenditures, especially when their yearly expenses are relatively high. For other 
actors (companies and the central government), biofuel production from jatropha might just 
form a minor share of their total activities and budgets and for them future income or general 
benefits and the profitability of the project are more important in determining success. These 
diverging (time) perspectives in jatropha investments exist in many multi-stakeholder, 
large-scale forestry programs. A lack of rules to cope with diverging perspectives is an 
important reason for program failure (chapter 4). However, in the camellia case-study, one 
company provides cash income to cover labour costs and rent to farmers, which gains 
commitment from farmers (chapter 3). The company, aiming for future income and long-term 
profitability, provides short-term liquidity to cooperating farmers to cope with the diverging 
perspectives.   
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Hence, this study contributes to understanding the relevance of time in forest-based 
biofuel programs. Looking at time perspectives of stakeholders improves our understanding 
of the structural complications of involving smallholders in large-scale forestry programs with 
long-term investments in developing countries. It confirms the findings of other studies which 
found that time matters (Convery, 1973; Hoogstra and Schanz, 2009; Dorfman and Heien, 
1989), and that program design should include measures to align differing perspectives.  
 
6.3 The impact of forest property rights devolution on forest resource management and 
investment 
China experienced a series of property rights reforms since the foundation of the People’s 
Republic. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest property rights in China. 
From the preceding chapters it can be concluded that the complicated forest property rights 
reform made forest property rights vague, particularly at the local level. Moreover, different 
forest management regimes with differing levels of forest tenure security affect farmers’ 
investment and participation.  
6.3.1 The property rights reform has led to different forestry management regimes 
China initiated a series of property rights reforms, which resulted in a variety of forest tenure 
regimes. In 2003, a new devolution attempt started with as a main objective to distribute the 
user rights of forestland to farm households. However, other kinds of management schemes 
such as collective use and contracting to private actors are also allowed (chapter 2). Hence, 
multiple forestry management practices exist under various tenure regimes, following 
different physical and socio-economic conditions as well as different governance 
arrangements at the village level.  
Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified and analyzed in the preceding 
chapters: Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual (chapter 2 
and chapter 3). Under the Collective regime, natural village representatives coordinate the 
management of forests. Individuals are assigned tasks of working on the forestland. Final 
forestry products are distributed to the households. In the case of a Company regime, the 
company and village representatives agree on the forestland rental and management at the 
start of the project. Households are involved in the daily management and share the final 
product. However, in the long-run, the village representatives hold the power to decide on the 
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future of forestland. Under the Collective-Individual regime, the village representatives 
coordinate the start of forest plantation with all villagers, and then village representatives 
distribute the forestland plots to individual households who manage the plots. However, as the 
households do not receive a forestland certificate, the user rights farmers holding is still 
uncertain in the future. Under Partnership, individual farm households join together in a 
partnership and take joint decisions on the plantation. More specifically, the investment and 
share of output are jointly decided in the partnership. Under the Individual regime, individual 
farm households manage the forest resource and investment by themselves. 
The identified forest tenure regimes are partly in line with findings of other research. 
For example, Holden et al. (2011) and Xu et al. (2008) identified family management, 
partnership, outsider contract management, villager group, and collective management. The 
regimes “Individual” and “Partnership” are also mentioned by Sun (2008), Xu et al. (2008) 
and Holden et al. (2011). The “Company” regime is a kind of “Outsider contract 
management” as described by Xu et al. (2008). Management by a Villagers’ Group (Xu, et al. 
2008) /Natural village (Sun 2008) is divided in our study into two different regimes, i.e. the 
Collective and the Collective-Individual. Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the recent property 
rights reform resulted in decentralized forest management at the local level. Although the 
descriptive statistics in chapter 2 are not representative for the whole of China, the results of 
this case still show that a multitude of different tenure regimes exists after the recent 
forestland property reform.  
These findings indicate that the devolution process in property rights reform 
redistributed the user rights to local stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization 
process and the property rights reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms 
including individual households, collective forestry farms, communities, national private 
enterprises (FAO, 2011b). In the past decade, many countries have initiated efforts to reform 
their tenure arrangements for forests and forest land, moving towards the devolution of access 
and management rights to non-state stakeholders, mainly households, private companies and 
communities (FAO, 2011b); hence the developments that are observed in China fit into this 
wider process. Because property rights reform is generally linked to the devolution of forest 
resource management, community forestry programmes, together with forest restitution and 
privatization are essentially passing rights over forests to a local community, individuals or 
the corporate sectors (FAO, 2011b).  
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6.3.2 Forest property rights and farm household behavior 
Following the recent property rights reform, the preceding chapters have looked into how 
forest property rights have affected farmers’ investment and participation behavior. Chapter 2 
confirms that in general, tenure regimes with higher degrees of tenure security will trigger 
higher household investment. Collective-individual regimes resulted in the lowest level of 
investment. This can be explained by uncertainty about possible redistribution in the natural 
village. Chapter 5 also indicates that the risk of future expropriation affects farmers’ 
participation in forestry projects. Thus, the research provides empirical evidence of how 
property rights influence farmer investment behavior.  
Based on the New Property Rights Theory, the five forest tenure regimes differ in 
terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure security for 
farm households. Based on this theory, the prediction is that tenure security increases from 
Collective, to Company, to Collective-Individual, to Partnership, and to Individual regime. 
The regression results in chapter 2 prove that under the different tenure regimes, farm 
households’ investments in labour and capital differ. More specifically, under the Company 
regime and the Collective-Individual regime, individual investment is significantly lower than 
under the Individual regime. This is in line with our expectations and assumptions. However, 
the Partnership regime has higher investments in terms of fertilizer and pesticide inputs than 
the Individual regime. This can be explained by the trust relation (or importance of guanxi 
connection) within the Partnership regime, which consists often of friends and relatives. 
While the Partnership tenure regime has the highest level of farmers’ investment, only 7.1% 
of the sampled farmers joined a partnership. 
Results of chapter 5 show that about 71% of the households perceive a risk of 
expropriation of land tenure. Only 37% of the households decided to participate in forestry 
projects. Moreover, regression results confirm that tenure insecure households are less likely 
to participate in forestry projects. The risk of expropriation reduces the farm households’ 
investment in better variety camellia projects. Because participation in a camellia project 
involves a long-term investment (the fruiting stage occurs only 5 years after plantation), 
tenure insecurity is a crucial determinant in a household's decision to participate.  
The evolution of property rights and their effects on investment are central issues in 
the development literature (e.g. Besley, 1995). From this literature, it can be concluded that 
land tenure security positively influences investment in land, as secure land rights provide an 
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incentive to invest, improve access to credit markets, and enable land trading with other 
farmers (Besley, 1995; Fenske, 2011). Our results are in line with the literature and other 
empirical studies on the relationship between forestry investment and tenure security (e.g. 
Otsuka et al., 2000; Fenske, 2011; Coulibaly-lingani et al., 2011; Thacher et al., 1996; 
Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Dolisca et al., 2006; FAO, 2011; Qin and Xu, 2013). Chinese forestry 
property rights show a trend of diversification after the devolution reform, with a majority of 
households still hesitating to invest, while others seem to take up the opportunity and risk for 
investment. Tenure insecurity leads to long-term risk and uncertainty and is therefore 
especially relevant in forestry because of the long gestation period of investments (Pattanayak, 
et al., 2003; Holden et al., 2011). On the other hand, security of forest tenure will reduce 
uncertainty over forest property rights and over respective investment returns for farmers. 
Hence, secure forest tenure is a fundamental element in achieving sustainable forest 
management and improved livelihoods (FAO, 2011).  
 
6.4 Bioenergy and oil forestry program development and benefit distribution to farmers 
Farm households should be crucial actors in forestry management because they are the direct 
practitioners on the ground. But farmers’ participation is still constrained by their capacity in 
terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. However, for large-scale forestry projects, 
engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the success of the project, with respect to a 
balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. 
Forestry development improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and 
poverty alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry 
programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical services, 
some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of farmers in the 
camellia program was only 37% (chapter 5). Moreover, the participation level varied across 
counties and villages (chapter 3).  
Individual regime generates heterogeneity of benefit distribution among local 
communities (chapter 3), because large-scale and wealthy farmers are more likely to adopt 
camellia (Chapter 5). Forestry programs generate different benefit distribution on farm 
households under different forestry project implementation regimes. All villagers had access 
to the program and subsidies in the Collective regime. Under this regime, the distribution of 
final products is based on family size or is done as an average per household, which is 
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considered equal and fair and has been used historically in natural villages. However, 
Collective does not clarify the property rights of forestland to farm households. Under 
Collective-Individua lregime, farm households in the natural village obtain the user rights of 
the forestland as well as the forest products derived from it. Clarifying land tenure exists 
because the management 'rights' of forestland are distributed to each farm household 
informally.  The same as Collective regime, the distribution of forestland is based on family 
size, as a common and equal rule. Through Company regime, farm households get access to 
projects and obtain benefits provided by the company. However, if the natural village 
leadership group is involved in the coordination between smallholders and company, the 
distribution of final outputs and other benefits in the natural villages might be considered as 
unfair, corruption is also reported by some villagers during the fieldwork. In comparison, the 
access to project participation in the Partnership and Individual regimes is more difficult and 
unequal, and benefit distribution between smallholders are more unequal. The results may 
confirm that Collective and Collective-Individual regimes provide more equal access to and 
benefits from the projects because natural villages organize the farmers together to participate 
in the projects. But not only companies obtain a significant proportion of the final product, 
also reported corruption of natural village leaders interfere in the benefit distribution between 
smallholders and other stakeholders. Although the discourse of national and international 
forestry projects is in general pro-poor, and projects are often formulated with such objectives, 
implementation of (inter)national projects through various levels in the local village often is 
quite a different story. Hence, the benefits for poor and marginal smallholders remain 
uncertain.  
The study contributes to the discussion on benefit distribution and equity in forestry 
projects and management which is seldom touched upon in China. It confirms that 
collective-based forestry regimes sometimes perform better than individual regime in terms of 
social equity. Starting in the 1980s, governmental forest tenure regimes in developing 
countries have been increasingly devolved to community-based forest tenure institutions in 
many parts of Africa and Asia (Suyanto et al., 2001; Edmunds et al., 2003). The devolution of 
forest tenure aims at a more equitable resource management and results also in a more 
sustainable use of a resource (Sandbrook et al., 2010; Ambus and Hoberg, 2011). As a part of 
REDD+, afforestation and reforestation projects should be concerned with benefit distribution 
and equity issues (Brown and Corbera, 2003). Evaluation of benefit distribution is not that 
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easy and this study provides a preliminary approach of such an evaluation in an afforestation 
and reforestation program with both international and national involvement in China.  
 
6.5 Interlinking institutions: contributions to theory 
In chapter 1, Oliver Williamson’s four-layer model of institutions was presented as the 
overarching framework to understand how multiple institutions influence bioenergy and oil 
forestry programs in rural China. While Williamson (1998) developed his four-layer 
framework initially from an institutional economics perspective, I illustrated in this thesis that 
the framework also has relevance for other disciplines that study institutions. 
The initial rationale behind the four-layered model of institutions was that institutional 
economics – and also the other social sciences – have not (yet) progressed to the extent that a 
unified theory of institutions can be formulated and applied meaningfully; and hence that we 
have to accept institutional pluralism. For that reason, this thesis used different institutional 
theories and approaches to study the three selected institutions (property rights, governance 
structures, incentive structures) influencing the implementation of bioenergy and oil forestry 
programs, each located at a different level of Williamson’s framework. However, I noted 
already in chapter 1 that each of these institutional analyses should be open to the linkages 
and interrelations between institutions at different levels, and the empirical research in 
Chapters 2 to 5 illustrated many examples of such interrelations and influences. Here I 
summarize and further conclude on these linkages between the studied institutions. 
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, many forest tenure reforms 
have been carried out. This is why, from an empirical perspective, it comes somewhat as a 
surprise that land tenure has a strong influence on structuring and conditioning governance 
institutions and incentive structures. However, from a theoretical perspective, land property 
rights and tenure regimes are expected to have such an influence as they are located at a 
‘higher’ level of Williamson’s framework. Evidence from this thesis shows that the last 
reform to some extent shapes human interaction and other institutions. However, as will be 
shown below, the institutionalization of tenure regimes is to some extent also aided by the 
implementation of the camellia projects. Furthermore, local governance institutions are 
supportive to current tenure regimes in that local actors try to overcome the difficulties that 
come about with these regimes: actors try to realign governance structures based on the 
regimes. This thesis hence shows how institutions on different levels of Williamson’s 
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framework are mutually reinforcing. In what follows, this finding will be further elaborated 
along the lines of the different chapters of this thesis.  
REDD+ and carbon offset projects have been criticized for creating incentives towards 
centralized governance, and for putting tenure rights at risk. In section 2.5.1, it has been 
shown that, despite the implementation of large-scale forestry projects, no re-centralization of 
forest tenure has taken place. Instead, forest tenure regimes affect the implementation of these 
projects. The findings of chapter 2 show that different tenure regimes do incite farm 
households’ investments to different degrees. The explanation of these differences, however, 
needs to revert to different institutions of Williamson’s categorization. For instance my 
findings show that farmers in a Partnership have the highest (working) capital investment. 
This result can be explained by reference to level 1 and 2 of Williamson’s framework. 
Partnerships are foremost founded among friends and relatives. Their level of trust in each 
other and in the long-term stability of the arrangement will be high, which will have an impact 
on their perceived security of investment. The low investment of farm households under the 
Company regime, can also be explained at the level of the institutional environment. In this 
regime, households do not know about the long-term distribution of forestland, as the 
company and the village representatives hold the power to decide on future forestland 
redistribution. The rules of the game hence are not supportive to such a long-term investment 
as forestry. In conclusion, while Chapter 2 finds different tenure regimes to be having 
different influences on forest investment, explanations for these findings partly revert also to 
other levels of Williamson’s framework.  
Chapter 3 shows that tenure regimes shape human action as well as interaction. In this 
chapter, different “implementation regimes” of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry projects 
are identified. The components of these regimes are local governance institutions, forest 
tenure and project policy. The chapter inquires in how far, under these different regimes, the 
distribution of benefits among stakeholders may differ. The results show that forest tenure, 
together with another institution on the level of the institutional environment, has a crucial 
effect on smallholders’ access to and benefits from large-scale projects. This “other 
institution” is the minimum area requirement rule (participation in a project requires a 
minimum of 50 Mu land), set by some of the county governments. The following will focus 
on the cases where such a minimum requirement has been set.  
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In areas where the forest land use rights had already been devolved to smallholders, 
smallholders face difficulties in participating in the projects as they alone cannot achieve the 
minimum area requirement. In the survey area of this research, this low access of 
smallholders was overcome by realigning local governance structures (third level of the 
Williamson framework). One governance structure is the Partnership. As mentioned above, 
for setting up a Partnership, mutual trust is crucial, an institution at the first level of 
Williamson’s framework. Hence, whether governance structures can be realigned to improve 
access to a project, will also depend on the first level institution “trust”.  
I also found that land rights institutions were influenced by governance structures, 
where governance arrangements of local authorities, farmers and bioenergy companies 
translated national and international forestry projects to the local context and by doing so, 
redefined land tenure rights. It seems that in the transition from a centrally planned economy 
to a more market oriented model, institutions at Williamson’s second level are no longer 
stable. This appears to be rather unique and a specific characteristic of contemporary China.  
From chapter 3, one may conclude that local governance plays a crucial role in 
intra-village benefit distribution, where access to the project is determined by forest tenure 
and project-related regulations by the county government such as the minimum area 
requirement. Whether local governance institutions can overcome smallholders’ difficulty to 
access a project, has been found to depend also on the first level institution “trust” (in the case 
of Partnerships). 
Chapter 5 then sheds light on the effects of different camellia project designs on 
incentive structures for farm households to participate in a project. It finds that international 
projects tend to incite participation of larger households with less migrant labour, and with 
household heads with a higher level of education. This is explained by the project’s stricter 
institutional environment, requiring a feasibility and environmental impact report, loan 
repayment and the signature – and understanding of – a formal contract. The second level 
institutional environment hence directly impacts incentive alignment (level four).  
Furthermore, the research on camellia plantations shows a rather smooth 
implementation of the projects, while jatropha biofuel projects are to some extent 
representative of less successful forestry project implementations. The following can be 
concluded for why, from an institutional perspective, large-scale forestry projects can fail. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the level of the alignment of governance structures. The institutional 
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environment, the Forestry-Oil Integration plan, is given, and so are other governmental rules 
and regulations, like laws and China’s vertically organized administrative structure with its 
inherent remuneration rules. Chapter 4 shows how the institutional environment makes the 
governance alignment particularly difficult. In the case of the government-driven arrangement 
of jatropha plantations, the institutional environment does not provide incentives to 
governmental officials to engage in the long run. What finally led the government (and 
farmers) to stop their engagement in jatropha plantation, was the withdrawal of CNPC, and 
the resulting lack of a refinery in their vicinity. The withdrawal of CNPC is attributed to a 
leadership change. In a cultural environment (level 1 of Williamson) where leadership change 
can result in ad-hoc changes in governance structures or even in the institutional environment, 
long-term investments such as in forestry are particularly vulnerable to changes at this 
institutional level. The institutional environment furthermore does not support governance 
alignment in that it does not provide any legal or regulatory support in the case that one actor 
stops cooperating within the game. This shortcoming in the legal framework holds for both 
cases of market- and government-driven arrangements. In the government-driven arrangement, 
differences in governmental ranks made it difficult to sanction the defector. In the 
market-driven arrangement, the lack of the rule of law made it possible for the company to 
just disappear. Due to uncertainty about the long-term behaviour of participants in an 
institutional arrangement, their establishment is at risk.  
In conclusion, this thesis started from the four-layered framework of Williamson for 
institutional analysis. Based on this framework, three institutions (each on a different level) 
were included in the analysis (property rights, governance and incentives), where the analysis 
of each institution separately required the operationalization of a specific theoretical 
framework. At the end of this thesis, two main insights stand out with respect to the 
Williamson framework. First, while the analysis in each chapter focused on a specific 
institution, it is clear from the discussion above that all levels of institutional analysis are 
highly interrelated and higher levels of institutions strongly affect lower levels. The analyses 
presented in the different chapters provide evidence of these influences. These ‘top-down’ 
effects were also indicated by Williamson (1998) but not discussed in detail. Insights from 
this thesis hence add to the understanding of the framework. Second, the thesis also provides 
evidence of what Williamson termed feedback effects, i.e. the impact of lower level 
institutions on higher levels such as the effect of local governance arrangements on the 
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definition of land property rights. Especially these feedback effects have received limited 
attention in the literature and the current thesis hence adds further insights and understanding. 
 
6.6 Policy implications and recommendations 
The planted area of jatropha is stagnating globally because many countries, companies and 
NGOs stepped out of jatropha plantations. Few jatropha projects obtained a net benefit, even 
in Africa where labour costs are low (Nielsen, et al., 2012). The bioenergy sector experienced 
a bubble due to the price developments for crude oil, which reached its highest point in 2007. 
After that, the decrease in the crude oil price made the market less promising, showing 
decreasing jatropha investments in South America, Africa and Asia. 
After China stepped out of jatropha, it moved into camellia forestry, in its search for a 
promising crop to provide edible oil as well as bioenergy. Camellia gained international 
support. Moreover, China's recent forest tenure reform predicts a change in forestry resource 
management, as forestland tenure devolution aims to provide more security for and benefit to 
private actors (farmers and companies), who are expected to invest more in forestry. Forestry 
is not only important for climate change mitigation and adaptation; it also provides products 
and income to forest-dependent farmers. This fits into China's long-term policy agenda to 
improve rural livelihoods and promote agriculture and forestry development in rural China. 
Hence, this section contains recommendations for the further implementation of bioenergy 
and oil forestry programs.  
First, policy inconsistency in bioenergy policies in China affected continuity. In China, 
state-owned companies abolished subsidies for jatropha and private companies discontinued 
their investment, partly because the central government subsidies for jatropha were 
discontinued. In addition, forest tenure policy also changed in China, which caused insecurity 
among stakeholders and affected their involvement in the implementation of bioenergy and 
oil forestry programs. In conclusion, policy consistency is crucial for long-term forestry 
investment.  
Second, as a transition society, the role of market-based mechanisms is growing in 
China. Cooperation started between private actors such as companies and farmers, but due to 
underdeveloped monitoring programs and ill-functioning sanctioning mechanisms, the 
companies could easily withdraw from or abandon their contracts with farmers. As a result, 
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fragile and low risk tolerant farmers see their livelihoods endangered. Hence, measures should 
be taken to improve the institutional environment with respect to monitoring and the rule of 
law. Moreover, well-developed market insurance can reduce the risks brought about by 
natural disasters and provide stability in investment and development of forestry. Finally, 
providing direct cash income to stakeholders with liquidity constraints to address their 
short-term financial challenges, such as farmers, can be helpful.   
Third, the objective of this reform is to establish a stable forest tenure system and thus 
to provide security to farmers and other stakeholders to improve participation of these private 
actors in forestry investments. Although the recent tenure reform intends to distribute tenure 
rights to individual farm households and increase security, land tenure security of local 
farmers has not been reached yet. The rapid developments in forestland tenure reform in the 
past create uncertainty among farmers and other stakeholders; hence it is important to 
improve stability of the forest tenure reform policy. Moreover, strengthening the legality and 
certainty of forest tenure after the reform is on its way, while effective supportive rules and 
market development are still required.  
Fourth, although China's forestry programs are formulated centrally, their concrete 
design and implementation is decentralized towards local authorities and stakeholders, and 
thus diverse. Understanding local governance characteristics is vital to adequately design and 
implement forestry projects and to involve smallholders. From this study, several 
recommendations can be formulated for further improving the implementation of forestry 
projects and Chinese forest resource management. Both government-driven and 
market-driven projects should take local governance arrangements into account during project 
design and implementation. Integrating local institutions and local tenure regimes into the 
project setting and operation is highly recommended. International programs use international 
standard experiences, but especially then a pre-test regarding the local conditions is essential 
for the future success of the program.  
Finally, large-scale forestry programs might create inequity and discriminate against 
fragile and marginal smallholders. Although the objectives of many forestry programs include 
poverty alleviation and the improvement of rural incomes, specific measures to target 
marginal and poor farmers are lacking. Hence, regulation on smallholders’ participation 
should be formulated to improve and guarantee the involvement of smallholders in the design 
and implementation of large-scale forestry programs and to let them benefit from the program. 
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Moreover, as Collective, Collective-Individual and Company regimes perform better in 
smallholder involvement, developing these arrangements according to the local institutional 
context is recommended. In addition, as local farmers usually lack information on 
participation policies, procedures and the general terms of (international) projects, they lack 
the capacity to participate. To increase participation, education and extension to increase local 
farmers’ knowledge on forestry projects is necessary. And, in order to reduce the transaction 
costs of involving a large number of smallholders, enhancing community trust and including 
poor farmers in existing social network is important. Finally, micro-credit provision is 
recommended because it helps to mitigate farmers’ financial constraints and enables farmers 
that are short of credit to participate.  
 
6.7 Study limitations and directions for further research 
This research has analyzed bioenergy and oil forestry programs after forestland reform from 
an institutional perspective, focusing on program implementation and farmer investment and 
participation. Some limitations of this research can be formulated. First, bioenergy and oil 
crops are suitable to grow in sub-tropical and tropical areas and are therefore mainly observed 
in south China. In addition, collective forest tenure has mainly occurred in south China, hence 
southern provinces have been the main target of the recent reform. As a result, this research 
conducted case-studies only in southern provinces. Furthermore, the case-study on camellia 
was only implemented in one province. Hence, extending the geographical scope of research 
would enable to check the robustness of the research findings for other parts of rural China. 
For instance, the tenure regimes and their effects have been examined only for the camellia 
project. Similar studies in other provinces can be made to better understand forestland 
(re)distribution policy and measure its effects. Such comprehensive analysis will help to 
provide a more complete picture of forestland property rights reform in China. More 
specifically, of interest is whether devolution of forestland tenure provides tenure security for 
the private sector and farmers, and what are the effects of further forestland reform 
implementation on farmers’ livelihood and equity.  
Secondly, because the jatropha case-study is based on projects that failed, because the 
camellia case-study proved to be just in the initial stage, and the forest reform was only just 
finished, it is difficult to estimate the long-term impacts and result on farmers’ participation 
and benefits. Hence, a new analysis after a lengthier period of implementation of the program 
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will provide further evidence and insights. Specifically, benefit sharing and distribution 
achieve significant attention in global bioenergy and oil forestry projects, including poverty 
alleviation and social sustainability (Duvenage et al., 2012). The social welfare and equity of 
bioenergy smallholder investment in developing countries are discussed widely (Hought et al., 
2012). This study of smallholder bioenergy and oil forestry can only partly contribute to this 
debate with a preliminary appraisal due to the initial stage of the studied projects. Future 
research may investigate the evolution of distribution effects in the studied program and the 
long-term effects on smallholders’ income. Future research may also widen the focus to social 
welfare of smallholders brought about by large-scale forestry programs.  
Finally, China has been experiencing a transition to a market economy, which has 
consequences for its society. The implementation of large bioenergy and oil forestry programs 
is embedded in and part of this critical transition, where private companies and individual 
farmers attempt to invest in forestry. Contract farming and contract performance are now 
becoming standard practice for both smallholders and companies in a transitional economy 
(Guo et al., 2007; Zhang, 2012; Montefrio and Sonnenfeld, 2013). However, results of this 
study suggest that the access to these contracts may not be equal across farmers. Further 
research should analyse the functioning and consequences of contract farming in the 
bioenergy and oil forestry sector for smallholders, especially as smallholders have to deal 
with long-term investment and not just annual crop farming.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix Ι A checklist for semi-structured interviews with stakeholders at each level of 
government, from provincial level to farmer representatives 
1. Who decides on the jatropha and camellia projects agenda? Who participates in the policy 
game? Who is excluded? Who takes the decisions? 
2. What are the main concepts in the policy discourses and the policy programs around 
jatropha and camellia projects? What do relevant policy documents related to jatropha and 
camellia projects contain? How do the various players in the field interpret the policy 
concepts? 
3. Which actors are involved in the jatropha and camellia tree cultivation and promotion and 
how are jatropha and camellia trees promoted at the local level? 
4. Whether there are any previous nationally or internationally initiated forestry projects? 
How were the projects implemented and do they have any impacts on the implementation of 
jatropha and camellia projects?  
5. What are your objectives for the programs? Do you have any obligation for the 
implementation of the program?  
6. How has the institutional arrangement been negotiated among the stakeholders? 
7. Apart from the program, is there any subsidy policy for planting jatropha or camellia? May 
you tell me about the subsidy standard, which department offers the subsidy, the requirements 
for getting the subsidy and for what reason will a household be rejected for getting the 
subsidy?  
8. What are potential risks in the program for the local government/company and farmers such 
as fire, pest, market risks, natural disaster etc? 
9. What are the benefits of participating in the program for the government/company and 
farmers?  
10. Whether there are any obligations in the program for the local government/company and 
farmers?  
11. Whether there are any previous experiences of jatropha or camellia projects?  
12. What is your expectation of further development of jatropha or camellia projects in the 
future?  
13. What is the local situation of the jatropha and camellia seed processing industry and 
market? 
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Appendix ΙΙ Administrative village questionnaire 
The goal of this research is to try to find out the determinants of success in camellia tree 
cultivation. Your answer is very important for my research. All the information you offer will 
be kept confidential and is only used for my research.  
 
Interviewer: __________              Date: ____________ 
County: __________   Township: __________    Administrative Village name: 
____________  
Interviewee: __________   contact Contact telephone number: __________  
Distance of village to:  County: ___ km,  Township: ___ km 
 
1. Characteristics of village leader 
 Item  Village leader  
Age Years  
Education Years in school  
Gender 1=male 
2=female 
 
Whether party 
member 
1=yes 
2=no 
 
When s/he became 
village leader in this 
village 
Year  
Procedure of 
obtaining the position   
1=recommended by former village 
leader  
2=recommended by administrative 
village  
3=delegated by the township  
4=villager  
5=others, specify 
 
Whether s/he fulfills 
also other roles  
1=farmer cooperative member 
2= owner of forestry 
enterprise/company 
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3=owner of other enterprise 
4=others, specify 
5=none 
 
2. Village condition and labour force  
2.1 Total number of natural villages                           ______ natural villages 
   
2.2 Total number of households in the administrative village        ______ households  
2.3 Total number of villager                           ______ persons 
2.4 Adult female labour force (16-55 years)                    ______ persons 
2.5 Adult male labour force (16-60 years)                     ______ persons 
2.6 Wage for employed labour                                    ______ yuan/day 
2.7 Number of farm households with access to electricity             ______households 
 
3. Forestland and forestry activities  
3.1 Forestland area according to property rights 
Item Individual Partnership Collective Forestland transfer 
within the village 
Forestland leased to 
outsiders 
Unit Mu Mu Mu Mu Mu 
2011      
 
3.2 Main Forestland area according to type of trees 
 Economic tree Ecological 
forest 
Protected 
forest 
Barren land 
Name     camellia 
tree 
Others   
Total area          
Average 
slop 
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Land 
quality 
1=good, 
2=medium, 
3=bad 
         
 
4. Tenure security  
4.1 Is the forestland distributed to farm households? If yes, what are the distribution rules? If 
not, why not? 
 
4.2 What is the total number of disputes in 2010? Describe the cases of who had the dispute 
with whom and who intervened in the dispute resolution in 2010? 
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Appendix ΙΙΙ Farm household questionnaire 
The goal of this research is to try to find out which factors determine farm households’ camellia tree cultivation. Your answer is very important 
for my research. All the information you offer will be keptconfidentialand is only used for my research. 
 
Farm household code   Survey date   
Name of the county   Name of the interviewer   
Name of the township    Name of the interviewee   
Name of the 
administrative village   Gender of the interviewee 
  
Name of the natural 
village   
Relation ofinterviewee and 
the farm household head 
  
Name of the farm 
household head   Contact telephone number 
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1. Household composition and family members’ activities.  
Series no. 
of 
househol
d 
member  
1.Relationship with 
household head 
1=head 
2=partner 
3=child or partner of 
the child 
4=grandchild 
5=parents and parents 
in law 
6=grandparents 
7=sibling 
8=other relative 
9= no relative 
2.Gender          
1=male 
2=female 
3.Age 4.Edu
cation 
level 
(years 
in 
schoo
l) 
Whether 
party 
member 
1=yes, 
2=no 
Main occupation: 
0=none 
1=agriculture 
2=forestry 
3=self-employment 
4= village leader 
5=township cadre 
6=other government employee 
7= working in non-agricultural 
jobs  
8=student 
9=other 
Work location if “Main 
occupation” = 7 
1=in the village 
2=other village in the town 
3=outside the town within the 
county 
4=other county within the 
province 
5=other province 
6=abroad 
1 head        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
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8        
9        
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2. Household land condition and activities 
 
2.1 Arable land and forestland conditions 
Item Arable land currently in use Arable land 
leased to 
others 
Forestland currently in use Forestland leased 
to others 
Own use Leased from 
others 
Individual Partnership Leased from others 
within the village 
Leased from others 
outside the village 
Unit Mu Mu Mu Mu Mu Mu Mu Mu 
2010         
 
2.2 Household farming activities 
 Units 
Agriculture Husbandry Other forestry(apart from2.3) 
mainly is NTPF 
Name of the crop  
Rice Maize Other: specify Pig Poultry  Other: specify Mushroo
m 
Medicin
e 
Other 
1.Yield Jin          
2.Market price  Yuan/Jin          
3.Total labour  Day/s          
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3. Camellia plantations  
 
3.1. Have you planted new camellia trees?  
1=yes, please go to 3.2. 
2=no, please go to 3.4. 
 
3.2. New camellia plantations on each piece of land 
Variables  Unit  Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot4 Plot5 
1. Size Mu      
2. Average slope  Degree      
3. Soil quality 1=good 
2=medium 
3=bad 
 
    
4. Tenure regime  Individual, Partnership, 
Collective-Individual, Company 
 
    
5. Whether the plantation was done under a 
project? 
1=yes, please specify the name 
2=no, please cross the box 
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6. Subsidy Yuan      
7. Low interest loan provided by project Yuan      
8. Cost for the first year  Yuan      
9. Labour for the first year Day/s      
10. Cost for the second year Yuan      
11. Labour for the second year  Day/s      
 
3.3. Has anyone of your household received from the forestry station any productive input/service related with camellia trees? (Multiple choice) 
1=none, 2=training, 3=better seedlings, 4=technology assistance, 5=fertilizer, 6=demonstrational plots trip, 7=others, please specify: 
____________________ 
 
Please continue with 4.  
 
Questions for those not having planted camellia trees  
 
3.4.Why did you not take part in the plantation? (Multiple choice) 
1=no enough labour, 2=lack of investment, 3=lack of technology,4=no subsidy support,5=low economic benefits, 6=risks in the market, 7=no 
forestland, 8=alternative use of forestland, 9=no processing facilities accessible, 10=others, please specify: ___________________ 
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Please continue with 4.  
 
4. Institutional part  
 
4.1. Do you know about any previous government initiated forestry programs? 
1=yes, 2=no 
 
4.2. Have you ever taken part in any local government initiated forestry project? 
1=yes, 2=no 
 
4.3. To what extent do you believe that the information on forestry projects by the local government is reliable? 
1=0-20%, 2=21%-40%, 3=41%-60%, 4=61%-80%, 5=81%-100% 
 
4.4. What is the subsidy standard for camellia plantations? ______ 
 
4.5. Are there any obligations for a farmer in the cultivation of camellia? 
176 
 
1=yes, list ______, 2=no obligation, 3=I do not know 
 
4.6. Are there any sanctions if the farmers discontinue the cultivation of camellia? 
1=yes, list ______, 2=no sanctions, 3=I do not know 
 
4.7. In your opinion, what is the local government’s motivation in promoting cultivation of camellia trees? (Multiple choice)  
1=bring benefit for farmers, 2=political achievement, 3=international pressure, 4=economic benefit for themselves, 5=others, please specify: 
__________ 
 
4.8. What are the risks for a farmer in taking part in the tea oil tree cultivation? (Multiple choice) 
1=lack of cash investment, 2=market risks, 3=natural disaster, 4=fire, 5=pest, 6=subsidy termination, 7=none, 8=others, please specify: 
______________________ 
 
4.9. What is the benefit in taking part in the camellia project? (Multiple choice) 
1=income increase, 2=technology training, 3=management training for the market, 4=ecological improvement, 5=none,6=other, please specify: 
__________________ 
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5. Household wealth 
 Productive machinery House  
1=brick 
2=wood 
Consumerdurables 
 
 Tractor Irrigation 
equipment 
Agro-produc
t 
Processing 
equipment 
Car Fridg
e 
Washin
g 
machine 
Television Scooter Computer Air 
conditione
r 
Water 
heater 
Original 
value(Yuan) 
Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan Yuan 
Age(year)             
 
6.Tenure security 
6.1. Do you expect risk of expropriation (within the next 10 years) 
1. Yes; 2.No 
 
6.2. Do you know the functions of the Forestland Title Certification? (Multiple choice) 
1=the legal contract of your user right of forestland within 70 years 
2=the legal contract stipulating for which forestland you own the user rights 
3=the prerequisite for the wood harvesting permit 
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4=the prerequisite for compensation when the land is withdrawn by the government and other sectors 
5=the prerequisite for the transfer of user rights of forestland to others 
6=others, _______________(specify) 
 
6.3. Do you have disputes over forestland?  
1=yes, for which issues_________________________, 2=no  
 
6.4. With whom do you have disputes?(Multiple choice)  
1=villager in the same village, 2=village collective group, 3=villager in the neighboring village, 4=neighbor village group, 5=forestry bureau, 
6=company, 7=private individual resident outside the village, 8=others 
 
6.5. Who intervenes for resolving the disputes? (Multiple choice)  
1= discussing among affected parties, 2=villager leader, 3=forestry bureau, 4=legal department, 5=other
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Appendix IV Endogeneity of tenure security 
Ma et al. (2013) argue that the inclusion of tenure security measures in an investment model 
presents a potential endogeneity problem. This endogeneity problem may have several causes. 
First, investments in land improvements or forestry plantations may increase the likelihood of 
obtaining secure land titles in the future. Incorporating tenure security as an explanatory 
variable in the investment model may then lead to an issue of reverse causality as tenure 
security may affect investment decisions but at the same time, investments can influence the 
level of tenure security. Consequently, coefficient estimates resulting from models that do not 
take account of reverse causality may be biased. The second type of endogeneity relates to 
unobserved household characteristics or actions that affect both tenure security and 
investment decisions. For example, households that invest in their land may also be more 
active in lobbying village leaders for protection of tenure rights. Being unable to incorporate 
such unobserved characteristics, may then lead to correlation between the variable tenure 
security and the regression model error term.  
 In the Chinese context, the reverse causality effect of tenure security and investments 
may be minimal. The reason for this is that land redistribution or expropriation are usually 
decided at the village level and are therefore independent of land management and 
investments decisions taken by households (Brandt et al., 2004; Liu et al., 1998; Ma et al., 
2013; Qin and Xu, 2013). Furthermore, this chapter discusses (marginal) labour and working 
capital investments rather than investments in forest plantation which also lowers the risk of 
reverse causality. The second type of endogeneity – unobserved variables that can affect both 
tenure security and investments decisions – may however be relevant also in my analysis. I 
therefore applied econometric techniques to correct for endogeneity arising from a binary 
endogenous variable based on Heckman (1974) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2005). 
This apporach is also referred to as the control function approach and solves the endogeneity 
problem based on a two-step procedure that is estimated by Stata’s treatreg command 
(Wooldridge, 2012). As compared to the results in table 2.5, tenure insecurity is no longer 
significant in the labout investment model and the collective tenure regime has no significant 
effect on capital investments. Other results remain largely the same.
26
 
 
                                                   
26 Remark that the results in table 2.5 are based on a tobit estimation model and the coefficients in tables 2.5 and 
A.2.1 can therefore not be directly compared.   
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Table A.2.1 Treatment effects model regression results 
         LABOUR     CAPITAL     
  Coefficient z-statistic sig. Coefficient z-statistic sig. 
       partnership -0.6 -0.5 
 
61.0 3.7 *** 
collective -4.0 -2.6 *** -31.1 -1.3 
 company -2.5 -2.4 ** -35.7 -2.3 ** 
tenure_insecurity 3.0 0.7 
 
-6.8 -0.1 
 size 0.0 -2.6 *** 0.4 1.9 ** 
distance -0.4 -1.1 
 
1.8 0.4 
 slope 1.2 1.9 * -4.1 -0.5 
 soilquality -0.3 -0.4 
 
-1.7 -0.2 
 headgender -2.5 -1.4 
 
54.3 2.1 ** 
headage 0.1 1.7 * 0.3 0.7 
 headeducation 0.0 -0.3 
 
-2.7 -2.0 ** 
householdsize -0.5 -3.5 *** 3.0 1.6 
 valueofhouse 0.0 -1.3 
 
0.0 0.2 
 _cons 6.4 2.3 ** -18.4 -0.5 
 
         TENURE INSECURITY TENURE INSECURITY   
       partnership -0.3 -0.8 
 
-0.3 -0.8 
 collective 1.3 4.2 *** 1.3 4.2 *** 
company 0.5 1.6 
 
0.5 1.6 
 size 0.0 1.5 
 
0.0 1.5 
 distance 0.2 1.6 
 
0.2 1.6 
 slope 0.2 0.7 
 
0.2 0.7 
 soilquality -0.2 -0.5 
 
-0.2 -0.5 
 headgender 0.3 0.5 
 
0.3 0.5 
 headage 0.0 1.0 
 
0.0 1.0 
 headeducation 0.0 0.1 
 
0.0 0.1 
 householdsize 0.0 -0.6 
 
0.0 -0.6 
 valueofhouse 0.0 -0.4 
 
0.0 -0.4 
 _cons -0.8 -0.7 
 
-0.8 -0.7 
               
       Number of obs 182 
  
Number of obs 182 
 Wald chi2(25) 85.75 
  
Wald chi2(25) 109.55 
 Prob > chi2 0 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
               
 * Significant at 10% level,   ** Significant at 5% level, and  *** Significant at 1%. 
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Summary 
Climate change, as a result of greenhouse gas emissions and ecosystem deterioration, 
is currently one of the planet’s main challenges. The forestry sector can play an 
important role in addressing this challenge because forests absorb large quantities of 
CO2. In addition, forests also provide economic, environmental, and sociocultural 
benefits. Several important international schemes are being implemented in 
developing countries to initiate afforestation and reforestation projects. The Chinese 
government is paying great attention to climate change and to green and sustainable 
economic development strategies. The forestry sector is a key focus in these 
strategies.  
However, China has experienced a number of difficulties in the 
implementation of national forestry programs. These include the “top-down” 
administrative approach, the lack of interagency cooperation and long-term planning, 
and poorly functioning market-based approaches. Furthermore, the government has 
neglected to engage local people in program implementation. Moreover, since 2003, 
China experienced a reform of forestland rights, where user rights of collective 
forestland are redistributed to individual households. As a result, understanding the 
interests and incentives of smallholders in forestry conservation programs is crucial 
to achieve the government’s pro-poor targets and to ensure benefits of these 
programs for the local population. 
 This research focuses on the institutional aspects of large-scale bioenergy and oil 
forestry programs and gives special attention to the smallholder implications. The 
general objective of this research is to investigate how the three institutions of 
property rights, the governance structure and farmer incentives affect the 
implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and whether and 
how these institutions determine farmers’ participation and benefits in these 
programs.  
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The research question has been investigated for two influential large-scale 
bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China (Jatropha and Camellia). Data was 
collected through secondary data collection, in-depth interviews with stakeholders, 
and farm household surveys. Through these methods, information and data were 
gathered about bioenergy and oil forestry policies, implementation and performance 
of the programs and the forest tenure reform process at different administrative levels. 
Farm household data was collected through questionnaires. The fieldwork on 
jatropha was carried out in Sichuan Province and Guangxi Province in 2010. The 
camellia fieldwork was undertaken in Jiangxi province in 2011. A valid sample of 
308 households from 30 villages was collected. The study has led to a number of 
interesting insights related to each of the three institutional aspects. 
First, good governance, which includes stakeholder participation, plays a 
crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. As forestry entails a 
long-term investment, how to set-up good and sustainable governance architecture is 
very important, but also challenging. The research shows that large-scale bioenergy 
and oil forestry programs in China are moving from government-organized, 
centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and multi-actor 
governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private 
actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and 
individual farmers. Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be 
distinguished as those driven and implemented by the government and those driven 
and implemented by market arrangements. As such, this structure confirms that new 
roles and interaction patterns between government and markets are present in 
contemporary transitional China. Another finding is that jatropha’s failure in China 
can be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor implementation and 
enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the withdrawal of 
a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed. 
Finally, convergent “time perspectives” of different actors in forestry institutional 
arrangements is important in the success of large-scale forestry programs. 
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The second set of results relates to the role of property rights and property 
rights reform. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest tenure in China. 
Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified in this research: Collective, 
Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual. The study indicates 
that the devolution process in tenure reform redistributed the user rights to local 
stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization process and the tenure 
reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms. Based on the New 
Property Rights Theory, it is hypothesized that the five forest tenure regimes differ in 
terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure 
security for farm households. The research findings confirm that in general tenure 
regimes with higher degrees of tenure security trigger higher household investment. 
Furthermore, the risk of future expropriation negatively affects farmers’ participation 
in forestry projects. 
Finally, the study addresses the question of farmer incentives and benefits. 
For large-scale forestry projects engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the 
success of the project, with respect to a balanced socio-economic development in 
poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. Forestry development potentially 
improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and poverty 
alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry 
programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical 
services, some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of 
farmers in the camellia program was only 37%. Moreover, the participation level 
varied among counties and villages, because farmers’ participation is still constrained 
by their capacity in terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. Finally, 
forestry programs generate different benefit distribution impacts on farm households 
under different forest project implementation regimes. Results show that five 
implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. Individual, 
Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own 
specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. 
Collective-individual, Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes 
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perform better in terms of program access and equal benefit distribution than 
Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the former three regimes, village 
leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit reducing the benefits to 
and marginal smallholders.  
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Samenvatting 
Klimaatsverandering, ten gevolge van de uitstoot van broeikasgassen en de schade 
aan ecosystemen, vormt momenteel een van de grootste uitdagingen voor onze 
planeet. De bosbouwsector kan een belangrijke bijdrage leveren om tegemoet te 
komen aan deze uitdaging omdat bossen grote hoeveelheden koolstofdioxide 
absorberen. Daarbovenop bieden bossen ook economische, ecologische en 
socio-culturele voordelen. In ontwikkelingslanden zijn verscheidene internationale 
programma’s opgezet om de aanbouw en heropbouw van bossen te stimuleren. Ook 
de Chinese overheid heeft het tegengaan van de klimaatsverandering en het opzetten 
van groene, duurzame ontwikkelingsstrategieën als prioriteit. De bosbouwsector 
speelt binnen deze strategieën een centrale rol. 
Een aantal factoren bemoeilijken echter de uitvoering van de nationale 
bosbouwprogramma’s in China, zoals de top-down administratieve aanpak, het 
gebrek aan samenwerking tussen agentschappen, het ontbreken van een 
lange-termijn planning, slechtfunctionerende marktmechanismen en een beperkte 
betrokkenheid van de lokale bevolking in de uitvoering van de programma’s. Een 
bijkomend element is de fundamentele landhervorming die sinds 2003 is 
doorgevoerd in China en waarbij collectieve gebruiksrechten van de grond 
herverdeeld zijn naar individuele huishoudens. Mede hierom is het cruciaal om een 
beter inzicht te krijgen in de rol, de motivatie en dus de voordelen van kleinschalige 
grondgebruikers in bosbouwprogramma’s om de doelstellingen van de overheid met 
betrekking tot armoedebestrijding te kunnen verwezenlijken. 
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de institutionele aspecten van grootschalige 
bosbouwprojecten voor bio-energie en -olie waarbij speciale aandacht wordt besteed 
aan de gevolgen voor kleinschalige grondgebruikers. De doelstelling van het 
onderzoek is om na te gaan hoe de drie instituties eigendomsrechten, governance en 
motivatie van landbouwers een invloed hebben op de uitvoering van grootschalige 
bosbouwprojecten voor bio-energie en -olie en met name hoe bepalend deze 
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instituties zijn voor de deelname aan en voordelen uit deze programma’s voor 
kleinschalige boeren. 
Deze onderzoeksvragen zijn onderzocht voor twee invloedrijke grootschalige 
bosbouwprojecten voor bio-energie en -olie in China (jatrophaen camellia). De 
onderzoeksmethodologie omvatte secundaire gegevensverzameling, interviews met 
stakeholders en een survey van landbouwhuishoudens. Door middel van deze 
methodes is op verschillende administratieve niveaus informatie verzameld over het 
beleid in de bosbouwsector voor bio-energie en olie, de uitvoering en resultaten van 
de programma’s en het landhervormingsproces. Landbouwhuishoudens werden 
persoonlijk bevraagd met behulp van vragenlijsten. Het veldonderzoek voor jatropha 
werd in 2010 uitgevoerd in de provincies Sichuan en Guangxi.Het camellia 
veldonderzoek werd uitgevoerd in de provincie Jiangxi in 2011. In totaal werden 308 
huishoudens bevraagd in 30 verschillende dorpen. Het onderzoek resulteerde in een 
aantal interessante bevindingen voor elk van de drie institutionale aspecten. 
Allereerst speelt een goede governance, waarbij stakeholders betrokken 
worden, een cruciale rol voor het succes van grootschalige bosbouwprojecten. Omdat 
bosbouw een lange-termijninvestering inhoudt, is het belangrijk – maar eveneens ook 
een uitdaging – om het beheer op een duurzame manier op te zetten. Het onderzoek 
toont aan dat grootschalige bosbouwprojecten in China evolueren van 
overheidsgestuurde, gecentralizeerde, top-down beheersstructuren naar governance 
structuren die meerdere niveaus en meerdere actoren omvatten, die meer door 
marktmechanismen gestuurd worden en waarin private actoren zoals bedrijven, 
NGOs, internationale organisaties, gemeenschappen en individuele boeren betrokken 
zijn. Grootschalige bosbouwprogramma’s voor bio-energie en -olie in China kunnen 
onderscheiden worden als deze die gestuurd en uitgevoerd worden door de overheid 
en deze gestuurd en uitgevoerd door marktmechanismen. Dit toont aan dat nieuwe 
patronen en vormen van interactie tussen overheid en markt ontstaan in het 
hedendaagse China. Een ander resultaat is dat het mislukken van de jatropha 
projecten in China in verband kan worden gebracht met de institutionele omgeving, 
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met name de gebrekkige uitvoering en opvolging van supervisie- en 
bestraffingsregels. Regels die het terugtrekken van een bedrijf moeten voorkomen en 
de uitvoering van dergelijke regels zijn belangrijk om de toewijding van bedrijven te 
garanderen. Tenslotte onderstreept deze studie ook het belang van een samenhang in 
de tijdsperspectieven van de verschillende actoren in een grootschalig 
bosbouwproject.  
Een tweede reeks van resultaten behandelt de eigendomsrechten met 
betrekking tot grond en met name de hervorming van deze eigendomsrechten. Het 
eigendomsrecht betreffende bosbouwgrond is drastisch hervormd in China sinds 
2003. In dit onderzoek werden vijf verschillende grondeigendomsregimes 
geïdentificeerd: collectief, collectief-individueel, bedrijfs, partnerschap en 
individueel. Met de de-collectivisering van eigendomsrechten zijn gebruiksrechten 
toegekend aan lokale stakeholders. Dit proces heeft geleid tot diversificatie in de 
beheersvormen. In navolging van de Nieuwe Eigendomsrechtentheorie, verschillen 
de vijf beheersvormen in residuele inkomens- en controlerechten watresulteert in 
verschillen in eigendomszekerheid voor landbouwhuishoudens. Het onderzoek 
bevestigt deze hypothese en vindt verder dat landbouwhuishoudens met een hogere 
eigendomszekerheid meer geneigd zijn tot investeren. Eigendomsonzekerheid, 
gemeten door het risico op onteigening, weerhoudt boeren er overigens van om deel 
te nemen aan de bosbouwprojecten die worden opgezet.  
Tenslotte kijkt deze studie ook naar de motivatie van landbouwers en de 
voordelen die zij uit de bosbouwprojecten halen. Het betrekken van kleinschalige 
grondgebruikers in bosbouwprojecten is cruciaal voor het succes van de projecten, 
met het oog op een evenwichtige socio-economische ontwikkeling in achtergestelde 
gebieden. De ontwikkeling van de bosbouwsector heeft potentieel positieve gevolgen 
voor de leefbaarheid van de rurale gebieden door het verhogen van de inkomens van 
landbouwhuishoudens. Armoedebestrijding is dan ook een belangrijke doelstelling in 
bosbouwprojecten voor bio-energie en -olie. Hoewel deze programma’s vaak 
financiële en technische steun bieden, blijkt de deelname van kleinschalige 
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grondgebruikers soms beperkt. Zo zijn slechts 37% van de ondervraagde 
huishoudens betrokken bij het camellia project. Deelname verschilt ook sterk tussen 
regio’s en dorpen omdat boeren beperkt worden door hun lage welvaartsniveau, 
beschikbare arbeid en opleiding. Een andere bevinding is dat bosbouwprogramma’s 
verschillende effecten hebben op huishoudens afhankelijk van het 
grondeigendomsregime. Eigendomsregimes verschillen in de mogelijkheden die 
huishoudens hebben om deel te nemen aan de programma’s maar ze verschillen ook 
op vlak van de verdeling van de voordelen. De collectieve, collectief-individuele en 
bedrijfsregimes bieden een gemakkelijkere toegang tot de projecten.Echter, in 
gevallen waar de hoofden van de gemeenschap betrokken zijn in de coördinatie 
tussen huishoudens en bedrijven, wordt de verdeling van voordelen soms als 
oneerlijk ervaren ten gevolge van corruptie. Deelname aan de bosbouwprojecten is 
moeilijker bij de grondeigendomsregimes partnerschap of individueel maar de 
verdeling van de voordelen wordt wel als transparant en eerlijkgezien. 
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